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Abstract
Insurance businesses for the cyberworld are an evolving opportunity. However, a
quantitative model in today’s security technologies may not be established. Besides,
a generalized methodology to assess the systematic risks remains underdeveloped.
There has been a technical challenge to capture intrusion risks of the cyber-physical
system, including estimating the impact of the potential cascaded events initiated by
the hacker’s malicious actions.
This dissertation attempts to integrate both modeling aspects: 1) steady-state prob-
abilities for the Internet protocol-based substation switching attack events based on
hypothetical cyberattacks, 2) potential electricity losses. The phenomenon of se-
quential attacks can be characterized using a time-domain simulation that exhibits
dynamic cascaded events. Such substation attack simulation studies can establish an
actuarial framework for grid operation.
The novelty is three-fold. First, the development to extend features of steady-state
probabilities is established based on 1) modified password models, 2) new models on
digital relays with two-step authentications, and 3) honeypot models. A generalized
stochastic Petri net is leveraged to formulate the detailed statuses and transitions
of components embedded in a Cyber-net. Then, extensive modeling of steady-state
xxix
probabilities is qualitatively performed. Methodologies on how transition probabili-
ties and rates are extracted from network components and actuarial applications are
summarized and discussed.
Second, dynamic models requisite for switching attacks against multiple substations
or digital relays deployed in substations are formulated. Imperative protection and
control models to represent substation attacks are clarified with realistic model pa-
rameters. Specifically, wide-area protections, i.e., special protection systems (SPSs),
are elaborated, asserting that event-driven SPSs may be skipped for this type of case
study.
Third, the substation attack replay using a proven commercially available time-
domain simulation tool is validated in IEEE system models to study attack com-
binations’ critical paths. As the time-domain simulation requires a higher computa-
tional cost than power flow-based steady-state simulation, a balance of both methods
is established without missing the critical dynamic behavior. The direct impact of
substation attacks, i.e., electricity losses, is compared between steady-state and dy-
namic analyses. Steady-state analysis results are prone to be pessimistic for a smaller
number of compromised substations.
Finally, simulation findings based on the risk-based metrics and technical implemen-




The year 2019 marked the tenth anniversary of enforcement for North America Elec-
tric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) com-
pliance [1]. The latest version of NERC CIP compliance represents an ongoing re-
finement in compliance derived from the first draft of CIP002-CIP009 in 2005 [2].
Security violations have been reported recently with fines [3]. Apparently, historical
events of cyber anomalies that are occurred over the past 15 years [4] are rooted in
the facts where many believe that these cyber-physical security issues in control cen-
ters and substations must be carefully planned for the imminent security threats. In
general, there are two groups of asset owners, i.e., ones would either aim to (1) ensure
100% compliance and move on with a minimum investment plan, or (2) comply with
a high desire to know how to invest and better protect their cyber-infrastructure with
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new security technologies. Although the current processes of compliance are thorough
and evidence-based, it does not adequately address specific technologies that would
enhance security measures to deter potential intrusions. This reflects systemic risk in
numbers that can be used for audits [5].
The convenient remote access to Internet Protocol (IP)-based substations elevates
security concerns [6, 7, 8]. It becomes a balancing decision between security and
maintenance as there are no perfect technologies to thwart uninvited “guests” ef-
fectively [9]. NERC CIP strongly recommends deploying an analytic of anomaly
detection features across all IP-based substations. Statistically, the anomalies are the
electronic evidence that sometimes can be used for forensic investigation, although
the downside would be being subject to tamper if attackers find out where the secu-
rity logs are stored. This source of security logging can be very useful in establishing
a security profile.
Direct security patches and updates are not permitted in a live control system. Hence,
the prevention of a cyber attack can be challenging, particularly with the increasing
number of unpatched software vulnerabilities that might not effectively reflect on
an organization’s security posture [10, 11]. One of the key countermeasures is risk
management that consists of the associated portfolios and assessment as well as the
emergency response. These residual risks require extraction within a cyber network
where this information can be consolidated and processed to make a meaningful
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conclusion for analysis of compliance. With digital protective relaying, the support
of IEC61850 can maximize the performance and reliability of the control system
[12, 13]. The new deployment of IP-based intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) can
post a security threat to be manipulated by attackers [14, 15, 16, 17].
One security technology that may not be well integrated into critical infrastructure as
part of the security solutions is the honeypots/honeynet framework. Such technology
has been used to cope with the malware that is a source of spreading security threats
[18, 19]. Generally, the honeynet is a fictitious network that consists of a virtual fire-
wall and servers (honeypots) that can be rephrased as a fake network representation,
i.e., a decoy. The honeynet was not widely used as compared to the intrusion detec-
tion system (IDS); honeynet can be a steppingstone to facilitate unauthorized access
and to spread worms. The malware becoming apparent that can be automated to
increase the trial-and-error rate to discover network architecture details and entities
within a network. This can be revealed through their unauthorized access and foot-
print. On the contrary, the current countermeasure may not be adopted in a more
proactive manner to promote risk awareness, although honeynet can be a technology
for deployment [20].
The overarching question here is that how the stakeholder community would conform
to a systematic evaluation of the cyber system based on the discrete events of intrusion
processes and modeling of hypothetical disruptive attacks at the substations. The
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primary contribution of this work is to establish an actuarial framework to measure
the systemic risk of the cyber system based on security technologies deployed in IP-
based substations using four Petri net models: firewall, password, IED, and honeynet
models. This work is connected with a discussion in the later section based on industry
practice in security logging and how this can be beneficial to redefine grid security.
1.1 Systemic Risk Modeling and Contributions
Fig. 1.1 shows how systemic risk can be formulated based on countermeasure, tech-
nologies, and methods. This dissertation establishes a comprehensive elaboration of
modified and updated cyber-net with new models of IEDs and the honeypot/honeynet
connecting the modified password and firewall models, as shown in Fig. 1.2.
Prevention
Systemic Risk
 with new configuration in 
Observe anomaly 






















Figure 1.1: Systemic risk modeling and anomaly data synthesis [21]
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The switching attack that opens circuit breakers at substations may be performed not
only via local substation supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), but also
through direct IED connections compromised that enables plotting for cyber-physical
system (CPS) switching attacks (see pink arrows pointing to substations in Fig. 1.3).
It is noted that the CPS in the power grid consists of a cyber system and a physical
system. The cyber system represents control and protection systems in the power
system highlighted in orange (Fig. 1.3).
Figure 1.2: Interdependencies of abstracted models in a cyber-net [21]
Figure 1.3: Systemic risk modeling and anomaly data synthesis
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Hackers’ targets are power equipment, and they often want to deenergize them or
incur operational issues to cause power outages.Generally speaking, hackers need two
steps to make this happen.The first step is to crack protection and control systems in
the cyber system, highlighted by orange in Fig. 1.3.The second step is to send false
commands or signals to the targeted system, illustrated in the pink arrows in Fig.
1.3. Therefore, the hacker attacks both the cyber system and the physical system.
Such attacks are called coordinated attacks.
Capturing the intrusion processes and behaviors of attackers within the private net-
works with security technologies of defender should be characterized in formalism for
the description of concurrency and synchronization for the computational problems
[22, 23]. For decades, the Petri net is utilized as an automaton to model between
finite-state and machines as well as to analyze the capabilities [24]. In a more recent
development on the cyber-physical system for the power grid, a preliminary model
establishment using the steady-state probability was introduced [25, 26].
The disruptive switching substation attack through the server is modeled; however,
the switching attack through IEDs such as digital protective relays is not explic-
itly modeled. The latest security technology, such as new security policies, can be
incorporated.
Other applications also gain attention in this subject and extend research in perfor-
mance evaluation, such as the control system in the nuclear power station [27], the
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energy control center [28], the impact analysis of the intrusion detection, and the
response of cyber-physical systems [29]. References [27, 28, 29, 30] adopt a Petri net
model mainly to derive the reliability and availability of the system for the cyberat-
tack. Although emerging issues on cyber insurance are discussed in [30, 31, 32, 33, 34],
none of those references for the other applications discusses the probability of disrup-
tive switching attack upon a compromised substation from the actuarial point of
view.
A similar type of attack has been addressed as a cyber-physical switching or system
reconfiguration attack [35, 36]. A compromise of the controllers for a generating
unit is also categorized as a switching attack [37, 38]. The influence of such attacks
reflecting grid vulnerability is clarified using the sliding mode trajectory [35, 36].
Such detection of anomalies can be achieved through game-theoretic analysis or the
multiple-model inference algorithms [37, 38].
The recent research studies for cyber-physical switching attacks highlight a coordi-
nated attack that consists of the false data injection attack, reconfiguration attack,
and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. Considerable coordinated attacks
are the plot against multiple component failures through a compromised network that
connecting multiple components, such as lines or substations. With the coordination
of the DDoS attack, there are combinations of attack scenarios that can be translated
into false data injection attacks on wrong measurements of generators, lines, or loads.
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It is common to relate bi-level modeling for the Load Redistribution (LR) attack,
bi-level model for coordination of LR attack, and all sorts of other attacks [39]. Such
strategies can lead to an optimal strategy with well-coordinated planning by attackers
that can potentially weaken grid operating conditions [39].
Among those possible coordinated switching attacks, this dissertation focuses on the
coordinated attack against substations because the impact of this type of cyberattack
becomes larger than others (Table 1.1). It should be noted that this dissertation does
not explicitly demonstrate the false data injection attack nor denial of information
access. However, those are indirectly included in the proposed Petri net model as
the probabilities, which will hereinafter be explicated. The first contribution of this
dissertation is to elaborate on the steady-state probability for a cyber-physical attack
at any IP-based substations, i.e., the probability will converge over a long time upon
successful intrusions to the internal networks.
Table 1.1
Substation component


















Low possibility High possibility
Var compensator Substation Low possibility Low possibility
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Figure 1.4: Coordinated cyberattacks and large-scale blackout
The hackers’ main purpose is to make people trouble on a nation-wide level. There-
fore, they spend time and energy to hack into substation systems first. Then, open
multiple circuit breakers connected to the substation. If a customer’s feeder is di-
rectly connected to the substation, that customer loses electricity. However, some
substation attacks can cause cascaded failure (in other words, domino effect) in the
power system. That means we eventually have a large-scale power outage (Fig. 1.4).
There are increasing cyber-related events in the ”power system field” as well as other
fields such as data breach news on social medias or famous credit companies. How-
ever, many power engineers believed that cyberattack driven power outage would not
happen. The Ukraine’s blackout in 2015 became a trigger to realize that cyberat-
tacks actually cause a large-scale power outage (Table 1.2). The cyber-related events
in power grids are rigorously showcased in [40].
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Table 1.2
Cyber-related events in power systems
Date Target and cyberattack type Country
2003 A nuclear power plant U.S.A.
Feb. 2011 A power plant management system Brazil
2013-2014 Stuxnet-like attack (against over 1000 energy companies) 84 Counties
2014 A Large US Power Company’s Automatic Voltage Regulator U.S.A.
Dec. 2015 BlackEnergy malware attack against regional power companies* Ukraine
Dec. 2016 Industroyer malware attack against regional power companies* Ukraine
May 2017
Ransomware against India’s West Bengal State
Electricity Distribution Company
India
2017 Cyber attack petrochemical power plant Saudi Arabia
2019 Power grid cyberattack in western interconnection U.S.A.
2020 IT network of ENTSO-E 35 countries in EU
* cyberattacks that cause large-scale power outages
In light of this, power companies worldwide seemed to revisit the cybersecurity re-
inforcement plan in their power systems. unlikely to be proactive to invest in se-
curity matters without the government’s requirement. The typical approach is to
apply extrinsic motivations to power companies, establishing more strict cybersecu-
rity standards with compliance tests (Fig. 1.5). However, facilitating their intrinsic
motivations can also be a promising approach (Fig. 1.5). Then, the concept of the
cyber-insurance framework emerges.
Figure 1.5: Extrinsic and intrinsic motivation for cybersecurity improve-
ment
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If we assume that the cyber-insurance framework is available, power companies can
reduce the insurance premium. Once they showcase new advanced cybersecurity
technologies, they improve the security level (Fig. 1.6). When the installation and
operating costs for the new technologies meet with the premium saving, power com-
panies can spontaneously employ the new cybersecurity technologies regardless of
the standards. As such, the cyber-insurance framework can urge power companies
to reinforce the cybersecurity level effectively. Besides, this framework can evolve
cybersecurity standards even faster.
Although health insurance and car insurance are a widely known business, no cy-
ber insurance of power grids is in not used. To establish a feasible cyber-insurance
Figure 1.6: Mechanism of cybersecurity improvement with cyber-insurance
framework
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framework against power systems, the accurate estimation of the cyber-risk with its
corresponding impact is mission-critical (Fig. 1.7). However, the risk analysis and
the impact analysis of the cyber insurance framework are incredibly challenging and
sill in infancy.
In the power grid’s impact, electricity loss (or loss of electricity) is the most criti-
cal indicator because electricity loss is directly linked to economic loss/impact. As
mentioned earlier, the cascaded events that are not from cyberattacks can addition-
ally occur in the power system. The steady-state analysis does not always properly
capture the process of the dynamic aspect of cascaded events. Therefore, dynamic
simulations play a key role for the impact analysis.
As mentioned earlier, the first contribution of this work is developing a cyber-net
Figure 1.7: Mechanism of cybersecurity improvement with cyber-insurance
framework
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Figure 1.8: Contribution of this work
model that describes cyberattacks not only for the SCADA but also for IEDs (Fig.
1.8). The second contribution is to establish the analysis of substation attacks using a
time-domain simulation tool instead of steady-state analysis [41, 42] (Fig. 1.8). The
reviewed articles are related to coordinated cyberattacks and cyber-insurance in the
power system.
1.2 Literature Review
Risk analysis and cyberattack: In the risk analysis, a way of intruding the
control and protection system in the grid needs to be hypothesized. Among the
enormous hacker’s measures to intrude, the coordinated cyberattacks are extracted
for rigorous review. Coordinated cyberattacks are known as the main reason for
Ukraine’s cyberattack in 2015 [43]. Since this incident, coordinated cyberattacks are
the most significant concern for large-scale blackouts.
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Impact analysis and electricity loss: In the power grid’s impact, electricity
loss (or loss of electricity) is the most critical indicator because electricity loss is
directly linked to economic loss/impact. Then, approaches to the impact analysis for
cyberattacks are exhaustively investigated.
Finally, the state-of-the-art research studies on the actuarial framework of cyberse-
curity on the power grid are reviewed.
Categorization Each article is intensively showcased, grouping them. The adopted
categorization with its criteria is sorted out (Table 1.3).
In the first category, the automatic generation control (AGC) manipulates generators
and indirectly affects customers. Disconnecting customers result in the power cut.
The second category, protective relays, can cause the substation-wide outage. Because
Table 1.3
Categorication and its criteria































Blackout scales can be different
depending on the countermeasure.
X X 3
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both generators and loads (i.e., customers) can be removed from the power system,
the partial or whole blackout is inevitable. The third category, sequential attack,
intentionally performs cascaded events, disconnecting critical power equipment one
by one. The hacker’s cascaded disconnection is highly likely to provoke the real
cascaded events, which leads to blackouts. The fifth category assumes a certain level
of the blackout to show the performance of the countermeasure. Therefore, this
category is indirectly related to blackouts.
Paper selection: The IEEE publishes most of the reviewed articles. Eighteen
papers are downloaded from the IEEE website, while two papers are from the Elsevier
website. The selected papers were mostly published in the range of 2018-2020. The
early access papers are proactively reviewed to catch up with state-of-the-art research
studies.
1.2.1 Coordinated Effort in Plotting an Attack
A wide variety of combinations are leveraged for the coordinated attack studies. The
fundamental concept is a mixture of an attack against physical electric components
(e.g., transmission line, generator) and another attack against cyber components (e.g.,
generation control systems and SCADA systems). However, no paper had curated
the patterns of coordinated cyberattacks.
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Xiang et al. [44] performed the first attempt to overview the studied patterns of coor-
dinated cyberattacks. Reference [44] analyzes the cyber-physical security in the grid
to prevent future coordinated attacks against power systems and proposes probable
coordinated attack scenarios. In light of the limited source about possible coordi-
nated attack scenarios with detailed mathematical modeling, the authors highlight
two typical attack coordination examples: the coordination between load redistribu-
tion (LR) attack and attacking generators; and the coordination between LR attack
and attacking transmission lines. The bilevel optimization [45] formulates the two
coordinated attacks. 1) At the upper level, hackers attempt to maximize load loss.
2) At the lower level, grid operators strive to minimize load loss. The case studies
in a modified IEEE 14-bus system [46] demonstrate how coordinated attacks can po-
tentially lead to a power outage. Also, it shows that coordinated attacks could cause
a larger blackout scale than standalone attacks. This paper also provides beneficial
tips for countermeasures on preventing and mitigating coordinated attacks based on
those results. For example, protecting critical measurements or devices only works to
mitigate the impact of the false data injection attack.
This article is extremely beneficial to get a big picture of the coordinated attack in
the cyber-physical power system because different engineers have different coordinated
attack patterns (Fig. 1.9). The authors listed up the possible combinations of the
coordinated attack shown below:
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Figure 1.9: Power system operation and attacks [44]
• Multiple line attack
• Multiple substation attack
• Line attack with DDoS attack
• Generator attack with false data injection attack
• Line attack with changing relay settings (i.e., with configuration change attack)
• Load redistribution (LR) attack with line attack
Despite the detailed review of the Ukraine cyberattacks at multiple substations, the
coordinated attack that consists of the switching attack and the DDoS attack is out
of scope in the case study. Besides, the employed power flow-based analysis passes
over the power system dynamics, resulting in a large error when calculating electricity
loss.
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1.2.2 Deceiving the control of AGC
The automatic generation control (AGC) is a grid-wide control system that can sig-
nificantly impact the whole interconnected grid. Among the reviewed papers, three
scholarly articles study the coordinated cyberattack against the AGC.
Article 1: Liu and Wang [47] face the cybersecurity issue with the internal threat.
Reference [47] studies the load redistribution attack with insider threats to combat
the cyberattack associated with the data breach (i.e., the data integrity attack). The
studied insider threat is the information leakage of the system operator’s defense
strategy. The leaked information is assumed to be acquired by the intruder and
leveraged by other attackers. The proposed ”security resource allocation” game model
formulates the insider’s information leakage and maximizes the operator and the
attacker’s rewards. The IEEE 14-bus and 118 bus systems’ case studies indicate
the system operator’s defense action’s severity to mitigate the load redistribution
attack. Moreover, the case study provides the following useful insights to grasp the
data breach’s impact on the steady-state condition. 1) The information leakage of the
defense strategy provides a significant advantage to attackers, increasing the expected
reward, especially before operators notice the data breach. 2) The damage on the
grid can be enormous even by the subtle data breach. The operators’ reward analysis
also clarifies that an increase in the security resource can be a cybersecurity measure
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to alleviate the insider threat’s LR attacks.
The authors achieved great success that the attacker and operator’s mixed strategies
at the Nash Equilibrium of the game enable us to formulate and solve the mini-
max (or min-max) problem. However, the aforementioned two insights can be easily
anticipated qualitatively without case studies. Moreover, the leaked data is energy
consumption only. Therefore, the contribution is somehow limited. Reference [44]
contrasts the impact of LR attacks with and without AGC/LFC information. To
offer better findings to readers, the authors should elaborate more on the sensitivity
analysis considering a wide variety of data breach types.
Article 2: Chen et al. [48] examine the impact of the load redistribution (LR)
attack against the load frequency control (LFC) system with the load (manipulation)
attack to elaborate more on the combined attack’s impact. The authors maximize
the combined attack’s impact in terms of the minimum cost (least-effort attack) per-
spective and the maximum power imbalance (maximizing frequency disruption via a
change in generation and loads) perspective, respectively. Also, they contrast the im-
pact with and without the availability of the LFC system information. The proposed
optimal coordinated attack scheme consists of the critical load bus identification for
the load manipulation and the optimal attack sequence design. A developed preven-
tion measure is based on the proposed optimal cyberattack scenarios with newly pro-
posed threshold-based detection methods. The case studies provide two new findings.
19
1) cyberattack performances incredibly vary with different attack objectives (as the
time to the frequency violation decreases, the attack cost exponentially increases); 2)
the proposed threshold-based detection methods to cope with the coordinated attack
can screen out the compromised signals.
This article presents an exceptional work, clarifying the remaining work in the LR
attack topic. Compromising the LFC can fluctuate the system frequency broadly.
However, it is unlikely to cause blackouts unless all loads are manipulated. The
authors set 0.5 Hz as the frequency excursion level, which is not controversial because
such threshold values vary depending on countries and grid size. However, LFC is not
only the frequency control in the power grid. We also need to consider the emergency
control that stabilizes the grid frequency stability. Therefore, the derived impact
through the simulation study is not accurate enough (i.e., it is not realistic).
Article 3: Fu et al. [49] yield a sequential coordinated attack framework for the
power grid to analyze the cyber risk against the combination of the switching attack
over the transmission lines and the load redistribution (LR) attack (or false data
injection attack) for the automatic generation control (AGC) system. The cascaded
line tripping model based on the Oak Ridge-Pserc-Alaska (OPA) model [50] represents
the sequence of cyberattacks (i.e., line tripping attacks). The well-known bilevel
model emulates the LR attack. The objective function and constraints of the model
are modified to obtain severer cascaded failure with power outages. The Q-learning
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based solution algorithm that the authors employ identifies the severest sequential
coordinated attack scenario. According to the simulation study with the IEEE 39-
bus system [51, 52], the proposed sequential coordinated attack tends to cause more
extensive power outage than the line tripping attack only due to evolving cascaded
events.
The novelty of this article is to copes with the three things simultaneously: 1) A
physical attack (transmission line tripping), 2) A cyber attack (load redistribution
attack delivering the false control signal to the generation dispatching control system),
3) A sequence of attacks (line tripping events). However, the physical attack is not
always the transmission line outage, but transformer outages and generator outages.
Also, cascaded events toward power outages are analyzed using only a power flow-
based approach. In other words, the dynamic behavior in the power grid during the
cascaded event is ignored.
Impact indicator in 3 articles In terms of the impact of the hypothesized coor-
dinated cyberattack, [47] considers only steady-state conditions without the impact
of cascaded events. In other words, the difference between the economic dispatch and
the load tripping cost is treated as the economic loss along with the operational loss
and load loss. Reference [48] determines the whole system collapse using a threshold
value of the frequency level. Reference [49] accounts for the number of separate lines
as the impact. Only [48] deals with electricity loss as the impact indicator. Overall,
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compromising only the AGC is unlikely to cause a large-scale power outage.
1.2.3 Manipulating the Protective Relays
Protections play an essential role in isolating targeted power equipment to prevent
it from damage. That means protective relays disconnect the power equipment from
the power system. Such power equipment loss can be a trigger of electricity loss
along with cascaded events. Among reviewed papers, three articles cover this topic
of compromising relays.
Article 1: Hong et al. [53] present an ICT layer-based and power grid domain-
based mitigation method to detect and alleviate cyberattacks on substation automa-
tion systems. The developed mitigation method tackles the hacker’s malicious action
on opening circuit breakers (CBs) via a configuration change attack (by changing
line protection settings), sensor data injection attack, and a direct CB control attack.
The established protection coordination cross-checks principle detects the configura-
tion change attack. The proposed transient fault signature-based cross-correlation
coefficient algorithm points out the false sampled values data injection attack. The
power grid-domain-based mitigation method clarifies the impact of nuisance CB op-
eration (mainly overloading) before its action to obviate potential cascading failures
due to a human error. The hypothesized intrusion scenario to the digital substation
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is emulated in a testbed (consisting of a HIL simulation with commercially available
IEDs and an RTDS) to validate the proposed substation attack mitigation method’s
performance. The proposed method showed excellent performance.
Although this article demonstrates the promising anti-cyber attack functionalities,
only one type of protection and communication protocol is studied. In other words,
the developed method’s verification is limited to a single component level, not the
system-wide level. For instance, the coordinated attack on multiple IEDs is treated
as future work. Besides, the cybersecurity level improvement is mostly qualitatively
explained. For example, the blackout scale caused by the malicious CB operation is
not quantitatively clarified. Although the authors use the testbed for the validation,
the justification of the proposed method is limited.
Article 2: Khaw et al. [54] describe a deep learning-based anomaly detection sys-
tem to protect distance protections from false tripping cyberattacks to protect the
power grid from potential cascaded failure. The authors tackle the following three
cyberattack scenarios. 1) false data injection attack, 2) replay attack, 3) integrity
attack via relay tap manipulation. The time-domain simulation with a wide variety
of loading levels of generators and fault locations is used to train the autoencoder via
the deep-learning algorithm [55]. The applied fault type is a three-phase fault only.
The trained autoencoder can identify the malicious data (i.e., voltage, and current),
mitigating the false data injection attack. The case studies exhibit 100% accuracy
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against the false data injection attack and relay tap manipulation attack. On the
other hand, the technical challenge remains for the replay attack.
This article adopts an anomaly detection approach instead of a misuse detection
approach, taking into account the stealthy nature of cyberattacks in the power grid.
Because the fault characteristics are highly likely to change due to the increasing
penetration of renewable energies, the anomaly detection approach must be more
promising. Although the undertaking technical challenge has similarities to [53], the
replay attack is newly studied. However, as mentioned in the article, only a balanced
fault is considered for the training datasets. Because over half of the fault type across
the globe is the single-line-to-ground fault, the authors should cover the unbalanced
fault. Besides, the tap position change is highly unlikely to happen while using
it, according to my best knowledge. The system operators usually change the tap
position only when that relay is out of service. Therefore, relays must be equipped
with an interlocking function so that tap positions cannot change under an operating
condition. Therefore, the relay tap manipulation attack may be out of scope.
Article 3: Chattopadhyay et al. [56] reveal the impact of an implementation attack
on substations to highlight the substations’ security analysis gap. The authors pro-
vide an overview of potential exploits clarifying security issues and dominant attacks
against IEDs and substations. The differential power analysis, voltage/frequency
scaling, fault injection, and malware attacks are significant concerns for IEDs. In
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contrast, GPS spoofing, Ethernet switch attack, SCADA attack, and WLAN attack
are the concern for substations. The authors perform two detailed case studies on
malicious false injection attack and hardware attack. The instruction attack is clari-
fied as the typical false injection attack with low-cost. Two possible countermeasures
are exhibited with the pros and cons. The first one, with instruction redundancy, de-
lays the reaction time but avoid increasing the cost of IEDs. On the other hand, the
second one that requires an additional sensor increases the cost but keep the reaction
time within the permissible range. The authors emphasize the difficulty in protec-
tion against the hardware attack because such an attack is designed to be dormant,
causing slow degradation of the relay performance.
This article is incredibly informative and provides much practical and fruitful in-
formation not only for relay engineers but also for cybersecurity engineers. Unlike
standard journal papers, the novelty and creativity of this article are subtle. How-
ever, the authors show off professional knowledge as a relay engineer with plenty of
observation of the attack process against the protective relay in-depth. Although
this article covers the cyberattack’s impact on the substation level, most discussions
are limited to the IED level. Therefore, this article falls short of elaborating on the
impact on substations, especially the process of spreading influence.
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Impact indicator in 3 articles All three references develop a mitigation approach
that directly or indirectly detects malicious action and blocks the false tripping. Ref-
erence [53] prevents a substation (automation) from:
• Configuration change attack (to change relay settings),
• False data injection attack (to change measured data),
• Switching attack (to operate circuit breakers),
while [54] prevents a distance relay from:
• False data injection attack (to change measured data),
• Replay attack (to change fault characteristics),
• Integrity attack (to change relay taps).
Reference [56] discusses hardware attacks as well as the false injection attack. No
articles deal with the impact on the power grid, mainly because establishing the
effective mitigation method is the most significant interest in those researches. It




Sequential attack events often cause large-scale blackouts along with cascaded grid
events. Among the reviewed papers, four scholarly articles study the sequential co-
ordinated cyberattack. It is noted that [49] also covers the cyberattack against the
transmission line.
Article 1: Paul et al. [57] analyze the impact of the sequence of cyberattacks on
the blackout scale, examining the learning parameters of cyberattack strategies for
combating the hackers on the energy sectors. Authors adopt the learning-based game-
theoretic approach [58] with the multistage sequential game to interpret the dynamic
sequence of events and determine the worst cyberattack scenario and the most ef-
fective defense policy. A commercially available time-domain simulation tool, named
Power World simulator, reproduce the learned cyberattack scenario, illustrating how
the switching action (i.e., disconnecting transmission lines one by one) disrupts the
grid operation accompanying the voltage violation, frequency violation, and overload-
ing. This paper serves as a case study in the IEEE 39-bus system [51, 52] that proved
that the learning process improves the defense strategy. The obtained new findings
can make the grid security more robust and reliable against the cyberattack.
To my best knowledge, this article is the only source to demonstrate the time-domain
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simulation results for the sequential cyberattack. Because the used models are a
dynamic simulation model of the Power World simulator, the synchronous generator’s
obtained dynamic behavior during the cascaded events is sufficiently accurate. On
the other hand, the protective relays, such as over frequency protections, are not
modeled. Therefore, other dynamics caused by protection operations are missing in
this paper. Also, the switching action targets are limited to line tripping. However,
transformer outages and generator outages can have a more significant impact on
power system stability.
Article 2: Zhang et al. [59] evaluate sequential cyber-topological attacks on cyber-
physical systems to figure out the critical sequence of cyberattacks that can lead to
cascading outage. The studied sequential attack is a coordinated intrusion attack
to grid branches with the false command injection attack and distributed denial of
service attack. An established coordinated attack process clarifies a mechanism with a
probability analysis considering the different timescales. The used tree-layout Markov
decision process model illustrates the cyberattack patterns/sequences, assisting in
identifying the minimal attack sequences that cause blackouts. The proposed pattern
concept that consists of critical combinations of attack events significantly compresses
the storage of risky attack sequences. The established search strategy dynamically
selects the next attack target, gradually increasing the search depth, which reduced
the heavy computation burden. The AC power flow-based case study in the IEEE
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39-bus system [51, 52] exhibits the proposed strategy’s outstanding performance with
the successful extraction of representative attack patterns.
This article provides a clue as to reducing the exhaustive enumeration of attack
scenarios. Therefore, the proposed scheme is beneficial only when we take a wild guess
using the power flow-based approach. However, the actual cyber-physical system
contains power system dynamics. For example, the rotor dynamics of synchronous
generators, various voltage and frequency controllers’ responses in the grid, and a wide
variety of protective relay operations significantly affect the load loss scale. Without
those dynamic aspects, we cannot correctly represent the real power system behavior
during cascading outages. In other words, the power flow-based wild guess of the load
loss includes an enormous error.
Article 3: Wang et al. [60] mine frequent attack patterns consisting of cyber attack
sequences and physical attack events to estimate the hacker’s attack process on the
entire electric power cyber-physical system (CPS). The authors define a coordinated
attack as a mixture of cyber and physical attacks, assuming that the cyberattack
always comes first. The fuzzy C-means clustering algorithm extracts the cyber-related
events from the collected alarm logs. The developed algorithm based on the temporal-
causal Bayesian network [61] recognizes the cyberattack sequences. The combination
of physical attack event criteria algorithm detects the physical attack events using
the characteristic curves of different attack measurement data in physical space. The
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proposed coordinated network attack sequential pattern mining algorithm with the
frequent pattern tree finds out the hidden multi-step attack patterns as well as the
frequent patterns of attack sequences. The testbed to which the established method
was implemented proved that the cyber-physical attack was tracked effectively and
efficiently.
The authors did fantastic work to reveal the attack process in cyber and physical
spaces. The developed temporal-topological correlation-based algorithm successfully
improves the validity of the entire cyber-physical attack. No prior knowledge to
create the rules associated with the method enables us to be practical use more
smoothly. However, the detection algorithm against the physical attack remains room
to be improved because we cannot differentiate between the three situations regardless
of using the temporal-topological correlation: 1) abnormal phenomena caused by
hackers, 2) abnormal phenomena caused by power equipment failure, measurement
device failure, and communication equipment failure, 3) abnormal phenomena caused
by the power engineer’s manipulation of the equipment during its maintenance.
Article 4: Sun et al. [62] develop a coordinated cyberattacks detection system
on the grid to overcome the coordinated attack that the existing measure cannot
resolve. The coordinated cyberattack here is the sequential (multiple) substation
attacks. The developed detection system identifies relations among abnormal behav-
ior patterns (e.g., intrusion detection system alarms, firewall logs), geography data
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(e.g., geographic attack location), and substations’ criticality. The created ”time fail-
ure propagation graph” model with the ”Fuzzy cognitive map” model calculates the
state value in each phase of the attack process. The developed system (CCADS)
delivers an alarm when the state value mentioned above continuously increases, in-
forming the coordinated cyberattack in the designated grid. The simulation using
a cyber-physical security testbed validates the online applicability for the proposed
CCADS. The proposed CCADS can be used for the online detection of a cyber attack.
The authors address the room to improve the detection efficiency and response time
for real-time operation.
This article runs the time-domain simulation using a commercially available tool
named DIgSILENT that has been widely used in power companies in the EU. There-
fore, the dynamic behavior caused by the sequence of the hacker’s disruptive switch-
ing actions can be demonstrated more accurately compared to many other research
studies. However, this article does not cover the grid side resilience (i.e., system
protection, or SPS). For example, in low voltage/frequency, the undervoltage or un-
derfreuqency load shedding system activates to take corrective actions, recovering the
grid stability. Such systems are called remedial action schemes and are widely used
in most of the advanced countries. Therefore, grid self-healing capability is missing,
which results in the pessimistic result in this article.
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Impact indicator in 4 articles Pertaining impact of the coordinated cyberattack,
only [57] addresses electricity loss in the entire system. The rest three articles mainly
pursue shortening the time to detect anomaly status [62] or critical attack patterns
[59, 60].
1.2.5 Countermeasures Against Sophisticated Attacks
The following four articles deal with the countermeasure for coordinated cyberattacks.
The first two papers aim to strengthen the resilience against cyberattacks. The rest
two papers invent the mitigation strategy to contain the influence of cyberattacks on
the power grid.
Article 1: Liu and Wang [63] create a grid topology optimization scheme to en-
hance the power system resilience against cyber-physical attacks, i.e., coordinated
attacks. The cyberattack here covers the switching attack on power stations and
substations. In contrast, the physical attack denotes immobilizing transmission lines
(via a transmission tower collapse, for example). A developed bi-level optimization
model formulates the coordinated cyber-physical attacks against the power grids de-
composing the upper level for the attack and the lower level for the grid recovery. A
developed networked topology optimization (NTO) model [64] mitigates the cyber-
physical attacks and strengthens the power systems’ resilience. Case studies in the
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modified IEEE 57-bus [65] and 118-bus systems [66] illustrate the impacts of coor-
dinated cyber-physical attacks, validating the proposed NTO approach. The three
resilience indicators (comprising a competence of electricity supply against a cyber-
attack, the same competence from the attack event to the full grid recovery, the grid
recovery time) proved that the proposed NTO-based mitigation strategy effectively
reduced the total load loss caused by the coordinated cyber-physical attacks. The
case studies also justified that decreased load loss and grid recovery time are smaller
than those derived by the conventional two methods, i.e., optimal re-dispatch and
optimal transmission switching based methods.
To my best knowledge, the transmission tower collapse by a human attack happened
only once in Japan over the last fifty years. The probability of such a physical attack is
extremely low. On the other hand, the cyberattack on power stations and substations
are highly likely to increase. The assumed combination of the coordinated attack is
getting more unrealistic, especially in the future. Besides, the proposed strategy
may be applied only for the breaker-and-a-half configuration busbar. Although the
authors insist that this busbar structure is widely used globally, this structure is not
dominant in many countries due to the larger space and higher cost. Therefore, the
applicable grid must be quite limited.
Article 2: Touhiduzzaman et al. [67] determine the optimal allocation of the secu-
rity mechanism diversity that minimizes security vulnerabilities to the grid to protect
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the power system against coordinated substation attacks. The authors hypothesize
the zero-day attack compromising the substation control system and disconnecting
the targeted substations when the security hole remains before updating the software
packages. The authors create a security graph model to represent the hacking process
to substations in the cyber system. The threat model [68] disconnects substations
via a zero-day attack. The physical system model [25] exhibits the loss of electricity,
i.e., power outage scale for each substation attack. The game-theoretic graph color-
ing technique [69] optimizes the deployment of software packages from cybersecurity
perspectives. The case study exhibits how the diversity strategy reduces the risk of
substation cyberattacks using the IEEE-118 bus system [66] as well as the IEEE-14
[46] bus system.
Although this work successfully shows the importance of proper diversity strategy to
mitigate substation cyberattacks’ risk, the assumed impact after hacking substations
is represented as the load loss for the designated substation attack. The hacking
probabilities are borrowed from another source [25]. Because [25] employs the power
flow-based approach to derive the blackout size, the dynamic aspect during the cas-
caded failure/event is missing. This article addresses that a diversity strategy includes
diversifying relay manufacturers. However, we cannot fully consider this action’s ef-
fect because diversifying relay manufacturers can decrease electricity loss for the same
substation attack.
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Article 3: Li et al. [70] explore the vulnerability of a coordinated cyber-physical
attack on the power grid to establish a countermeasure protection strategy within
the constrained budget. The coordinated attack here comprises a physical and a cy-
ber one. The first attack denotes the line disconnection. The second attack consists
of the load (redistribution) attack and topology preserving attack. The second one
masks the line event to evolve the deterioration of grid stability. The proposed new
sensitivity factor, named generalized generation shift factor, depicts the sensitivity of
power flow over the line to the bus injection. This sensitivity is used to derive the
cyberattak’s impact. The bi-level ”mixed-integer linear programming” [71] formu-
lation successfully identifies the most disruptive and invisible physical attack under
the designated constraint. The case study indicates that a well-coordinated physical
attack poses the topology-preserving attack, which incurs the severest grid impact. It
is noted that the heavy computation burden for the use of the bi-level model, pointing
out the increasing difficulty in applying the proposed approach for the larger grid.
The authors also address that the offered protection strategy remains the technical
challenge, although establishing the strategy per se is the final goal.
This article combats a challenging topic that has never been attempted. However,
the employed severity indicator of the coordinated attack is the power flow over the
transmission line only. Then, the authors discuss the overloading level. All transmis-
sion lines have a short-term rating and long-term rating. Whether the overloaded line
is an issue depends on how long it takes to resolve the overloading condition via the
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configuration change. The different loading level of the unit brings to a different time
to complete the required configuration change. Therefore, so many essential system
constraints are missing in this article. Besides, the authors use the wrong language for
the ”load redistribution.” The meaning of ”load” here is a generator’s load, not the
customer’s energy consumption. Such misuse can incur the reader’s misconception.
Article 4: Lakshminarayana et al. [72] devise a moving-target defense strategy to
combat the coordinated cyber-physical attack in the power grid. The studied coor-
dinated attack comprises the false data injection attack to provoke a physical distur-
bance and the concealment of the false data to have grid operators not recognized.
The core of the moving-target defense strategy is to oscillate the transmission line
reactances via distributedly deployed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS)
devices all the time. Hackers cannot get to know the perturbed impedance before/-
during the attack process. Therefore, the proposed moving-target defense scheme
can detect the cyberattack, confirming no perturbed aspect in the measured data.
The authors design the moving-target defense using two steps. 1) The graph theory
derives the minimum subset of links for the D-FACT device deployment that cov-
ers attacks against all edges. 2) The game-theory identifies the best subset of links
(within the D-FACTS deployment set) to perturb the grid minimizing the defense
cost. The simulation case study in the IEEE 14-bus systems [46] provides the right
perspective on the proposed moving-target defense strategy’s detection performance
36
and cost performance.
This article copes with a new type of combined cyberattack, i.e., to conceal the false
data injection attack’s signature. Therefore, the novelty lies in the tackled topic.
However, generally speaking, the power system operator and engineers cannot accept
injecting any perturbing signal at a grid-wide level. The main reason is that such
fluctuated signals caused unwanted power swing oscillation in history. Such oscilla-
tion can also jeopardize the performance of the current protective relay performance.
Therefore, the proposed strategy is significantly unrealistic because it leads to the
power system operator’s growing concern about deteriorating grid stability.
1.2.6 Definition of Coordinated Attack
The generalization of a coordinated cyberattack is a combination of multiple attack
tactics. However, many engineers across the globe have defined the same term in a
different way. Substation switching attack is one example of a typical coordinated
attack due to the compromised control system in a substation by a bad actor in
the cyber system, and circuit breakers are presumably manipulated (tripped). The
coordinated attack in this dissertation denotes a manipulation of switching sequence
through the compromised control system in substations.
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1.2.7 Actuarial Framework
The following four scholarly articles cover the actuarial framework in the power sys-
tem. The first three are relevant to cyberattacks, while the last one does not pertain
cyberattacks.
Article 1: Liu et al. [73] invent an actuarial framework to capture and reduce
the hazardous nature of interdependence among cyber risks, intending to enhance
the cyber insurance market for power systems. The authors research the insurance
schemes for power systems against emerging cyber threats. The absorbing semi-
Markov process models the cyberattack scenarios on the power grid. Besides, a de-
veloped stochastic model reflects the correlation of cyber risks across the power sys-
tem. A created sequential Monte Carlo simulations framework evaluates the power
grid’s impact not only by physical component failures but malicious cyberattacks.
This article then designs an insurance scheme to manage the power grid’s risks with
the financial consequences against cyber threats. The case study with the proposed
premium principle reveals the significant impact of self-protection in cybersecurity.
That can drive stakeholders to invest further in cybersecurity. Therefore, the pre-
sented actuarial framework is highly likely to enhance the participation rate from
insured parties as well as insurers’ perspectives.
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The authors combat an unprecedented problem in establishing actuarial frameworks
against cyberattacks in the bulk power system and obtains beneficial new findings.
However, this paper showcases one optimistic assumption and one pessimistic ap-
proach. The first one is that hacker’s disconnecting power equipment always succeeds.
The second one is that cascaded events toward power outages are analyzed using only
a power flow-based approach. In other words, the dynamic behavior in the power grid
during the cascaded event is ignored.
Article 2: Yang et al. [74] establish a cyber insurance premium calculation frame-
work regarding cyber risks in digital substations to establish a new cyber insurance
business in the power system field. The assumed cyberattack here is substation
attacks via hacking the SCADA system. The proposed cyber insurance framework
comprises three components: 1) the power loss caused by the hypothesized substation
attack, 2) the grid restoration time after the outage, 3) the blackout scale-dependent
economic loss. The employed ruin theory [75] determines the feasible insurance pre-
mium pool using the aforementioned three elements. The authors simulate massive
substation attacks in the IEEE test systems with the power flow software to obtain
the brownout/blackout scale. Then, they derive the grid restoration time as the
“mean time to restore power” using the generic restoration milestone model. The
economic loss is borrowed from a publicly available source such as the ERCOT report
[32]. Sensitivity analysis and spatial correlation study results provide findings. For
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example, the unit’s ramp speed and the loading level give a more considerable impact
on the ”mean time to restore power.”
This article describes a new idea of how to calculate the cyber insurance premium
in the power system. Although the overall approach with the cyber attack target
is similar to [73], only this article explicitly considers grid restoration time for the
calculation. The probability of hacking the SCADA system is represented as steady-
state probabilities, the data of which are referenced from other sources (e.g., [25]).
Because [25] employs the power flow-based approach to derive the brownout/blackout
scale, the cascading event’s dynamic behavior is missing. Besides, the case studies
are nothing to do with the importance of cybersecurity-enhancing measures, such as
the honeypot. One of the grid’s cyber insurance contributions is to let grid companies
invest in cybersecurity technologies more appropriately and proactively. Therefore,
the comparison study for the insurance premium with and without upgrading cyber-
security strategy is preferable.
Article 3: Lau et al. [76] design a new actuarial principle to estimate each transmis-
sion company’s premium, considering correlated cybersecurity risks and the balance
between the security investment and saving in the insurance premium. The developed
Stakerberg Security Game model [77] formulates the optimal mixed strategies and
deploys the defense resources across multiple targeted substations, representing the
optimal stochastic distribution mechanism. The created Semi-Markov Process model
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[78] derives the intrusion tolerant competence in the SCADA system that buffers
residence time before the substation outage to enhance the grid resilience against
cyberattacks. Case studies obtain the above competence for various attack scenarios
with findings. 1) The self-resilience against the substation attack in SCADA systems
depends on the defense resource allocation. 2) The more defense resources are in-
vested in the substations, the more intrusion tolerant capability against substation
attack can be enhanced. 3) The designed insurance premium principle can provide
the incentive for investments in enhancing the intrusion tolerance capability.
This article tackles a non-business matter, i.e., cyber insurance in power grids. The
authors claim that cyber buying insurance in power grids is likely to be mandatory
in the future. However, many challenges remain. For example, grids are electrically
connected and tightly interrelated. Therefore, the cybersecurity investment in one
power company affects the security level in other companies. If the insurance premium
decreases for one company only, this raises a fairness issue. This article assumes only
one company in the entire grid. That means the proposed scheme may be leveraged
only in an isolated grid or the grid with no AC interconnections, such as Japan and
ERCOT in the U.S.
Article 4: Yang et al. [79] advance an insurance strategy to offset the possible im-
balance cost that wind generation owners need to bear due to the intermittent power
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output. The authors assume that wind owners participate in the electricity mar-
ket. The energy storage system (ESS) selected as an alternative approach alleviates
the supply-demand imbalance caused by inaccurate wind forecasts. The insurance
compensates for the residual loss. The ESS and insurance policies are combined to
reduce the imbalance risks of trading wind power as a whole in real-time markets.
The proposed approach determines the most economical ESS capacity in different
excess scenarios. The Monte Carlo simulation estimates the insurance premiums, an-
alyzing the impacts of insurance excesses on premiums. Case studies indicate that
the proposed insurance strategy is likely to achieve the risk aversion with the ESS
against the trading wind power in real-time electricity markets.
This article addresses that insurance in the power grid has tremendous potential as
a risk transfer tool. In other words, the insurance business may be enhanced to the
power system field, which means we can extend the actuarial research to cybersecu-
rity. Although this article demonstrates the outstanding preliminary results, many
other things need to be considered to substantialize. For example, the minimum bat-
tery capacity can tremendously differ depending on the controller (e.g., active power
control and state of charge control) and the battery type (e.g., sodium-sulfur, lithium-
ion, vanadium redox). Besides, the proper control to minimize the battery capacity
also depends on the wind power property (e.g., the power output characteristics vary
depending on the number of blades).
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Common research purpose in 4 articles Reference [74] performs the first at-
tempt to showcase a sound approach to derive the insurance premium for the cyber
related event in the power system. On the other hand, the rest three scholarly ar-
ticles more focus on advancing an idea to incentivize the grid owner for reinforcing
cybersecurity.
1.3 Critical Research Areas in Wide-Ranging At-
tacks
Recommended research areas for a great variety of attack plots is asserted in one of
the reviewed articles.
Ni et al. [80] do not directly study the coordinated cyberattacks but propose a con-
cept of cyber-physical ”coordinated situation awareness.” They also propose an active
defense against cyberattacks based on the temporal and spatial correlations between
cyber and physical systems to overcome the limitation of the conventional one-sided
defense system. The employed example regional frequency control system validates
the proposed concept, representing the overall theoretical architecture and the key
technologies. The proposed concept comprises two actions: 1) coordinated situation
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prediction and early warning, 2) coordinated trace-back of cyberattacks. The coordi-
nated trace-back consists of the faulty device identification at the physical system and
the attack traceability at the cyber system. The authors clarify the following critical
research areas to implement the coordination and reap the corresponding benefits
rigorously.
1) Cyber-physical power system (CPPS) and cyberattack modeling,
2) Analysis of CPPS security,
3) Risk analysis considering anomaly attacks,
4) CPPS control theory.
Lastly, the authors recommend the importance of collaborative work between the
cyber and physical planning divisions to pursue the optimal control and planning for
the CPPS.
This article provides tailored research challenges toward the coordinated cyberattack
in the cyber-physical power grid. Despite less novelty, the authors did fantastic
work with sufficient creativity, providing an integrated view of the field’s research
activity. Although the page limitation restrains the covered topic, the authors should
investigate and discuss not only the frequency control system but also the voltage
control system in terms of the applicability of the proposed concept. This dissertation
covers the aforementioned research areas and contributes to the above 1) and 2).
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1.4 Security Threats Against Power Communica-
tion Infrastructure
1.4.1 Targeted Facilities in Power Grid
Nowadays, more engineers gain their interest in a research study on cybersecurity
against power grids. According to the literature survey in Subsection 1.2, the targeted
power equipment is shown below:




• Digital protective relay (IED)
• Substation
The first four equipment is a representative component of the power grid. On the other
hand, substations cover all four components mentioned above. Protective relays are
deployed at power stations and substations to protect the above four components from
disturbances, such as lightning strokes. Although relays are one type of equipment,
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they do not play the role of generating, delivering or consuming electricity. The
AGC is a grid-wide control system that is different from others. Because the load
redistribution (LR) attack is a well-known term among cybersecurity experts, the
term, LR attack, is often used instead of addressing the cyberattack against AGC.
Other than the aforementioned list of power equipment, local voltage controllers are
also a target of cyberattacks, such as SVC/STATCOM[81, 82, 83], and AVR[84]. Also,
wide-area monitoring, protection, and control systems (WAMPAC[85], also known as
SPS and SIPS) target cyberattacks (especially the DoS attack) [86, 87, 88, 89]. Among
those targeted power equipment, the substation attack attains the highest research
interest in this research field (Fig. 1.10). This dissertation focuses on the substation
attack, including the power station attack. It is noted that the electricity market is
also a target of cyberattack [90, 91, 92, 93], although it is not the power equipment.
1.4.2 Attackers’ Stratagem
Cyberattacks are categorized into several types of attacks. According to the literature
survey, the following eight cyberattacks are studied (Table 1.4).
Among those types of cyberattacks, the switching attack attains the highest research
interest in this research field. Targets of the switching attack are mainly substations














Figure 1.10: Targeted facility in power grids
Table 1.4
Type of cyberattack and corresponding target




Data integrity attack Load 2
False (data/command) injection attack Relay, CB 4
Configuration change attack Line, Protective Relay 4
Distributed DoS attack AGC, CB 2
Load redistribution (LR) attack AGC 3
Switching attack Line, substation, power station 10
Replay attack Protective Relay 1
Zero-day attack Software in substation 1
attack. Because this dissertation focuses on the switching attack against substations,
including power stations, the central research topic is in the scope of the dissertation.
On the contrary, the DoS attack is the most predominant type of cyberattack. For
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example, the DoS attack on the Internet exhibited a 16% increase in the first half
of 2018 compared to the same period in 2017 [94]. This fact boosts up this research
study of DoS especially for AMI [95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102]. It is noted that
the distributed DoS attack is a DoS attack caused by multiple computers, while a
single computer causes the DoS attack. The type of cyberattacks is not limited to
the above list. For example, de-synchronization attacks [103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108,
109, 110, 111] can be leveraged as another kind of DoS attack.
1.5 Doctoral Contributions
Risk analysis using steady-state probability of compromising SCADA and
relays: Many of the recent research studies gain their interest in compromising the
power system-wide control such as the AGC and the SCADA. “what-if” scenarios
is mostly established, and many authors focus on validating the advanced counter-
measure against cyberattacks. However, actuarial frameworks require the discussion
on how often an event happens from stochastic power of view. The recent articles
do not deal with this stochastic process but rather spend more energy on “what-if”
approaches. This dissertation addresses the hacking process into the SCADA and
IEDs (i.e., protective relays) that cause disruptive switching actions on substations
in a stochastic manner. This work refines the previous study [25], integrating new
cybersecurity technologies such as two-step authentication and honeynet.
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Impact analysis using power system dynamic simulation model: Almost
all recent research studies adopt a static based approach, i.e., power flow calcula-
tion program-based approach. Although more engineers have increased their interest
in representing cascaded events/attacks, most approaches leverage the continuous,
multiple power flow snapshots. Only a few engineers [57, 62] start to use the time-
domain dynamic simulation program. However, they do not keep an eye on the
cascaded events caused by system-wide protections. The significant challenge is no
generally accepted guideline for the protection (relay) model selection. The relay
settings are not always fully available. This dissertation serves as guidance on which
relay models are required to represent the cascaded events. Besides, it demonstrates
how the impact of cyberattacks becomes pessimistic when the power flow approach
is employed instead of the dynamic simulation.
The organization of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 advances a cyber-net
model that comprises cybersecurity technologies such as firewalls, passwords, two-step
authentications, and honeynets to derive the intrusion probability as the stationary
stochastic process. Chapter 3 presents the sensitivity analysis of case studies with
discussions of security technologies that affect the steady-state probabilities. Chap-
ter 4 clarifies the necessary dynamic control and protection models to demonstrate
cascaded events that are stemmed from cyberattacks, with substation attack case
studies. Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation.
49
1.6 Publication Listing
The following lists are published during the doctorate candidacy since 2012 while Mr.
Yamashita was a part-time PhD candidate; he had been a full-time research at Central
Research Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI). Koji converted his candidacy
into a full-time PhD student at Michigan Tech in Summer 2018 and moved to the
United States. These published proceedings and journals involve internationally with
other researchers from around the world.
Book chapters:
• K. Yamashita, C-W. Ten, and L. Wang, ”Dynamical Analysis of Cyber-Related
Contingencies Initiated from Substations,” under special edition of ”Security for
Cyber-Physical Systems: Vulnerability and Impact,” edited by Hadis Karimipour,
Pirathayini Srikantha, Hany Farag, and Jin Wei-Kocsis (the editors), pp. 223-246,
Springer, Cham, 2020.
50
Article published in journals (related to this dissertation):
• K. Yamashita, C-W. Ten, Y. Rho, L. Wang, W. Wei, and A. Ginter, “Measuring
Systemic Risk of Switching Attacks based on Cybersecurity Technologies in Sub-
stations,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 35, No. 6, pp. 4206-4219,
Nov. 2020.
• C-W. Ten, K. Yamashita, Z. Yang, A. Vasilakos, and A. Ginter, “Impact As-
sessment of Hypothesized Cyberattacks on Interconnected Bulk Power Systems,”
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, Vol. 9, No. 5, pp. 4405 - 4425, Sep. 2018.
Article published in journals (non-related to dissertation with
affiliation of Michigan Technological University):
• H. Satoh, K. Yamashita, K. Shirasaki, and Y. Kitauchi, “Root-mean Square
Model of Three-Phase PhotovoltaicInverter for Unbalanced Fault,” IEEE Open
Access Journal of Power and Energy, accepted as publication on 9/17/2020.
• D. Zhao, M. Qian, J. Ma, K. Yamashita, ”Photovoltaic generator model for power
system dynamic studies,” Solar Energy, Vol. 210, pp. 101-114, 2020.
• S. Su, Yong Hu, Luobin He, K. Yamashita, and Shidan Wang, “An Assessment
51
Procedure of Distribution Network Reliability Considering Photovoltaic Power In-
tegration,” IEEE Access, Vol. 7, pp. 60171-60185, May 2019.
Other article published in journals (non-related papers to dis-
sertation):
• J. Ma, D. Zhao, L. Yao, M. Qian, K. Yamashita, and L. Zhu, “Analysis on
application of a current-source based DFIG wind generator model,” CSEE Journal
of Power and Energy Systems, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp 352-361, Sep. 2018.
• L. Korunovic, J. V. Milanovic, S. Z. Djokic, K Yamashita, S. M. Villanueva, and
S. Sterpu, “Recommended Parameter Values and Ranges of Most Frequently Used
Static Load Models,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, May 2018.
• K. Yamashita, H. Renner, S. M. Villanueva, G. Lammert, P. Aristidou, J. C.
Martins, L. Zhu, L. D. P. Ospina, and T. V. Cutsem, “Industrial Recommendation
of Modeling of Inverter Based Generators for Power System Dynamic Studies with
Focus on Photovoltaic,” IEEE Power and Energy Technology Systems Journal, Vol.
5, No. 1, pp. 1-10, March 2018.
• S. Su, Y. Hu, T. Yang, S. Wang, Z. Liu, X. Wei, M. Xia, Y. Ota, and K. Ya-
mashita, “Research on an Electric Vehicle Owner-Friendly Charging Strategy Us-
ing Photovoltaic Generation at Office Sites in Major Chinese Cities,” Energies, Vol
52
11, No. 2, Feb. 2018.
• S. Su, Y. Hu, S. Wang, W. Wang, Y. Ota, K. Yamashita, M. Xia, X. Nie, L.
Chen, and X. Mao, “Reactive power compensation using electric vehicles consider-
ing drivers’ reasons,” IET Transactions on Generation, Transmission & Distribu-
tion, Jan. 2018.
• G. Lammert, K. Yamashita, L. D. Pabon Ospina, H. Renner, S. Martinez Vil-
lanueva, P. Pourbeik, F.-E. Ciausiu, and M. Braun, “Modelling and Dynamic Per-
formance of Inverter Based Generation in Power System Studies: An International
Questionnaire Survey,” CIRED -Open Access Proceedings Journal, Vol. 1, 2017.
• G. Lammert, K. Yamashita, L. D. Pabon Ospina, H. Renner, S. Martinez Vil-
lanueva, P. Pourbeik, F.-E. Ciausiu, and M. Braun, “International Industry Prac-
tice on Modelling and Dynamic Performance of Inverter Based Generation in Power
System Studies,” CIGRE Science & Engineering, Vol. 8, June 2017.
• J. V. Milanovic, K. Yamashita, S. Marinez Villanueva, S. Ž. Djokic, L. M. Ko-
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2.1 Quantifying Metrics for Electronic Intrusion
2.1.1 Attacks Upon IP-based Substations
Attacks upon substation can be one of the growing concerns from the power system
security point of view. Especially after the Ukraine substation attacks in 2015 and
2016 [112], many people around the world started to realize that the substation attack
is no longer science fiction. Besides, such events made us aware that the cyber-physical
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world and the real world are now seamless.
Power system security is one aspect of the power system reliability triggered by a
system event such as system fault, i.e. lightning strokes, and disconnection of power
equipment, i.e. generator tripping, and load shedding. Because the system event
initiated almost all large blackouts, power system engineers have paid attention to the
possible future threat that can violate the power system security, i.e. large blackouts.
The dependence on electricity has increased, and uninterrupted electricity is vital for
the current society. Such cyberattacks on substation can even threaten human life.
Therefore, the substation attack is highly likely to be one of the future threats not
only for the power companies but for the entire nation.
2.1.2 General Footprints to an IP-Based Substation
The hacking of the substation in Ukraine was initiated by hacking the control system
in six substations in Ukraine. The hacking of the control system is attained via
cracking the firewall and the password of the server in the substation. Then, our
interest becomes the frequency or the probability of the substation attack with its
impact (i.e. loss of electricity in the targeted grid). From the power system planner’s
point of view, not only the probability of the next blackout caused by the substation
attack next year but also the averaged probability of the substation attack for a long
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time becomes crucial. The latter is also known as the term, steady-state probability
in the probability theory or stationery distribution in the stationery process.
2.1.3 Characterizing Intrusion Process
2.1.3.1 Markov Chain
The stationery distribution is often discussed in the Markov chain. To obtain a clearer


















Figure 2.1: Example of attack transitions to substation network
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In this example, the state space is represented as S = {S1, S2, S3} where,
S1: Search for a Targeted Substation
S2: Hacking into Servers at the Substation
S3: Disconnecting Breakers at the Substation
When the state at time m is defined as {Xm}, the probability of this state, and
the transition probability from one state to another are expressed as P (Xm) and
P (Xm+1|Xm), respectively. In this example in Fig. 2.1, P (Xm+1 = S2|Xm = S1) =
0.1 and P (Xm+1 = S2|Xm = S2) = 0.8.
The Markov chain is defined as Equation (2.1) using a state at time m, {Xm}.
P (Xm+1|Xm, . . . , X1, X0) = P (Xm+1) (2.1)
The meaning of this equation can be summarized as two bullet points:
• Xm+1 is determined by Xm only
• Xm−1, Xm−2, Xm−3... are nothing to do with Xm+1
In this example, it can be stated that disconnecting breakers is nothing to do with
searching for the targeted substation but has much to do with cracking the server at
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the substation only. This characteristics shown in Equation (2.1) is called Markov
property. When the Markov chain and its relevant theorems are used, the Markov
property for the created Markov chain model needs to be tested first. If the Markov
property is not justified, the Markov chain model needs to be further updated, and
the segmentalize the states, i.e. increasing the number of states is known as a general
countermeasure. Therefore, the Markov chain can be utilized, especially when the
action flow or procedure is clarified.
2.1.3.2 Stationery Distribution
The stationery distribution in the Markov chain is a set of state transition probabilities
that is time-invariant after transiting from one state to another infinitely. Let’s
discuss the stationery distribution of the discrete-time Markov chain. It is noted
that the Markov chain has two types: 1) discrete-time Markov chain 2) continuous-
time Markov chain. When the discrete-time Markov chain is given as Xm, n-step
ahead transition probability from the state i to the state j at the time, m is described
as Equation (2.2).
pij(m,n) = P (Xm+n = j|Xm = i) (2.2)
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The n-step ahead transition probability matrix at the time,m is described as Equation
(2.3).
P(m,n) = pij(m,n) (2.3)
where,
P(m, 0) = I (2.4)
If the transition probability matrix, P is time-invariant, the Markov chain is called a
time-homogeneous Markov chain and is represented as Equation (2.5).
∀m,n ≥ 0,P(m,n) = P(0, n) = P(n) = (p
(n)
ij ) (2.5)
The stationary distribution of the time-homogeneous Markov chain, π is defined as
Equation (2.6) using the transition probability matrix, P .
(π1, π2, ..., πk)P = (π1, π2, ..., πk) (2.6)
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π1 + π2 + ...+ πk = 1 (2.7)
To obtain a clear image, let’s use the previous example in 2.1. The transition proba-
bility matrix, P is expressed as Equation (2.8). It can be realized that the summation
of each row is always one. In other words, the summation of the probabilities from
one state to another (including the same state) needs to be always one. This is an






















Because a row vector, π needs to be satisfied with Equations (2.6) and (2.7), the
simultaneous equation is created introducing π = {π1, π2, π3} as shown in Equation
(2.9).
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0.9π1 + 0.1π2 + 0.9π3 = π1
0.1π1 + 0.8π2 = π2
0.1π2 + 0.1π3 = π3
π1 + π2 + π3 = 1 (2.9)
Then, the solution is derived as Equation (2.10). These probabilities represent the
stationary distribution, i.e. steady-state probabilities. Then, it can be realized that
the disconnection of breakers is rarely occurred because of the low probability, and
most hackers must search for the targeted substation. Once we create the accurate
Markov chain model, such state probability can be quantitatively clarified.





















It should be noted that the limit distribution is not always the same as the stationary
distribution. Only if the stationery distribution is not aperiodic, this is identical to
the limit distribution. A typical periodic stationary distribution is shown below.























































































Therefore, examining the periodicity of the stationery distribution is important to
conclude if the steady-state probability can be obtained. In the example in Fig.
2.1, the stationery distribution shown in Equation (2.10) is not aperiodic, i.e. the
stationery distribution represents the steady-state probabilities.
2.1.3.4 Continuous-Time Markov Chain
Markov chain is represented using the continuous-time Markov process as well as
the discrete-time Markov process. All the previous discussions are based on the
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discrete-time Markov process, and the difference between the two Markov chains are
summarized below:
• Discrete-time Markov chain: The transition probability from the state i at the time
m, to the state j at the time m + 1 depends on only the state, Xm = i (see Fig.
2.2).
• Continuous-time Markov chain: The transition probability from the state i at the
time s, to the state j at the time s + t depends on the time difference, t (see Fig.
2.3).
As shown in the above bullet points, the continuous-time Markov chain’s unique char-
acteristics are that the time to transit from one state to another is variable, as shown
in Fig. 2.3. Strictly speaking, the sojourn time at one state can vary, while the transi-
tion is performed instantaneously (i.e. the transition time is zero). In the example in
Fig. 2.1, the time to disconnecting breakers from successfully hacking servers at the
targeted substation can vary depending on how long the hackers struggles to figure
out the way of how to disconnect breakers at the targeted substation.
In the continuous-time Markov chain, the sojourn time at a state spreads according to
Figure 2.2: Discrete-Time Markov process
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Figure 2.3: Continuous-Time Markov process
an exponential distribution. Suppose the sojourn time at a state spreads according to
other distributions such as alpha-, beta-, chi-, and gamma. In that case, distributions,
the Markov property’s stochastic process, is more generalized and called continuous-
time Semi-Markov chain.
2.2 Irregular Event Abstraction Using Petri-Net
Models
2.2.1 Properties of Petri Net
A substation attack occurs through several significant steps. 1) cracking firewall, 2)
cracking password, 3) hacking into control server, 4) isolate electrical equipment at the
substation such as connected transmissions and transformers and buses via disruptive
switching attacks. Those steps may be treated as a state, and the sequence of steps
may be represented as an Automaton that comprises ”state” and ”transition” (Fig.
2.4). Petri net enhances the representation capability and is one of the graphs and
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Figure 2.4: Automaton
Figure 2.5: Petri net
a place and transition net with input and output arcs. One of the most significant
advantages of using the Petri net is that the notion of time can be added (Fig. 2.5).
The fundamental mechanism is shown in Fig. 2.6. Circles denote a place in a Petri net
model. In this example in Fig. 2.6, one token is shown in a place. The token on the
left-hand side is called the initial token that represents an initial condition. Between
the two places, one transition is expressed as an open bar. When the transition is
ready to activate, it is said that the transition is fired. Then, the token in the input
place is jumped to the output place. It is noted that the transition time is ignored in
the Petri net.
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Figure 2.6: Transition mechanism of Petri net
Figure 2.7: Representation capability of Petri net
Petri net is suited for expressing the concurrent, asynchronous, stochastic, non-
deterministic, and distributed systems. So, the Petri net enables us to model a wide
variety of systems with those operations (Fig. 2.7).
Another significant aspect is that the Petri net has three faces. The first one is a
graphic tool. Other competitors can be a flowchart or a block diagram. The second
one is the simulation tool. We can simulate concurrent and dynamic events using Petri
net. The third one is mathematical methodology. We can create the state equation
or algebraic equation for the targeted system via the Petri net model. Although the
Petri net model was proposed in the 1960s, this is still the only tool with those three
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faces.
2.2.2 Modeling the Extension
Petri net is a graph-based modeling tool that has been extensively researched. Over
time, the Petri net has been evolving that introduces different types of transitions.
Figures 2.8 and 2.9 show various types of Petri net and their evolving history, indi-
vidually. Timed Petri net introduces a notion of time, i.e. a fixed timed transition.
Then, the stochastic Petri net extended the functionality of the timed transition intro-
ducing the exponentially distributed timed transition. This enables us to map to the
continuous-time Markov chain. Generalized stochastic Petri net adds a new type of
transition, named immediate transition, together with the exponentially distributed
timed transition. Enhanced stochastic Petri net allows us to use other distribution
functions for the timed transition.
Figure 2.8: Various Petri net
69
Figure 2.9: Enhanced Petri net
Due to the space limitation, the generalized stochastic Petri net (GSPN) is focused
for modeling substation attacks.
2.2.3 Generalization of Stochastic Events
2.2.3.1 Definition for Simplified Firewall Model
Figure 2.10 shows an example of GSPN that represents a simplified firewall model.
The GSPN is represented as the GSPN of P , T1, T2, A, W , and M0. The meaning of
those variables are:
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• P : set of places
• T1: Branching probability for immediate transition
• T2: Transition rate for timed transition
• A: set of arcs
• W : set of weights of arcs
• M0: initial marking
Solid bar in Fig. 2.10 denotes the immediate transition and the open bar denotes the
timed transition. In this example, the tuple of describing the GSPN is as follows:
GSPN = {P, T1, T2, A,W,M0}
P = {p1, p2, p3, p4}
T1 = {t1, t2}
T2 = {τ3, τ4, τ5}
W = {w1, w2, w3, w4, w5},
M0 = (1, 0, 0, 0)
where p1 denotes the initiation of the firewall rule cracking, and p2 denotes the suc-
cessful cracking of firewall rules. Places, p3 denotes the failure to crack firewall rules.
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The place, p4 denotes reaching to password input screen of the server. Variables, t1 de-
notes the transition probabilities of the successful cracking of firewall rules. Variables,
t2 denotes the transition probabilities of the failure to crack firewall rules. Variables,
τ3 denotes the transition rate of responding to attackers opening a port. Variables, τ4
denote the transition rates of responding to attackers indicating the password input
screen. Variables, τ5 denote the transition rates of responding to attackers denying
opening any ports.
In this example, the GSPN consists of a set of 4 places, 2 immediate transitions
probabilities, 3 timed transitions, 10 arcs, and 10 weights of arcs. When marking
is defined as the number of tokens at p1, p2, p3, and p4, the initial marking, M0 is
expressed as M0 = [1, 0, 0, 0].
Figure 2.10: Example of GSPN
72
2.2.3.2 Reachability Graph Mapping to Markov Chain
To map the GSPN to the Markov chain, markings’ transition is more focused instead
of the transition of places. It is realized that GSPN transits from M0 to M1 or M2 by
firing the immediate transitions t1 or t2. Because the immediate transition is used,
M0 is called vanishing marking, i.e. no waiting time at a state (and no transition
time from one place to another). The GSPN transits from M2 to M0 by the timed
transition of τ5. The GSPN also transits from M1 to M3 or from M3 to M4 by the
timed transitions, τ3 and τ4, respectively. When only timed transitions are used to
transit from the current marking to other markings, this marking is called tangible
marking. In this example, M1, M2, and M3 are the tangible marking. Hereafter,
the superscript, V and T are added to vanishing markings and tangible markings,
individually.
The graph that consists of those markings and their arcs is called a reachability
graph (Fig. 2.11). In the reachability graph, the term, weight, is newly introduced
because the transition probability and the transition rate are not differentiated in the
reachability graph. Therefore, the values of the immediate transitions and the timed
transitions are used as they are, as the weight of the reachability graph.
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Figure 2.11: Reachability graph of firewall Petri net
2.2.3.3 Transition Probability Matrix for Semi-Markov Chain and
Continuous-Time Markov Chain
Once a reachability graph is generated, a transition probability matrix is created in
the followings.
• Vanishing marking: weights, i.e. transition probabilities are input as they are.
• Tangible marking: weights needs to be normalized at each row of the transition
probability matrix.
Let’s assume imputed values for the immediate transition and the timed transition
show below (Fig. 2.12):
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• T1 = {t1 = 0.001, t2 = 0.999}
• T2 = {τ3 = 10
−6, τ4 = 10
−6, τ5 = 0.5× 10
−6}
Figure 2.12: Extended reachability graph
In this example, the rate probability matrix, U that consists of the transition rate
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Here, the probability matrix, P consists of the transition probability from each vanish-
ing marking to each tangible marking or vanishing marking, other than the normalized
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rate transition matrix. The sub-matrix of P that consists of the transition probabil-
ity from each vanishing marking to each tangible marking or vanishing marking is
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(2.17)
The probability matrix seems to be calculated combining matrices, P V and UT as
shown in Equation (2.18). However, the Markov property requires a condition that
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The probability matrix seems to be calculated combining matrices, P V , and UT , as
shown in Equation (2.18). However, the Markov property requires a condition that
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The tangible marking has a certain sojourn time at the corresponding marking, while
the vanishing marking has no sojourn time at the corresponding marking. Because of
no sojourn time for vanishing markings, the transition probability becomes zero, and
vanishing markings can be eliminated from the transition probability matrix shown
in Equation (2.20). The reduced transition probability matrix, P ′ is derived from
Equation (2.21).
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P′ = P TT + P TV
(









P V V P V T






In this example, the matrix dimension is reduced from four to three, as shown in
Equation (2.22). Because only exponentially distributed timed transitions remain
in the reduced transition probability matrix, it becomes the probability transition






























































This reduction of the transition matrix, removing the vanishing markings, contributes
to computational efficiency by formulating this problem with the continuous-time
Markov chain instead of the semi-Markov chain.
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2.2.3.4 Steady-State Probability for Continuous-Time Markov Chain
It can be recognized that the derived transition probability matrix, P ′ has the same
form in Equation (2.8), which means the steady-state probability can be calculated
using the same procedure that was explained in Clause 2.1.3. Substituting Equation
(2.22) into Equation (2.6) and utilizing Equation (2.7), the steady-state probability
is derived as Equation (2.23).
0.001π̃2 + 0.001π̃3 = π̃1
0.999π̃2 + 0.999π̃3 = π̃2
π̃1 = π̃3
π̃1 + π̃2 + π̃3 = 1
∴ (π̃1, π̃2, π̃3) = (0.001, 0.998, 0.001) (2.23)
It should be noted that the probabilities in Equation (2.23) is derived mapping GSPN
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to continuous-time Markov chain, i.e. using the normalized P T . Therefore, the de-
rived steady-state probabilities need to be mapped from the continuous-time Markov
chain to GSPN.
2.2.3.5 Steady-state Probability for GSPN
The steady-state probability is calculated from both the steady-state distribution,
π̃i|i=1,2,... and the corresponding sojourn times, hi|i=1,2,.... The expected sojourn time
(also known as holding time) hi at a marking state i can be derived from the transition



















, if i ∈ Tangible Markings
0, if i ∈ Vanishing Markings.
(2.24)
In this example in Fig. (2.10), the sojourn times, h1, h2, and h3 are calculated as







































Once hi is obtained, the steady-state probability is generally calculated from Equation



















































Let’s discuss the meaning of the steady-state probabilities, πi|i=1,2,3 using this example
in Fig. 2.10. Each π corresponds to the probability of each marking state. The
marking state corresponds to each state (or the combination of states in the case of
multiple tokens). As shown in Fig. 2.12, marking states, M1, M2, andM3 corresponds
to p2, p3, and p4. As already mentioned, there is zero probability for the marking state,
M0 because this state is transited to either M1 or M2 immediately once the current
state becomes M0. Therefore, M0 is not discussed as the steady-state probability.
As shown in Fig. (2.10) and Equation (2.27), the following probabilities are clarified.
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• M1(=p2): 0.1% of hackers successfully cracked firewall rules. Those hackers are
waiting for incoming password input screen of servers in order to login to them.
• M3(=p4): 0.1% of hackers are able to attempt the password cracking using the
password input screen of servers in the targeted substation.
• M2(=p3): 99.98% of hackers are struggling to cracking the firewall rule because
they fail to crack them.
Thus, once the steady-state probabilities are calculated, the hackers’ status can be
clarified from a stochastic perspective. It should be emphasized that the steady-
state probabilities show the probability after the elapse of an infinitely long period of
time. As mentioned earlier, this type of indicator can be vital, especially when the
countermeasure for substation attack needs to be designed in the industry.
2.2.3.6 Review of Procedure of How to Calculate Steady-state Probabil-
ity of GSPN
The entire procedure of how to derive the steady-state probability for GSPN is sum-
marized in Fig. 2.13. As shown in Fig. 2.13, the Markov property is effectively
utilized while the steady-state probability is calculated. Based on the extended reach-
ability graph of the GSPN, the Semi-Markov chain is created first. After eliminating
vanishing markings, i.e. immediate transitions with the normalization for the timed
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transition, the continuous-time Markov chain is created. Thus, the steady-state prob-
abilities are calculated under the continuous-time Markov chain. An inverse normal-
izing technique is applied to derive the steady-state probabilities of the GSPN. There
are many available non-commercial tools and commercially available tools to calcu-
late the steady-state probability of the GSPN. Therefore, once a GSPN is created,
the steady-state probability is automatically calculated. Such tools also enable us
to use different distributions other than the exponential distribution for the timed
transition. Besides, they can even analyze how the probabilities are converged to the
steady-state probabilities.
Figure 2.13: Procedure for steady-state probability of GSPN
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242.2.3.7 Role of Tokens in GSPN and indicators obtained from GSPN
Once the steady-state probabilities for GSPN are obtained, the useful indicators
shown in Table 2.1 are also obtained. If the initial token number is 1, the second
column is the same as the third column. The indicator, Throughput provides the
averaged number of tokens that move from one place to another. To clarify the
steady-state probability of the substation attack, the place probability would be the
most important indicator. Probability of B equals a summation of the expression πi
for Mi that belongs to B. B is a subset of the reachability of the Petri net.
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2.3 Cyber-Net Examples Inferring Substation
Anomalies
Although the risk of cybersecurity has been studied as a potential data breach, mainly
in security businesses [113], their primary interests are to estimate the number of
attacks shortly. A recent paper proposes a timed Petri net to estimate the steady-
state probability of attacks on special protection scheme (SPS) [114]. Modeling the
risk of intrusion and its processes based on security technologies is highly desirable.
Technologies of deployed cyberinfrastructure and its associated anomalous events can
be modeled in generalized stochastic Petri net (GSPN). The cyber-net defined in this
Chapter is the construction of (bipartite) directed graph based on specific security
technology, which can model the inter-dependencies of cyber components within a
network. In this section, three fundamental models are introduced: (1) firewall model
on control servers in substations, (2) password model on control servers (i.e. SCADA)
in substations, (3) extended password model on intelligent electric device (IED),
i.e. advanced protective relays in substations. Those three models are assembled to
represent the cyber-net with new technologies shown in Fig. 1.2.
It is noted that weights, i.e., transition probabilities and rates in Sub-section 2.3 are
imputed with values within reasonable ranges.
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2.3.1 Firewall Model
The example firewall model is enhanced based on the original establishment [25]. The
tuple of describing the cyber-net model quantitatively and qualitatively is as follows:
GSPN = {P, T1, T2, A,W,M0}
P = {pbegin, prule1,α, prule1,β, prule2,α, prule2,β, prule3,α, prule3,β, ppass}
T1 = {t1,a, t1,b, t2,a, t2,b, t3,a, t3,b}
T2 = {τrate,1, τrate,2, τrate,3, τr,4, τr,5}
M0 = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
W = {w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7, w8, w9, w10, w11},
where
• The place, pbegin denotes the initiation of the firewall rule cracking.
• The places, prule1,α, prule2,α, and prule3,α denote the successful cracking of firewall
rules 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
• Places, prule1,β, prule2,β, and prule3,β denote the failure to crack firewall rules 1, 2,
and 3, respectively.
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• The place, ppass denotes reaching to password input screen of the server.
• Variables, t1,a, t2,a, and t3,a denote the transition probabilities of the successful
cracking of firewall rules 1, 2, and 3.
• Variables, t1,b, t2,b, and t3,b denote the transition probabilities of the failure to crack
firewall rules 1, 2, and 3.
Variables, τrate,1, τrate,2, and τrate,3 denote the transition rate of responding to at-
tackers opening a port.
• Variables, τr,4 and τr,5 denote the transition rates of responding to attackers denying
attackers of opening any ports and to attackers with status of password input,
respectively.
The password cracking shows only two possibilities, i.e., the successful login, or the
login failure. Those probabilities are modeled as the immediate transition, and the
sum of the two probabilities is one. On the other hand, the server’s response time is
not immediate, and such time delay is modeled as the timed transition. Therefore,
the GSPN is applied to this model and the rest of the proposed models.
The reachability graph in Fig. 2.14 is an extended semi-Markovian Process because
the sojourn time in each state is restricted to be either zero or exponentially dis-
tributed.
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(a) Modified Firewall Model
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 (a) Petri net model
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MT3 0 0 0 0 10
−6 0 0 0
MT4 5× 10
−7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT5 0 0 0 0 10
−6 0 0 0
MT6 0 0 0 0 10
−6 0 0 0
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the matrix describing the transition rate from each tangible marking to each vanishing
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where P V = (P V V | P V T ) denotes a matrix describing the transition probability
from each vanishing marking to each vanishing or tangible marking, while P T =
(P TV | P TT ) denotes a matrix describing the transition probability from each tangible
marking to each vanishing or tangible marking. P T is calculated from UT normalizing
the sum of each row to one.
In this firewall model, the rates corresponding to each timed transition can be written



















= [0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 2.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0]× 106. (2.29)
Since h1 = h2 = h3 = 0, the transition probability matrix, P may be reduced to a
5× 5 matrix, P′ using
















0 1 0 0 0
.01 0 .0099 .009801 .9703
0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0



















π̃j = 1. (2.32)
The steady-state distribution, π̃, for the tangible markings is derived as
π̃ = [.009712, .02884, .009614, .009518, .94231]. (2.33)
The steady-state probability πj|j=1,··· ,8 is calculated from both the steady-state distri-
bution, π̃j and the corresponding holding times, hj. For any j in tangible markings,
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π̃4h4 + π̃5h5 + π̃6h6 + π̃7h7 + π̃8h8
= .972 · π̃jhj × 10
−6. (2.34)
From (2.29) and (2.33), the steady-state probability is calculated as
π = [.009439, .05607, .009345, .009251, .9159]. (2.35)
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2.3.2 Password Model for Servers
The example password model based on the original establishment [25] is defined as
follows based on the GSPN representation:
GSPN = {P, T1, T2, A,W,M0}
P = {p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6}
T1 = {t1, t2, t4, t5};
T2 = {τ3, τ6, τ7, τ8}
W = {w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7, w8}
M0 = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0),
where
• The place, p1 denotes the initiation of the password cracking of local SCADA
systems.
• The place, p2 denotes the successful login.
• The place, p3 denotes the failed login to the local SCADA.
• The place, p4 denotes the knowledge discovered from the SCADA.
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• The place, p5 denotes the executed sequence of disruptive switching attacks from
the SCADA.
• The place, p6 denotes the failure to sequentially execute switches due to interlocking
blocks.
• Variables, t1, t2, t4, and t5 denote the transition probabilities of the successful login
to the SCADA, of failure to login to the SCADA, of failing to execute, and of
successful execution of the sequential switching in the targeted substation, respec-
tively.
• Variables, τ3, τ6, τ7, and τ8 denote the transition rates of learning to discover
the cyber-physical relation, the response to attackers indicating the failed login,
response to attackers about successful switching attacks, and response to attackers
indicating the failure of the sequential switching due to interlock rules, respectively.
The GSPN and corresponding reachability graph are shown in Fig. 2.15. Once the
reachability graph is obtained, the transition probability matrix P and its reduced
form P′ are
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respectively. Using similar argument as in Section 2.3.1, the steady-state distribution,
π̃, and the steady-state probability, π, are derived as follow:
π̃ = [.00990 .9802 .00989 .000013], (2.38)
π = [.0099996 .98996 .000010 .000026]. (2.39)
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2.3.3 IED Authentication (Extended Password Model)
The example password model is also enhanced based on the original establishment
[25] in order to implement the two -step authentication function. Below is the tuple
of the cyber-net representation to quantify the statuses with transitions representing
the model:
GSPN = {P, T1, T2, A,W,M0}
P = {p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, p7, p8, p9}
T1 = {t1, t2, t5, t6, t8, t9};
T2 = {τ3, τ4, τ7, τ10, τ11, τ12}
W = {w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7, w8, w9, w10, w11, w12}
M0 = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
where
• The place, p1 denotes the initiation of password crackings of IEDs.
• The place, p2 and p3 denote the failure to access and the successful access to the
IED with the viewing mode, individually.
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• The place, p4 denotes the attempt to access to the IED with the control mode.
• The places, p5 and p6 denote the failure to access and the successful access to the
IED with the control mode, individually.
• The place, p7 denotes obtaining the knowledge to manipulate IEDs.
• The place, p8 denotes the executed sequence of disruptive switching actions via
IEDs.
• The place, p9 denotes the failure to execute switching actions due to the mainte-
nance.
• Variables t1 and t2 denote transition probabilities of the successful access to IEDs
with the viewing mode and of the failed access due to wrong passwords, respectively.
• Variables, t5 and t6 denote transition probabilities of the successful access to IEDs
with the control mode and of the failed access due to wrong passwords, respectively.
• Variables, t8 and t9 denote the transition probability of the successful execution of
sequential switching actions of circuit breakers in the targeted substation via the
IED and of failing to execute the operation of the IED.
• The variable, τ3 denotes the transition rate of exploring available IEDs with the
control mode.
• Variables, τ4 and τ10 denote the transition rate of the response to attackers indi-
cating the failed attempt to access to the IED.
• The variable, τ7 denotes the transition rate of learning to discover the knowledge
of how to manipulate relay settings of IEDs.
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• The variable, τ11 denotes the transition rate of the response to attackers about
successful switching attacks.
• The variable, τ12 denotes the transition rate of the response to attackers indicating
the out of service state.
Once the reachability graph is obtained, the transition probability matrix is derived
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The corresponding steady-state distribution and the steady-state probability are de-
rived as (2.42) and (2.43), respectively.
π̃ = [9900.0, 980100.0, 99.0, 9800.0, .1, 98.9]× 10−6, (2.42)
π = [9899.0, 980004.0, 99.0, 9800.0, .1, 197.8]× 10−6. (2.43)
2.3.4 Honeynet Model
2.3.4.1 Brief History of Honeynet
There is an inevitable attack, no matter how cybersecurity is reinforced. That is
what we call, zero-day attack. This type of attack is characteristic that the hacker
can compromise servers before applying the patch to the server. In this case, even
the dynamic patch cannot prevent it.
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Figure 2.17: Example deployment of honeynet
A honeypot can be a promising tool to make the patch more promptly. A honeypot is
a decoy that pretends to be a real server. It is placed with the critical servers, and it
allows attackers to invade the honeypot, as shown in Fig. 2.17. Because the attackers
usually start downloading their tools and applications to the honeypot after they
invade it, what attackers are doing via the honeypot can be observed mostly using
event logs.
However, honeypot has not been treated as a useful tool as the security technology.
The biggest issue is that the honeypot can be the stepping stone server. That means
the honeypot can be used to attack other servers more effectively. The second most
significant issue is that it is not easy to operate the honeypot. The professional who
can check the attacker’s activities and analyze the logs cannot always be hired. On the
other hand, the attacker’s approaches have been evolved from day today. Honeynet
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Figure 2.18: Example of prevention function of honeynet [115]
must be more highlighted because it helps to enhance situational awareness.
A prevention function that is shown in Fig. 2.18can be a promising way to tackle the
first issue.
2.3.4.2 Modeling of Honeynet
The proposed cyber-net model contains the modified password model and the IED
model in the previous section, as well as the developed honeynet model. The honeynet
is assumed to have the following functions:
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• Collect passwords
• Update the firewall rule to prevent the attackers from connecting to the Internet
from the honeynet.
Generally, a honeypot should trap intruders that establish security events where such
anomalies would be their footprints across a network. The logging features are cap-
tured in the cyber-net modeling, where it can interact with firewalls within the net-
work to coordinate substation’s anomaly events. Such events can reflect new rules at
the time and will thwart future intruders. The observed statistics stay in the event
logging that can be purged once every audit cycle. The modeling of a particular type
of honeypots can mimic the IEDs, where attackers may use it as a steppingstone to
further a plot. In the case of honeynets with the prevention function in Fig. 2.18,
the firewall can automatically update the statistics reflecting the new rules that can
mitigate in the next cycle of observations as evidence for NERC CIP.
2.3.4.3 Integrated Cyber-net Model with Honeynet
The example cyber-net model with honeynets are shown in Fig. 2.19. The following
immediate or timed transitions are used in the GSPN model:
• Variables, t1 and t2 denote transition probabilities of the intrusion attempt for the



























0=[ =1 else 0]
1=[ =1 else 0]
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5=[ =1 else 0]
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8=[ =1 else 0]
9=[ =1 else 0]
10=[ =1 else 0]
11=[ =1 else 0]
12=[ =1 else 0]
13=[ =1 else 0]
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15=[ =1 else 0]
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Figure 2.19: Petri net model for cyber-net with honeynet [21]
• Variable, τ42 denotes the transition rate of copying the tools to the honeynet for
the intrusion attempt.
• Variables, t43 through t45 denote transition probabilities of the failure to crack a
designated firewall rule.
• Variables, t46 through t48 denote transition probabilities of the successful cracking
of firewall rules.
• Variables, τ49 through τ51 denote transition rates of responding to attackers opening
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Figure 2.20: Reachability graph for cyber-net with honeynet [21]
a designated port. Variable.
• The variable, τ52 denotes the transition rate of response to the attackers indicating
failure to open any ports.
• Variables, t53 and t54 denote transition probabilities of the successful communication
to the Internet from the honeynet and of the failure to communicate to the Internet
from the honeynet, respectively.
• Variables, τ55 and τ56 denote the transition rate of exploring the available IED
and of failure to reaching to the IED due to the prevention function that are
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implemented in the advanced honeynet, respectively.
It is noted that the rest of the transition probabilities and rates in the firewall model
and the IED model have been defined in the previous sections, 2.3.1 and 2.3.3.
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Chapter 3
Case Studies of Intrusion Paths to
Substation Networks
3.1 Model Parameters and Insights from Steady-
State Probabilities
The developed cyber-net model enables to derive several useful indicators. The
steady-state probability of cracking the firewall is calculated from the sum of the
probabilities of p12 and p13. The steady-state probability of cracking the first authen-
tication is calculated from the sum of the probabilities of p15 and p16. The steady-state
probability of cracking the second authentication is calculated from the sum of the
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probabilities of p18 and p19. The steady-state probabilities of disruptive switching
actions and of the successful transmission of the outgoing packets from the honeynet
to attack other servers, (i.e., using the honeynet as the steppingstone) are obtained
from p18 and p32, respectively.
The first clause introduces sensitivity analyses for honeynet using the developed
cyber-net model in Fig. 2.19. The second clause provides the steady-state proba-
bilities of the substation outages due to disruptive switching attacks for SCADA and
IEDs using the IEEE 14-bus system model [46]. The attack from outside is assumed
for all the case studies.
3.2 Sensitivity Analysis of Intrusion Attempts
with a Single IED
3.2.1 Integrated Models with Honeynets
The steady-state probabilities of each place in Fig. 2.19 are shown in Table 3.1. The
steady-state probability of disruptive switching actions is 5.8×10−9. The steady-state
probability at the place, p9 gives the highest value of 0.94. The steady-state prob-
ability at the place, p13 gives the second highest value of 0.029. These results show
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Table 3.1
Probabilities of a cyber-net in Fig. 2.19
Place Probability Place Probability
P04 9.70590E-03 P19 2.90866E-06
P05 9.60884E-03 P21 2.91186E-13
P06 9.51275E-03 P24 9.80392E-11
P09 9.41763E-01 P25 9.70589E-11
P12 2.91157E-04 P26 9.60883E-11
P13 2.88246E-02 P29 9.51274E-09
P15 2.91157E-06 P32 5.82373E-13
P16 2.88246E-04 P33 2.90895E-10
P18 5.82315E-09
that most attackers are highly likely to keep attempting the firewall rule cracking.
Historical data are often used to estimate the future cyber-risk. However, invisi-
ble/implicit risks such as cracking the firewall cannot be estimated. The proposed
cyber-net model enables to derive such risks as the steady-state probabilities.
The steady-state probabilities of disruptive switching attacks with honeynets that
do not have the prevention function, and with advanced honeynets that have the
prevention function are derived and compared in this case study. In the case of the
honeynet with no prevention function, the transition probabilities, t53 and t54 are set
as 0.999999 and 1.0× 10−6, respectively. In the case of theh advanced honeynet, the
transition probabilities, t53 and t54 are set as 1.0 × 10
−6 and 0.999999, respectively.
The fraction of the honeynet is set as the transition probability of t2 in the range of
0 (0%) and 1, (100%) and five indicators are shown in Figs. 3.1 and 3.2. As shown in
Fig. 3.1, the steady-state probability of reaching the Internet from honeynets linearly
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increases as the fraction of honeynets increase, while four steady-state probabilities
with honeynets that have no prevention function are almost the same regardless
of the fraction of honeynets. On the other hand, Fig. 3.2 shows five steady-state
probabilities with advanced honeynets. The curve in the figure shows exponential
changes with respect to the increased number of honeynets and servers deployed in
the substation network.
The following are the observations from the simulation with or without prevention
function:
3.2.2 Honeynet without Prevention
As depicted in Fig. 3.3, the discrete events from simulations show the two distinct
curves of probabilities for each events where all of them converge in the end. If
the honeynet without prevention function shares 99% of the servers, the number
of attackers who spread outgoing packets gradually increases as time goes (see the
second top indicator in Fig. 3.3). That results in an increased number of attackers
who attempt to crack firewall rules, i.e., where steady-state probabilities of places,
p4, p5, p6, p9, rise consistently when it reaches the steady state.
At the time of around 107, the place describing the attackers crowding to the password
cracking stage via successfully cracking firewall rules (see the third top indicator in
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Fig. 3.3). Although the increasing timings of the third top indicator are different de-
pending on the fraction of honeynets, the third top indicator eventually reaches to the
same level over a long period of time. Because steady-state probability only indicates
the probability over the long period of time, steady-state probabilities of cracking
firewall rules and passwords and of switching attack are the same, independent from
the total numbers of honeypots and servers are modeled.
3.2.3 Honeynet with Prevention
If the honeynet has the prevention function, nearly all attackers are trapped in the
honeynet (i.e., such attackers fail to infect other servers from the honeynet) once
they invade into it. That implies that the honeynet model has a dead end that
does not feedback to the attackers as part of the learning process. On the other
hand, the IED model has a feedback that enables attackers learn in this trial-and-
error discovery. That says, some attackers who successfully perform the switching
attack can be trapped in the honeynet at the second round or later according to
the hypothesized fraction of t2. Because the steady-state probability discusses the
probabilities of each state over an incredibly long period of time, no loop structure
of the honeynet model makes the number of attackers who are trapped in honeynets
exponentially accelerated as the fraction of honeynets, t2 increases. Then, the number
of such attackers is saturated once the probability of the switching attack is small,
113
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Figure 3.1: Probabilities of a cyber-net in response to fraction of honeynet
without prevention function [21]
  







































































































































































 Honeynet as Steppingstone
Figure 3.2: Probabilities of a cyber-net in response to fraction of honeynet
with prevention function [21]
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Figure 3.3: Time-varying probabilities of a cyber-net in response to fraction
of honeynet without prevention function [21]
3.3 Sensitivity Analysis with Multiple Systems
To reach the steady-state probability of substation attacks, the cyber-net model in
Fig. 2.19 is further extended to include multiple IEDs and a SCADA. The major
protections that are installed at 220 kV or over substations and power stations are
taken into account as IEDs. Readers can refer to the typical representation of relay
types and the number of their settings per each relay in substations from [116]. This
reference of the CIGRE report based on the relay experts from around the world is
used as the base to set up the case studies here. We deem the number of setting
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parameters on relaying as potential combinations of tripping associated breaker(s) by
experience. This reference is used here in the simulation study.
3.3.1 Interpretation of Immediate Transitions
The installed protections are different between a power station and a substation, and
the volume of these protections at each power station/substation varies depending
on the number of power equipment such as generators, transformers, buses, and
transmission lines. In addition, the type of protective relays can vary depending on
the voltage level in the substation.
A distributed control center monitors and controls 6-7 substations in transmission
systems on average, according to the real-world example. If the distributed control
centers are modeled at a 132kV/66kV substation in the IEEE 14-bus system model,
two control centers are hypothesized. Because IEDs and the server at the control
center have their unique static IP addresses, the risk of the substation attacks via a
control server can be diversified at a substation level.
In this study, each relay type is assigned to individual IED, and t21 and t22 in Fig.
2.19 are provided according to the fraction of the protective relays at a substation,
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where nrelay denotes the number of same relay type at a substation, nCS and nSS
denote the numbers of control centers and substations in the system, respectively
(nCS = 2 and nSS = 10 for this study case).
3.3.2 Timed Intrusion Transitions
This paper proposes a systematic manner of how to provide two specific parame-
ters, τ27 and τ31 of the developed cyber-net model in Fig. 2.19. When an IED is
compromised by attackers, and the relay settings change, malicious tripping due to
the intentional wrong relay settings could occur. In this case, the time to review all
relay settings is highly likely to increase as the number of relay settings increases.
It is suggested that the time to learn how to deal with the IED for the attack, i.e.,
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the inverse of τ27, is assumed to be proportion to the number of relay settings for
each protection scheme. In this case study, τ27 is set as the default imputed value of
1.0 × 10−6 for the IED, i.e., the distance relay that has the largest number of relay
settings of 19 and derived from Eq. (3.3). The transition rate τ27 for SCADA needs
to be initialized as there is a much larger number of switches to be reviewed, it is
likely to have a longer time to overview all controllable switches and to get acquainted
with the environment of local SCADA system than direct connections to IEDs. In
this study, τ27 for SCADA is set to be 9.5× 10
−8.
On the other hand, at least one AND conditions and many OR conditions are generally
included in the relay logic diagram, and many relay settings can be restrained to avoid
the improper relay settings coordination. Therefore, as the number of relay settings
increases, the possibility of the malicious relay operation can increase against such
constraints, i.e., the attackers are likely to shorten the time to operate the targeted
IED. In light of this, it is suggested that the time to complete disruptive switching
actions, i.e., the inverse of τ31 may be assumed to be inversely proportional to the
number of relay settings. In this case study, τ31 is set as the default imputed value
of 0.5× 10−6 for the IED, i.e., the high impedance voltage differential relay that has
the smallest number of relay settings of 2 and all τ31 are derived from Eq. (3.3). In
this study, τ31 for SCADA is set to be 4.17× 10
−7.
τ27,IED =
1.0× 10−6 × 19
nry set
; τ31,IED =




where nry set denotes the number of relay settings.
The rest of the transition parameters are assumed to be the same as the values in
Fig. 2.19. These will be updated based on the observation of the time window from
the available event source from the local computer systems.
3.3.3 Typical System Deployment in Substation and Case
Studies
Figure 3.4 shows the outline of the created cyber-net model with up to 8 IEDs. In
order to elaborate on the installed protections at each power station/substation, the
following are considered using [46]:
• A step-up transformer of synchronous generators or condensers are directly con-
nected to the 132-kV bus; they are typically connected to a substation with the
voltage level is lower than 132-kV. Step-down transformers of loads are not consid-
ered in this study.
• One reactive power compensator is included if a load or a transformer is explicitly
shown without reactive power compensators or synchronous condensers.
• A double-circuit line for the one-line diagram shown in general IEEE test cases.


































   Figure 3.4: Case setup for cyber-net with multiple protective IEDs and a
SCADA [21]
is assumed to be applied to multi-circuit transmission lines that share the same
towers.
3.3.4 Simulation Results
The probabilities of disruptive switching executed against the substation automation
SCADA system or executed by compromised IED-initiated (CII) attacks are shown in
Table 3.2. The table shows that the probabilities of IEDs are inversely proportional
to the number of relay settings as well as proportional to the number of protective
relays, relatively to all relays in the designated substation.
The steady-state probability of the substation attack is the summation of the steady-
state probabilities of switching attacks for the SCADA and for IEDs that result in
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the entire substation outage. A subset of breaker tripping associated IEDs can en-
ergize the entire substation, depending on the substation topology. For example,
compromising IED6 and IED7 at Bus 1 in Table 3.2 can cause the whole substa-
tion outage. The steady-state probability of such a simultaneous switching attack is
calculated using two initial tokens. In this case, the steady-state probability of the
switching attack for IED6 and IED7 is derived as 1.70 × 10−14, which is 104 times
smaller than the steady-state probability of switching attacks for the SCADA and
negligible. On the other hand, compromising IED1 at Bus 1 in Table 3.2 also causes
the whole substation outage. This steady-state probability is around 100 times larger
than that for the SCADA and is not negligible. Therefore, the only steady-state
probability of switching attacks for a single IED that causes the whole substation at-
tack, (i.e., only when all bus protections at a substation are compromised) other than
the steady-state probability for the SCADA needs to be included. In other words,
the steady-state probability of switching attacks can be negligible when using more
than or equal to two different relay types for bus protections. In this case study,
the steady-state probability of the switching attack for substation 1 at Bus 1 can be
derived as 1.592 × 10−7(with 1.563 × 10−7 + 2.927 × 10−9). The same procedure is
applied to derive the steady-state probability of switching attacks at each substation
in the different IEEE standard models, such as IEEE 30-Bus [117], 57-Bus [65], and









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.5: Steady-state probability for each substation (sequential order)
in IEEE 30-bus systems
Figure 3.6: Steady-state probability for each substation (sequential order)
in IEEE 57-bus systems
3.4 Practical Consideration in Case Studies
3.4.1 Industry Practice in Security Logging
In practice, anomalous statistics for each utility can largely vary. Due to the propri-
etary information, such datasets are not publicly available. Some values are imputed
based on the empirical base that falls within a reasonable range. Although deriv-
ing reasonable transition probabilities and rates for the cyber-net model would be a
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Figure 3.7: Steady-state probability for each substation (sequential order)
in IEEE 118-bus systems
future research study, the considerable approach is shown in Table 3.4.
The number of commissioned protective relays set up in substations can be directly
obtained from the utilities. This is in proportion to the typical deployment of sub-
station equipment, such as associated busbars, transmission lines, and transformers.
The attempts resulting in successful intrusion to bypass firewalls or passwords can
be inferred from the security event logs from the available sources. That can include
honeypots to be modeled [118, 119, 120]. The frequency of the zero-day attack can
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also be obtained from the database that is available to the public [121, 122]. As se-
curity event logs do not reveal to the zero-day vulnerability for the honeynet and the
data can vary as time goes by, only carefully thought values are imputed in the case
studies. Accessing to the proprietary data would strengthen the quality of systemic
risk in a practical case study that would allow insurances to better assess utility risk
with regards to their readiness in security defense.
3.4.2 Transition to Cyber Insurance Business for Power
Grids
The creativity of attackers’ stratagem can result in different operational implications.
Switching attack in the control system would perturb the instability of a power grid.
There may be combinations of events with assistance from insiders where an attack
can be effective when coordination between insiders and the remote collaborators
may create events of disturbance, such as electrical short circuits. Substations are
connected with multiple components where an abrupt switching of all of these com-
ponents can implicate system operation, which is studied in [35, 36, 37, 38]. Although
security is viewed as a low-probability, high-impact event, the new perspectives of en-
terprise risk management in planning should consist of two major components, i.e.,
assessment of security readiness and remedial/preventive responses. The planning
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for security investment should be based on the operational bottleneck from histori-
cal observations with simulations where it should reflect consequential contingencies
associated with each substation and their corresponding outages. On the contrary,
this work extensively captures the high level of abstraction with respect to technol-
ogy implementation, and the events from the first intrusion attempt to execute a
switching attack in discrete events successfully. The prevention of such cyber events
is described in the proposed models.
3.4.3 Establishing Actuarial Framework
Establishing the premium of an insurance policy depends on two fundamental aspects
of consideration, i.e., (1) distributions of frequency, and (2) severity of insurance
claims. These two distributions are often estimated based on historical observations.
This work establishes a systemic risk framework to provide quantities pertaining to
what is deployed in substations. To the best of our knowledge, gauging the fre-
quency of event occurrence that captures within a substation has been challenging
due to a large number of attack vector combinations. The proposed model estimat-
ing the steady-state probabilities of potential case combinations provides a means of
adjustment for future protection improvement in security planning. The anomalous
incidents can lead to successful intrusion, and the actuarial aspect of the anomalies
should be captured in the systemic risk.
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Chapter 4
Simulated Attack Impacts of
Grid-Wide Stability
The impact of switching attacks may be simulated by either a power flow-based
approach and a dynamic simulation-based approach. The former has been studied
in [41, 42]. However, the latter is not studied with sufficient protection models. In
power engineering society, N -k contingencies have been carefully examined. Most of
the contingencies are system faults with a significant voltage drop and/or frequency
drop. In the case of the voltage drop, the ephemeral, transient behavior occurs only
during the fault, and then the power grid moves into the post-fault operating point.
This short-term (typically 60-250 ms) behavior can accelerate the rotor speed of
synchronous generators, and the grid results in the disconnection of generating units
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along with the loss of synchronism. Most rotor angle stability studies accompany
the aforementioned short-term behavior with significant voltage sags. On the other
hand, switching attacks do not possess this type of behavior because the specific
system event does not happen. It is noted that the behavior and impact are the
same between the frequency-related N -k contingencies and the switching attack that
disconnects generators and loads only.
Disconnecting branches opening circuit breakers do not usually cause a significant
impact on the power grid. Therefore, this event is not treated as any contingencies.
However, if all branches connected to one or more substations are disconnected, this
impact can be unignorable. This study is totally out-of-scope in the industry because
this is treated as an extremely rare event. Besides, there is no generally accepted
guideline of which models power engineers should employ for the simulation.
Chapter 4 clarifies the necessary control models and protection models that must
be used for switching attack studies. Transient stability, frequency stability, and
voltage stability are considered when extracting the necessary models. The time-
domain simulation results for the switching attack against substations and IEDs are
showcased using IEEE standard models.
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4.1 Key Factors of Dynamical Behaviors
This section discusses the contributing factors of system dynamics that can lead to
cascading consequences, leading to potential brownout or blackout.
4.1.1 Voltage Threshold
Voltage level of substations with 200 kV or higher can be vulnerable to switching at-
tacks. Therefore, the transmission network can become the major target and analysis
of base case and how the bottleneck of a system can be identified and later imple-
mented with security protection technologies. Although the remove of a lower voltage
substation may not initialize a cascade of blackout, the combinatorial analyses should
be included in a study.
4.1.2 Types of System Stability
Grid’s well-being is observed by its abnormal phenomena that is generalized into 3
types: (1) transient stability, (2) frequency stability, (3) voltage stability, and overload
[123]. Any of the stability issues below can occur triggered by the initial events of
sequential switching attacks in substations.
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Transient stability: Transient stability is not generally violated without the sig-
nificant voltage drop. Therefore, the possibility of the violation of transient
stability due to substation switching attacks is relatively low. However, poorly
damped power swing oscillation or negative damping oscillation can happen,
when the dominant frequency component of the power swing oscillation totally
changes, or when steady-state stability is violated after the substation switching
attack. In addition, the angle difference between synchronous generators and
synchronous condensers can be expanded during the cascaded events, which
results in the out-of-step status in the grid.
Frequency stability: Losing one or more substations due to switching attacks often
create abrupt mismatch in power balance between generation and loads, which
results in change in the system frequency. In general, as k of “S-k” becomes
larger, frequency stability issue is more likely to happen (But that is not always
the case). Both significant frequency drop or rise can occur. However, frequency
drop is more likely to be observed because the frequency rise leads to the gener-
ator tripping by overfrequency protections. This is due to the frequency starts
to decrease after the generator tripping.
Voltage stability: Undervoltage load shedding can happen once the significant volt-
age drop mainly due to system faults or deficiency of the reactive power support.
However, some loads are disconnected due to their local protection in the case
of low voltage before activation of undervoltage load shedding. In addition,
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system faults do not occur during substation switching attacks. Therefore, the
voltage collapse caused by voltage stability is unlikely to happen. On the other
hand, the significant voltage rise can also happen especially when loads with
a large amount of reactive consumption are lost all of a sudden (see a case
study in Clause 4.4.2). That condition is likely to happen especially when a
large amount of loads and/or transformers are disconnected due to substation
switching attacks. As k of “S-k” becomes larger, the violation of voltage instead
of the voltage stability issue, is more likely to happen.
Overload: Overloading conditions can also be a major abnormal phenomenon as a
result of substation switching attacks. Once a heavily loaded line (or tie-line)
between a large power station and load centers is disconnected, the power flow
over the disconnected line is rerouted to the remaining available lines and those
lines can be overloaded.
The stability limit may not necessarily be restricted by by the thermal limit and
transient stability. The limit for frequency stability can restrain the power flow over
the transmission line. In this case, such a transmission line has sufficient margin for
the overloading before the switching attacks, and the possibility of the overloading
due to substation switching attacks is unlikely. Transformers show a time-inverse
characteristics for the overloading and some transformers have short-term and long-
term limits. In sum, the combination of instability introduced can implicate the
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overall control for destabilizing the grid.
4.1.3 Protective Relaying
Major protections are classified into: (1) line protection, (2) transformer protection,
(3) bus protection, and (4) generator protection. It should be emphasized that the
protections in transmission network are normally designed to detect the system faults
with significant change in the voltage, current, and frequency to minimize the faulted
section and to prevent power outages. Only when such significant change in electric
quantities is observed/detected, the protections can initiate their actions. However,
substation switching attacks do not always cause such a change in electric quanti-
ties. Therefore, protective relays that are designed for clearing the system faults are
unlikely to operate in the case of substation switching attacks.
Line protection: Unlikely to operate except overloading protection
Bus protection: Unlikely to operate
Transformer protection: May operate over- or under- voltage protection
Generator protection: Likely to operate
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4.1.4 Wide-Area Control and Protection
The local protection is designed to arm the grid avoiding equipment damage. On the
contrary, the scheme of wide-area control and protection involves multiple substation
coordination. Such schemes are categorized as:
• Protective relays to protect a component
• Protective relays to pre-empt the blackout.
The special protection system (SPS) is widely used to prevent cascaded events that
cause the blackout. Although blackout are barely occurred [124], it is unevitable
and its impact of blackouts is unignorable. The SPS is classified into two types: 1)
response-based SPS, 2) event-based SPS [125, 126] (See Fig. 4.1 a)). The response-
based SPS is provoked by detecting the dynamic behavior following a severe distur-
bance. Because remote or system-wide electric quantities are not generally required,
this type has been typically implemented and used by utilities around the world.
On the other hand, the event-based SPS normally requires system-wide information,
but initiates the corrective action earlier than the response-based SPS, matching the
event with the decision table As shown in Fig. 4.1 b), a fault detection function is
often applied to activate the event-based SPS for higher reliability. The disruptive





















Figure 4.1: Event-based SPS and response-based SPS
Therefore, the event-based SPS do not initiate the corrective control action, while the
response-based SPS can take that action. In light of this, the response-based SPS is
out of scope of this simulation study.
4.1.5 Combinatorial Complexity for a Larger Power Grid
Statistically, an exhaustive enumeration of total substation outage combinations
grows exponentially with the size of a power system [127]. The correlation is system-
dependent where the the same size of the system under different topological setup
would result in different combinations of diverged power solution solutions. The total
numbers of substation in each power system could have different impact based on
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the elimination methods at the lower k values, which is the number of substation
outages. Efficient algorithms to include cascading outage and without outage have
shown significant reduction of combination at the lower number of k; model with cas-
cading outage would help to avoid large enumeration of evaluation with steady-state
analysis [41, 42]. This chapter would adapt these algorithms to study combinations
validating through dynamic simulation methods. On the other hand, complete enu-
meration without power system analysis tool can be computationally intensive [128]
due to each combination would have to be validated to know if a scenario may lead to
cascading blackout or brownout. An accurate assessment with time-domain analysis
is needed in determining the significant impacts of the grid.
4.2 System Dynamics Under Switching Attacks
Cascaded events triggered by switching attacks from compromised substations hypo-
thetically can be simulated in details using time-domain simulation tools [127]. If
loads are connected to the compromised substation, those loads are manually discon-
nected by hackers and brownout can happen, the loss of electricity (LOE) is not zero.
As k of S-k increases, the electricity loss caused by the manually disconnected power
equipment is likely to increase because more substations are disconnected from the
main grid. On the other hand, as k of S-k increases, the risk of additional discon-
nection caused by protective relays, i.e., cascaded events, also increase. The risks
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of cascaded events can lead to major brownout or blackout and a large number of
protective relays operate before the power outage. Therefore, protective relays are
modeled to capture the sequential dynamics in simulation where it captures cascade
of grid instability.
However, protective relays for clearing short circuit faults or ground faults are unlikely
to operate because fault currents are not created during substation switching attacks;
meaning, protective relays that operate without fault currents are the pre-conditions
of the grid before further analysis. In addition, the protective relays that operate first
for the same power system dynamics (i.e. protective relays whose operating condition
are more close to the normal operating condition), need to be properly modeled in
the more realistic studies.
4.2.1 Frequency Relay
Frequency relay models are considered for synchronous generators, including syn-
chronous condensers, and loads. The relay settings of overfrequency relays and un-
derfrequency relays generally consist of a frequency level, a timer that impose delays
and the undervoltage blocking function. The undervoltage blocking function disables
tripping power equipment when the measured voltage is low, because the frequency
relay fails to calculate the frequency accurately.
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Because the frequency relay is often operated in multiple steps/stages, the multiple
relay settings are often employed with the common undervoltage blocking function.
In order to avoid the mechanical damage of the power plant, over speed protective
relays are activated when the frequency significantly increases. However, over speed
relays are unlikely to operate before the overfrequency relay operation because the
frequency threshold level of over speed relays is higher than that of overfreuqency
relays. Therefore, over speed relays may not kick in wake of the attack events.
4.2.2 Overvoltage Relay
Overvoltage relay models should be implemented for transformers and synchronous
condensers, if any. The relay settings of overvoltage relays generally consist of a
voltage level and a timer. Overvoltage relays may have the higher voltage level with
the shorter timer, which is known as the instantaneous overvoltage relay.
4.2.3 Out-of-Step (OOS) Relay
Out-of-Step (OOS) relays [129] should be used for transmission lines as well as gener-
ators (including synchronous condensers, if any). OOS relay is designed using either
the impedance or the voltage angle difference [116]. Although OOS relays are not
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always placed in all of transmission lines in many countries, it is recommended to
implement OOS relays to all of the lines for substation switching attack case studies
from numerical stability point of view (Otherwise, the time-domain simulation can
unexpectedly be terminated due to the numerical instability during cascaded events)
as well as in the stability point of view.
4.2.4 Voltage/Frequency (V/F) Relay
The volts per hertz relay is generally implemented in generators. This relay can
operate especially when the system frequency significantly goes down or when the
terminal voltage significantly goes up. This protection may be skipped if overvoltage
relay and underfrequency relay are modelled. Over-excitation limiters (OEL) [129]
may be used on behalf of overvoltage relays because over-excitation limiters play a
role to reduce the terminal voltage of generators. On the contrary, the OEL should
be used if it is deployed in a generating unit.
4.2.5 Undervoltage Relay
Undervoltage relays should be used for loads. However, the typical relay settings
of undervoltage relays are the threshold voltage level and its timer, and the typical
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relay settings of the timer is 0.5 seconds or longer. On the other hand, the loads have
their own disconnection characteristics in response to the voltage level and this self-
disconnection characteristics reacts nearly instantaneously, i.e., significantly faster
than the operation of the undervoltage relay. Therefore, the modeling of the load
self-disconnection characteristics is critical.
4.2.6 Automatic Voltage Controller
In order to represent the cascaded event more precisely, not only proper protective
relay models, but also accurate generator models with controller models are vital. A
representative exciter model should be implemented in generator models including
synchronous condenser models. For the selection of the exciter model, the AC exciter
is a general choice. In the case of the bulk power system with large capacity generators
and poorly damped inter-area oscillations, the thyristor based exciter with the power
system stabilizer (PSS) may be selected for a large capacity generator, such as 1 GVA
class generators [130].
The aforementioned exciters must include over-exciter limiter (OEL) in modeling.
This is due to the voltage imbalance can significantly change the filed voltage of
generators can exceed its upper limit and the OEL starts to decrease the field voltage,
which results in lower terminal voltage of the generator and lower reactive power
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support from the generator. Although the response speed of the OEL is much slower
compared to that of the AVR, the dynamic response of the OEL can shorten the time
to blackouts especially when it takes longer time to result in blackouts. The generic
model with its parameters is provided in references [131, 132].
4.2.7 Frequency Controller
The primary frequency model should be implemented into generator models excluding
synchronous condenser models. Because most countries use thermal power unit as a
major source, the simplified steam turbine governor model may be used as the generic
power plant type. The generic model with its parameters is provided in references
[132, 133].
The secondary and tertiary frequency controllers may be skipped for substation
switching attack case studies mainly because the response time is not quite fast com-
pared to the cascaded events after substation switching attacks. However, when the
long-term stability study is required, the secondary frequency control, also known as
automatic generation control (AGC) [129], should be considered in the modeling.
The power plant controller model [129, 133] that can precisely represent the dynamics
of boiler and fuel controllers is suggested to be included especially when advanced
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gasification combined power plants (AGCCs) [133] need to be modeled. The ex-
hausted gas control reacts relatively fast and exhausted gas control can be prioritized
depending on the ambient temperature and the active power output level. Generally
speaking, the power plant controller model that represents modes of operations [129],
either turbine-following mode or boiler-following mode, is critical and can significantly
change the system frequency. However, there is currently no available generic power
plant controller model with its parameters. Therefore, only when the real-life case
study is performed and those information are available, that can be included in the
modeling.
4.3 Modeling the System Specifics
The system diagram of the IEEE 14-bus system model is shown in Fig. 4.2. Ten
substation locations are also shown using figures in a star box in the same figure.
Fig.4.5 shows the power flow solution based on [46]. Because this system model is
represented as of a part of American Electric Power System in 1962 [46, 130], the
DC exciter model with the OEL is used as the exciter (see Fig. 4.3) and the primary
frequency controller of steam turbines is used for both generators as the frequency
controller of generators (see Fig. 4.4). Both units are assumed to be operated in
regulated machines with the turbine output upper limit of 105% and the power plant
controller and automatic generation control (AGC), i.e., secondary frequency control
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Figure 4.2: Single diagram of the IEEE 14 bus system model and assumed
substation locations [21]
are not implemented in the model. It is noted that parameters shown in Figs. 4.3
and 4.4 are example parameters.
The rated capacity of a single thermal power unit in 1960s was less than 500 MVA,
it is assumed that the Substation 1 includes three 100 MVA units with the output of








Rated Capacity [MVA] 100 100 100 60
Rated Power [MW] 85 85 85 51
Inertia Constant, M [s] 6 6 6 6
D-axis Reactance [p.u.] 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
D-axis Transient Reactance [p.u.] 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
D-axis Sub-transient Reactance [p.u.] 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Q-axis Reactance [p.u.] 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Q-axis Sub-transient Reactance [p.u.] 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
D-axis Transient Time Constant [s] 1 1 1 1
D-axis Sub-transient Time Constant [s] 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Q-axis Open Circuit Time Constant [s] 0.206 0.206 0.206 0.206
Q-axis Sub-transient Time Constant [s] 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Armature Leakage Reactance [p.u.] 0.225 0.225 0.225 0.225
Armature Time Constant [s] 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Zero Phase Reactance [p.u.] 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Negative Phase Reactance [p.u.] 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
4.3.1 Modeling the Frequency Deviation in Relays
The following settings of overfrequency and underfrequency relays for generators (in-
cluding synchronous condensers) are as follows: [135, 136].
• 61.8 Hz (overfrequency relay)
• 58.0 Hz (underfrequency relay)
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Figure 4.4: Primary Frequency Control model [134]
136].
• 59.3 Hz (5% reduction with relative to the total load)
• 58.9 Hz (additional 10% reduction with relative to the total load)








































































Blue: Active power output of generator [MW] (Reactive power output [Mvar])
Pink: Active power load consumption [MW] (Reactive power load consumption [Mvar])
Black: Magnitude of bus voltage [p.u.] with angle of bus voltage [degrees]
Figure 4.5: A Power flow solution using IEEE 14-bus system model
Note that the maximum load shedding amount is of 25% for the total loads. Because
the undervoltage locking level is often set as 0.4 p.u., the value is then used, which
means the frequency relay does not trip the loads when the voltage level is under
40%. The other parameters include timer is set to zero in the case studies, while the
circuit breaker operation time is set as 70 ms.
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4.3.2 Overvoltage Relaying
The following parameters of overvoltage relays are implemented in [137],[138]:
• 115% (Overvoltage relay with time=1s)
• 125% (instantaneous overvoltage relay with time=30ms)
In addition to the timer imposed, the circuit breaker operation time is set as 70ms.
4.3.3 Out-of-Step Blocking
The voltage angle difference between the terminal voltage and the internal induced
voltage is used for the Out-Of-Step (OOS) relay for synchronous generators, while
the voltage angle difference between transmission lines is use for the OOS relay for
networks. When the voltage angle difference is used for OOS relays, the relay setting
is set as 180 degrees between the two buses according to the definition of the OOS
condition. Although the timer is set as zero, the circuit breaker operation time is set
as 30 ms. A typical setup of relaying combination for each substation is illustrated





















































27: Underfrequency relay emulated by load self-disconnection characteristics
Note: The assigned numbers are based on [139].
Figure 4.6: Deployment of relay models in IEEE14-bus system model [134]
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4.3.4 Modeling the Electrical Loads
Load characteristics are represented using the exponential load model with the voltage
and frequency dependent as shown in Eq. (4.1) [129, 140]. Load voltage characteris-
tics indices are based on widely used parameters for power system analysis in utilities
and system operators [141]. The coefficients of Load frequency characteristics are
set based on the International Council on Large Electric Systems (CIGRE) work-
ing group which goes through substantial studies on the utility’s grid systems from







































P0: Initial active power consumption of loads
Q0: Initial active power consumption of loads
V0: Initial load bus voltage
P : Active power consumption of loads
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Q: Reactive power consumption of loads
V : Load bus voltage
∆f : Frequency deviation [Hz]
The loads defined here is an aggregated electricity consumption of thousands of con-
sumers at high voltage transmission network. The aggregated loads in distribution
network [143] represents a fraction of high voltage loads. The modeling of loads is
an empirical study that accumulates the statistical correlation between voltage and
current magnitudes from the current and potential transformers (CT/PT).
4.3.5 Undervoltage Phenomena and Load shedding Scheme
The load self-disconnection characteristics are summarized in the following [144]:
Load Self-disconnection Voltage: Below 80%
Load Self-disconnection Starting Voltage: 80%
Load Self-disconnection Saturation Voltage: 40%
Maximum load Self-disconnection Amount: 25%
This characteristic illustrated in Fig. 4.7 are employed by all loads (both active
power loads and reactive power loads) and superimposed on the load voltage and
frequency characteristics shown in Equation 4.1. Because disconnected loads do not
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normally recover quickly and it takes over a minute for many loads to recover, load
recovery characteristics are not considered in the model. For example, once the
load bus voltage level is below 40% under the rated frequency, 25% of the loads are
disconnected, and the remaining 75% loads that stay connected reduce the active and
reactive power consumption to 40% and 16% (=0.42), individually, due to the load
voltage characteristics. The following case studies are performed using a commercially
available time-domain simulation tool [145].
Figure 4.7: Load self-disconnection model [134]
4.4 Event Replay with Cascaded Relay Resulting
in Power Outage
4.4.1 Case 1: Sequence of Relay Operation
The sequential relays are initiated by the switching attack on substations 2 and 12
in Fig. 4.2 where it is referred to one combination of S-2 cases. This serves as the
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initiating events where assumptions made here is that attackers successfully hack into
the substation through the substation firewall and have compromised the substation
console that has accessed to all substation breakers.
As shown in Fig. 4.8, protective relays at different locations are operated sequentially
during the cascaded stage. As shown in Fig. 4.9, the underfrequency relay operations
for load at 0.06s through 0.36s are aggregated. In this example substation switching
attack, one of the generators is isolated due to the attack and tripped 0.3s after
the switching attack due to the overfrequency relay operation. The protective relay
operation for the isolated component is not included in Fig. 4.9.
In this study case, the synchronous generator at Bus 1 is accelerated after the switch-
ing attack, while the synchronous condensers is decelerated after the switching attack.
This discrepancy comes from the opposite magnitude relation between the mechanical
output and electrical output of those synchronous machines.
The output of synchronous condensers is zero at the steady state. However, it immedi-
ately increases using its rotating energy, i.e., the inertia shown during the occurrence
of attack at substations 2 and 12. Because the electrical output is larger than the
mechanical output for that time period, the rotating speed of synchronous condensers
decreases, which is indicated by the measured frequency decrease.
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Figure 4.8: Relay operation time for substation switching attack on Sub-
stations 2 and 12 [134]
decreases when the attack at substations 2 and 12 occurs because the deficiency of
the active power output is compensated by synchronous condensers as well as the
synchronous generator at Bus 2. Therefore, the electrical output is smaller than the
mechanical output following the substation switching attack, the rotating speed of
synchronous generator at Bus 1 increases, i.e., the measured frequency increases.
Therefore, the underfrequency relays for the loads and synchronous condensers oper-
ate, while the overfrequnecy relay for the synchronous generator at Bus 1 operates at













































Figure 4.9: Sequence of relay operation with corresponding waveform [134]
4.4.2 Case 2: Sequence of Relay Operation
The sequential relays are initiated by the switching attack on substations 1, 3, 10, 11,
12, 13, and 14 in Fig. 4.10 where it is referred to combinations of S-7 cases. Protective
relays at different locations including overvoltage relays are operated sequentially
during the cascaded stage. As shown in Fig. 4.11, the underfrequency relay operations
for load at 0.05s through 0.15s are aggregated. In this example substation switching
attack, one of the generators is isolated due to the switching attack and tripped 0.24s
after the switching attack due to the overfrequency relay operation. The protective
relay operation for the isolated component due to the switching attack is not shown
in Figs. 4.10 and 4.11.
155
In this study case, the synchronous generator at Bus 2 is decelerated after the switch-
ing attack, while the disconnected synchronous generator at Bus 1 is accelerated after
that. As shown in Fig. 4.12, the electric power output at Bus 2 increased immediately
right after the switching attack. Because the electric output exceeds the mechanical
input of the generator at Bus 2, the rotating speed of the generator starts to decrease,
which results in decrease in the system frequency.
On the other hand, the terminal voltage of synchronous condensers at buses 6 and
8 increased by over 10% and reach to over 115% right after the switching attack.
Synchronous condensers generally contribute to increase the system voltage providing
reactive power at heavily load conditions. Before the substation switching attack, the
synchronous condensers at buses 6 and 8 are connected to the medium point of the grid
between power stations and loads. However, after the substation switching attack,
those condensers are eventually connected to the end of the grid as shown in Fig.
4.12, losing the supporting loads, and their terminal voltages are raised.
As the system frequency decreases, the connected loads are gradually disconnected
due to underfrequency relays, which leads to lighter loading condition, and the sys-
tem voltage further increases and reaches to over 125%. Therefore, instantaneous
overvoltage relays of one synchronous condenser at bus 6 and transformers near bus 6
at 0.19s. It is noted that undervoltage relay operation at bus 6 in Figs. 4.11 and 4.12
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is the results of disconnection of the transformer at bus 6, not the reason of the sub-
station switching attack. After disconnecting them, the system voltage additionally
increases and the rest synchronous condenser and the transformer are disconnected
due to the overvoltage relay at 0.20s, which is a typical cascading event.
The immediate increase in the system voltage at 0.20s contributes to increase the
total demand due to the load voltage characteristics, which accelerates the decrease
in the system frequency and trip the remaining generator at bus 2 due to the un-
derfrequency relay at 0.21s. It is noted that undervoltage relay operations at buses
2, 4, and 9 in Figs. 4.11 and 4.12 are the results of the blackout, not the reason
of the blackout. Therefore, the underfrequency relays for the loads and synchronous
condensers operate, while the overfrequnecy relay for the synchronous generator at
Bus 1 operates at 0.51s, which results in the blackout.
4.4.3 Case 3: Sequence of Relay Operation
The sequential relays are initiated by the switching attack on substations 2, 10, and
11 in Fig. 4.13 where it is referred to one combination of S-3 cases. Protective relays
including OOS protections at different locations are operated sequentially during the
cascaded stage. Fig. 4.14 illustrates the underfrequency relay operations for load
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Figure 4.12: Phenomenon of system dynamics for the IEEE 14-bus system
[46] initiated by a substation switching attack upon substation 7 [134]
attack, one of the generators at bus 2 is isolated due to the switching attack and
tripped 0.30s after the switching attack due to the overfrequency relay operation.
Referred to Clause 4.4.1, the connecting synchronous generator at bus 1 is accelerated
while synchronous condensers decelerate. In this case, as the discrepancy of the rotor
speed between the synchronous generator and the synchronous condensers increases,
(the twist of) the angle difference between them also increases, which results in the
out-of-step conditions at two locations (over the line between buses 4 and 5 and






















Figure 4.13: Sequence of relay operation [134]
the electrical distance between the source and loads is expanded, and the remaining
generator at bus 1 is tripped by overfrequency relay.
4.4.4 Losses of Electricity
The losses of electricity (LOE) are often considered the pre-cursor of grid instability.
Statistically, the following simulated statistics of LOE for the case study in IEEE
14-bus system is shown below:
0 ∼ 9.99%: 21 cases
10 ∼ 19.99%: 30 cases





















Figure 4.14: Sequence of relay operation initiated by tripping substations
[134]
30 ∼ 39.99%: 30 cases
40 ∼ 49.99%: 2 cases
50 ∼ 59.99%: 0 cases
60 ∼ 69.99%: 0 cases
70 ∼ 79.99%: 0 cases
80 ∼ 89.99%: 8 cases
90 ∼ 99.99%: 0 cases
100%: 950 cases
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Figure 4.15: Phenomenon of system dynamics for the IEEE 14-bus system
[46] initiated by a substation switching attack upon substations 2, 10, and
11 [134]
Under this study of simulation, the percentage of evident number of blackouts for k
from 1 to 10 of S-k has reached 92.3%. The simulation results have shown that the
original hypothesis of assumption, which is the total combinations of blackout cases
decrease as the size of the grid is larger for k ≤ 10. The constant 10 is arbitrarily
assigned based on the knowledge of simulation study that optimally provides the
intuition of study that shows the cutoff of large combinations for the first 10 order.
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4.5 Extensive Cyber-Based Contingencies
4.5.1 S-k Contingency
This is a classical study of cyber-based contingency under steady-state analysis. The
presumed outages of components associated with each node of transmission network
(referred to substation outages) is removed from the base cases. However, such stud-
ies do not include sequential events in “time” to demonstrate the cascading [146] and
it can be challenging to capture blackout/brownout in steady-state simulation. The
“divergence” of power flow solutions is the only indicator to show that system reaches
its limit and such simulation study can be pre-screening. Investigation of dynamic
study may exhibit the scenarios otherwise, depending on the relay models that cap-
ture the cascades. This approach is improved computationally by eliminating the
combinations in the early stage of k so that a larger number of combinations would
not carry forward to the higher number of k. Such approach can significantly reduce
total combination when incorporated the cascading effect using power flow method
(steady-state). The advantage of this approach can stimulate the combinatorial cases
in a shorter time using practically-sized transmission network that can be very use-
ful for simulating a studied network for actuarial science that can be quantitatively
utilized to estimate risks.
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4.5.2 R-k Contingency
Each substation is gradually replaced with digital relays for modernization of IP-
based substations. Depending on the relay types, each relay is connected to different
part of the circuit breakers in a substation. While this may prove the usefulness
of details in term of impacts, the types of deployed relays in a power system can
be complex to mimic the real scenarios. This sort of contingency can be structured
between S-k and N -k/N -1 [147]. Without systematic elimination techniques, it can
be computationally challenging for each base case, especially when the size of a power
system is larger than 1000-bus system. This framework is under development.
4.6 Impact Evaluation
A hypothesized impact study evaluates the plausible consequence of cyberattacks and
anticipates system behaviors based on a specific operating condition. Such prediction
of potential cascading outages and failures can be utilized to derive metrics that
quantify the attributes of a case study. This requires validation of impact credibility
on methods used in steady-state and dynamic simulations. A conceptualization of
impact evaluation is proposed to handle the combinatorial nature of cyber-related
issues associated with :
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• Critical/non-critical combination verifications,
• Cascade confirmation,
• Re-evaluation.
4.6.1 Critical/Non-Critical Combination Verifications
This verification involves a steady-state and dynamic analysis of the hypothesized
components and substation outages. This checkpoint is used to determine inconsis-
tent simulation outcomes from both dynamic and static modules and reconcile the
difference through cascade confirmation and probability re-evaluation through an ad-
justment of parameters. For example, a hypothesized substation outage would result
in power flow diverged that may not necessarily reflect a similar dynamic simulation
outcome. This could happen when a power flow simulator shows no cascading failure
symptom, but the dynamic study indicates otherwise.
4.6.2 Cascade Confirmation
The cascade confirmation proposed here is to determine the coherency of relative angle
and frequency under specific switching permutation. The studies will include deter-
mining the number of permutations deemed conclusive and adequate, corresponding
to sequential contingencies. The effective pre-screening of sequential contingencies
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would include substation dependencies and the practicality of concurrent cyberat-
tacks to disconnect components/substations out of the grid abruptly. The challenges
here adequately represent an unordered combination of outage from the steady-state
power flow module.
4.6.3 Re-Evaluation
Re-evaluation often occurs when both simulators demonstrate a significant deviation
of outcome that requires an adjustment. Such errors can be related to either of the
simulators where specific handling is necessary. The discovery of tuning between the
two modules can significantly reduce the discrepancies and will strengthen the ver-
ification and credibility of the hypothesized scenarios. The results depend on the
size of a power system. Fig. 4.16 enumerates all critical and non-critical cases and
illustrates cascaded evaluation with steady-state rapid screening to dynamic simula-
tion to verify the catastrophic scenarios. The divergence evaluation in a power flow
model determines the criticality of hypothesized substation outages. However, the
steady-state evaluation results may not consistently demonstrate the same outcome
in the sense of potential grid instability of cascading implication. Fig. 4.16 describes
the dependencies of steady-state simulation screening with a probability of the critical
contingency P that is derived as 0.1%, while the probability of the non-critical contin-
gency is derived as 99.9%. The summation of probabilities at each level (steady-state
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and dynamics) is always equal to 1.0. These probabilities are the statistical numbers
established to determine the total number of convergent and divergent cases. The
steady-state approach would largely eliminate the criticality of problematic scenarios,
which may not always be correct. The latter part of the dynamic simulation examines
the consistencies of both methods, whether they are stable or unstable from the power
system stability point of view. This may not always be the same between both. The
verification of dynamic simulation could reveal the criticality of non-critical contin-
gency, which is statistically derived. As shown in the figure, the critical combinations
with probability 0.1% based on steady-state simulation will be examined with the
dynamic simulation that may result in 73.5%. On the other hand, the dynamic sim-
ulation verification can also reveal the probability of the critical contingency that
is statistically derived by 4.7% from the steady-state probability of the non-critical
contingency, which is 99.9% in most cases. Computationally, the steady-state ap-
proach is much less expensive than the dynamic simulation verification, while the
latter approach has a higher degree of accuracy with a detailed description of system
behaviors.
In general, steady-state analysis may not always reflect a potential issue of poten-
tial cascading, especially the transient states are not sequentially captured one af-
ter another subsequent outages. The stability evaluation of cascading outages is a
dynamic-security analysis with variables in transient status such as time period, fre-
quency and voltages instability, generation-load imbalance, and metrics of cost-benefit
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Figure 4.16: Enumerative grouping for critical and non-critical cases [127]
justification of catastrophic impacts [146, 148, 149, 150]. For example, the mismatch
of generation and load in power flow evaluation model can be numerically balanced
on the “reference” node, where physically, there is no slack bus in the practical world.
The imbalance of generation and load can only be achieved by adjusting generation
output and/or shedding load. The time transition of one state to another is not
sequentially captured in the steady-state power flow model – the power flow evalu-
ation solely addresses the divergence-convergence issue which is directly related to
the initiation of voltage, generation, bus type, and topology of power system. The
time interval is critical in the dynamic analysis with cascading outages. Sequential
cascading events can be induced in a bulk power system after an initial cyberattack
that can range in an interval of 5s to 15s for a switching action initiated by attacker
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automation tools. The operation condition of power system should reflect the transi-
tion states that may lead to unstable or not in term of generator ramping up/down or
load shedding as well as the influence of various protection scheme deployed on any
microprocessor-based components within a substation-level network. Consequently,
the active power flow of each transmission line needs to be updated during each time
interval. Moreover, under certain circumstance, the models of steady-state analysis
may be inadequate to detail the sequential disruptive switching permutation under
a substation specific scheme, e.g., one-an-half bus-breaker model because the IEEE
test case may be simplified in most of the steady-state analysis appeared in the lit-
erature. The accuracy of dynamics simulation may necessarily needs a more detailed
topology for such study. Additionally, the steady-state analysis may not be able to
capture islanding issue when a cascading outage occurs [151, 152]. In a larger system,
the initiating event of switching attacks upon the substations may initiate a breaker
tripping that results in multiple islands. This can be a unique situation where power
flow verification may not always agree with a diverged outcome if multiple islands
are discovered and the handling of multiple “slack” buses may not immediately com-
pensate the generation-load imbalance across the islands. Without a methodological
approach, there may not be a direct way to conclude that stabilities can be achieved
among these multiple islands as a result of a cyberattack initially.
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4.7 Simulation Results for S-k Contingency
4.7.1 Power Flow Based Blackout Rate
The brownout rate and blackout rate in the IEEE standard systems are derived from
a power flow calculation program.
4.7.1.1 IEEE 14-bus system
The blackout rate rapidly increases as k of S-k increases while k is below 5 in the
IEEE 14-bus system (Table 4.2). When k is equal to or more than 5, the increase
in the blackout rate is saturated in the IEEE 14-bus system. k of over 8 of S-k is
skipped because blackout rate is always one. It is noted that the IEEE 14-bus system
comprises 10 substations.
4.7.1.2 IEEE 30-bus system
The blackout rate rapidly increases as k of S-k increases while k is below 6 in the
IEEE 30-bus system (Table 4.3). When k is equal to or more than 6, the increase
in the blackout rate is saturated in the IEEE 30-bus system. k of over 11 of S-k is
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Table 4.2
Power flow based brownout and blackout cases of S-k contingency analysis







S-1 7 3 0.400
S-2 20 25 0.667
S-3 30 90 0.833
S-4 25 185 0.929
S-5 11 241 0.964
S-6 2 208 0.971
S-7 0 120 0.983
S-8 0 45 1.000
skipped because blackout rate is always one. It is noted that the IEEE 30-bus system
comprises 24 substations.
Table 4.3
Power flow based brownout and blackout cases of S-k contingency analysis







S-1 20 8 0.286
S-2 115 161 0.583
S-3 478 1,546 0.764
S-4 1,255 9,371 0.882
S-5 2,143 40,361 0.950
S-6 2,348 132,248 0.983
S-7 1,618 344,486 0.995
S-8 678 734,793 0.999
S-9 156 1,307,348 1.000
S-10 15 1,961,241 1.000
S-11 0 2,496,144 1.000
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4.7.1.3 IEEE 57-bus system
The blackout rate rapidly increases as k of S-k increases while k is below 6 in the
IEEE 57-bus system (Table 4.4). When k is equal to or more than 6, the increase
in the blackout rate is saturated in the IEEE 57-bus system. k of over 19 of S-k is
skipped because blackout rate is always one.
Table 4.4
Power flow based brownout and blackout cases of S-k contingency analysis







S-1 25 17 0.405
S-2 293 568 0.660
S-3 2,134 9,346 0.814
S-4 10,807 101,123 0.903
S-5 40,343 810,325 0.953
S-6 114,826 5,130,960 0.978
S-7 254,324 26,724,004 0.991
S-8 443,899 117,586,286 0.996
S-9 615,204 445,276,606 0.999
S-10 679,422 1,470,763,551 1.000
S-11 597,624 4,279,963,752 1.000
S-12 416,539 11,057,700,349 1.000
S-13 227,579 25,518,503,701 1.000
S-14 95,659 52,860,133,421 1.000
S-15 29,964 98,672,397,652 1.000
S-16 6,607 1.66510E+11 1.000
S-17 916 2.54662E+11 1.000
S-18 60 3.53697E+11 1.000
S-19 0 4.46775E+11 1.000
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4.7.1.4 IEEE 118-bus system
The blackout rate rapidly increases as k of S-k increases while k is below 6 in the
IEEE 118-bus system (Table 4.5). When k is equal to or more than 6, the increase
in the blackout rate is saturated in the IEEE 118-bus system. k of over 7 of S-k is
not calculated because extremely large arrays needs to be allocated and the memory
error derails the calculation.
Table 4.5
Power flow based brownout and blackout cases of S-k contingency analysis







S-1 67 42 0.385
S-2 2,167 3,719 0.632
S-3 45,107 164,827 0.785
S-4 666,054 4,897,197 0.880
S-5 7,503,993 109,324,278 0.936
S-6 66,795,314 1,958,228,050 0.967
S-7 483,308,071 29,313,464,285 0.984
4.7.2 Dynamic Simulation Based Blackout Rate
The brownout rate and blackout rate in the IEEE standard systems are derived from
a commercially available time-domain simulation tool [145].
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4.7.2.1 IEEE 14-bus system
The blackout rate rapidly increases as k of S-k increases while k is below 5 in the
IEEE 14-bus system (Table 4.6). When k is equal to or more than 5, the increase in
the blackout rate is saturated in the IEEE 14-bus system. If k is over 7, any cases
incur blackouts. The S-10 is skipped because it is obvious that the grid results in the
blackout.
Table 4.6
Dynamic simulation-based brownout and blackout cases of S-k contingency







S-1 6 4 0.400
S-2 15 30 0.667
S-3 20 100 0.833
S-4 15 195 0.929
S-5 9 243 0.964
S-6 6 204 0.971
S-7 2 118 0.983
S-8 0 45 1.000
S-9 0 10 1.000
4.7.2.2 IEEE 30-bus system
The blackout rate constantly increases as k of S-k increases while k is below 8 in the
IEEE 30-bus system (Table 4.7). When k is equal to or more than 8, the increase in
the blackout rate is gradually saturated in the IEEE 30-bus system. k of over 8 of
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Table 4.7
Dynamic simulation-based brownout and blackout cases of S-k contingency







S-1 24 4 0.143
S-2 189 87 0.315
S-3 1,164 860 0.425
S-4 5,049 5,577 0.525
S-5 15,637 26,867 0.632
S-6 35,082 99,514 0.739
S-7 57,540 288,564 0.834
S-8 69,860 665,611 0.905
S-k is not calculated because extremely heavy computation is required.
4.7.2.3 IEEE 57-bus system
The blackout rate constantly increases as k of S-k increases while k is below 5 in
the IEEE 57-bus system (Table 4.8). On the other hand, the increasing speed of
the blackout rate gradually declines as k of S-k increases. k of over 4 of S-k is not
calculated because enormously heavy computation is required.
Table 4.8
Dynamic simulation-based brownout and blackout cases of S-k contingency







S-1 41 1 0.024
S-2 809 52 0.060
S-3 10,384 1,096 0.095
S-4 97,881 14,049 0.126
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4.7.2.4 IEEE 118-bus system
The blackout rate is nearly zero when k of S-k is below 4 in the IEEE 118-bus system
(Table 4.9). It is noted that the number of blackout cases is not zero when k of S-k
is over 1. It can be seen that the blackout rate decreases as the grid size increases.
Table 4.9
Dynamic simulation-based brownout and blackout cases of S-k contingency







S-1 109 0 0.00000
S-2 5885 1 0.00017
S-3 209883 51 0.00024
4.7.3 Comparison of Brownout and Blackout Cases Between
Power Flow Analysis and Time-domain Simulation
As shown in Fig. 4.16, the blackout and brownout combination is classified into four
types (Table 4.10).
The four types shown in (Table 4.10) can be derived in the three IEEE standard
systems, sorting out the results in Clauses 4.7.1 and 4.7.2. The conformity pertaining
to blackout can be observed from the last two columns in Tables 4.11, 4.12, 4.13,
and 4.14. The IEEE 14-bus system is the smallest grid with the smallest number
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Table 4.10
Combination of blackout (critical) and brownout (non-critical) cases
Type








2 X X X
3 X X
4 X X X
of substations (10 substations). On the other hand, the IEEE 118-bus system is the
largest grid with the largest number of substations (109 substations). As the grid size
increases, the impact of a single substation outage decreases. Therefore, the blackout
rate is overall high in the IEEE 14-bus system, while the brownout rate is overall high
in the IEEE 118-bus system. As shown in Table 4.14, only one blackout case for the
S-2 contingency and fifty one blackout cases for the S-3 contingency.
Conformity in small grids: In the case of small grid, such as the IEEE 14-bus
system, the number of Type 4 is always larger than that of Type 3. On the other
hand, the number of Type 2 is mostly smaller than that of Type 1. Therefore, the
blackout conformity is overall higher than the brownout conformity. The IEEE 30-bus
system also exhibits the similar trend.
Conformity in large grids: In the case of large grid, such as the IEEE 57-bus
system and IEEE 118-bus system, the number of Type 4 is always smaller than that
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of Type 3. On the other hand, the number of Type 2 is always larger than that
of Type 1. Therefore, the brownout conformity is overall higher than the blackout
conformity.
In light of the above, the higher conformity is flipped between the blackout and
brownout, depending on the grid size.
Table 4.11
Conformity in terms of brownout/blackout in IEEE 14-bus system
S-k Type1 Type2 Type3 Type4
Blackout rate
static dynamic
S-1 2 5 1 2 0.30 0.40
S-2 11 9 6 19 0.56 0.67
S-3 23 7 13 77 0.75 0.83
S-4 23 2 13 172 0.88 0.93
S-5 11 0 9 232 0.96 0.96
S-6 2 0 6 202 0.99 0.97
S-7 0 0 2 118 1.00 0.98
S-8 0 0 0 45 1.00 1.00
S-9 0 0 0 10 1.00 1.00
Table 4.12
Conformity in terms of brownout/blackout in IEEE 30-bus system
S-k Type1 Type2 Type3 Type4
Blackout rate
static dynamic
S-1 1 19 5 3 0.333 0.167
S-2 13 102 87 74 0.583 0.315
S-3 92 380 784 768 0.764 0.425
S-4 325 887 4,162 5,252 0.882 0.525
S-5 704 1,326 14,311 26,163 0.950 0.632
S-6 1,040 1,203 33,879 98,474 0.983 0.739
S-7 799 616 56,924 287,765 0.995 0.834
S-8 439 155 69,705 665,172 0.999 0.905
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Table 4.13
Conformity in terms of brownout/blackout in IEEE 57-bus system
S-k Type1 Type2 Type3 Type4
Blackout rate
static dynamic
S-1 0 25 16 1 0.167 0.024
S-2 0 293 516 52 0.583 0.060
S-3 1 2,133 8,251 1,095 0.764 0.095
S-4 8 10,799 87,082 14,041 0.882 0.126
Table 4.14
Conformity in terms of brownout/blackout in IEEE 118-bus system
S-k Type1 Type2 Type3 Type4
Blackout rate
static dynamic
S-1 0 67 42 0 0.385 0.000
S-2 0 2,167 3,718 1 0.632 0.000
S-3 0 45,107 164,776 51 0.785 0.000
Active power output adjustability: The power flow calculation specifies a slack
bus that compensates all of the deficiency of the generation and matches the gener-
ation with loads maintaining the nominal frequency. On the other hand, the time-
domain simulation can consider the upper limit of the active power output of gener-
ators and represent the frequency drop. Thus, the power flow analysis can provide
more optimistic results compared to the dynamic simulation. In the case of small-scale
networks, a single substation outage can pose a significant active power imbalance.
Therefore, this property is predominant when the grid size is small (Fig. 4.17). In
other words, the power flow analysis with the superior active power-adjustability is
prone to indicate optimistic results compared to the dynamic simulation in smaller
grids.
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It is noted that the active power output adjustability can be the same regardless
of the grid size due to no upper limit of the swing generator’s active power output.
However, more enormous active power changes in the swing generator can also cause
















































Figure 4.17: Active power output and load adjustabilities in response to
grid size
Load adjustability: On the other hand, the spontaneous and forced load reduction
can be precisely simulated in the time-domain simulation, while it is hard to emulate
in the power flow analysis. The main point here is that active power and reactive
power consumption become a function of the load bus voltage as well as frequency
(see Equation 4.1), and the load bus voltage cannot be uniquely identified without
an iterative approach. Because this iterative approach requires multiple power flow
calculations, the power flow approach cannot generally represent the load shedding
behavior. Because the load reduction can increase the possibility of containing cas-
caded events, the time-domain simulation can provide more optimistic results than
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the power flow calculation. In large-scale networks, a single substation outage is un-
likely to incur significant active power imbalance, while the grid-wide load reduction
effect enhances the grid resilience in terms of frequency stability. Therefore, this
property is predominant when the grid size is larger (Fig. 4.17). In other words, the
time-domain simulation with the eminent load adjustability shows optimistic results
compared to power flow analysis in larger networks.
Power flow calculation failure: Besides, the power flow calculation often fails
when one or more bus voltage is low. Even if only one voltage cannot be converged,
no power solution is obtained. There are five possible reasons (Fig. 4.18). There
are many low initial voltages in the IEEE 118 bus system. Besides, there are so
many synchronous condensers that provide Q power. The loss of Q support causes
significant local voltage drop. Normally, power flow program cannot consider the load
shedding system. Many free software cannot deal with the voltage dependent loads.
Therefore, power flow analysis can show pessimistic result in the larger grid, such as
the IEEE 118 bus system.
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Figure 4.18: Reasons for power flow calculation failure
4.7.4 Comparison of Blackout Rate with and without Se-
quential S-k Contingency in IEEE 14-Bus System
The sequential coordinated attack has been a hot research topic and studied more
broadly, as shown in the literature survey in Clause 1.2.4. Engineers need to dif-
ferentiate between the sequential attack and the sequential event as the cascaded
event.
Sequential (cyber)attack in power grids: The hacker’s multiple disconnection
of power equipment at a different timing, initiated by the false command injection.182
Cascaded event/effect in power grids: Multiple disconnection of power equip-
ment at a different timing, initiated by the local and system-wide protections.
The sequence of coordinated attack events is assumed to be disconnection of one sub-
station (i.e., single substation outage) every five seconds. The timing was carefully
selected, taking into account the longest time to brownout/blackout (3 seconds) and
the settling time from one operating status to another. It is emphasized that the cas-
caded event is always represented using the time-domain simulation unless otherwise
stated about the power flow analysis.
The blackout rates with and without sequential substation attacks are the same when
k of S-k is below 5 (Tab. 4.15). Once k of S-k exceeds 4, the discrepancy of the
blackout rate with and without sequential substation outages gradually increases. The
Table 4.15
Dynamic simulation-based brownout and blackout cases of S-k contingency


















S-1 6 4 6 4 0.400 0.400
S-2 15 30 30 60 0.667 0.667
S-3 20 100 120 600 0.833 0.833
S-4 15 195 360 4,680 0.929 0.929
S-5 9 243 720 29,520 0.964 0.976
S-6 6 204 720 150,480 0.971 0.995
S-7 2 118 0 604,800 0.983 1.000
S-8 0 45 0 1,814,400 1.000 1.000
S-9 0 10 0 3,628,800 1.000 1.000
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number of compromised high-voltage substations was seven in the Ukraine cyberat-
tack with large blackouts in 2015. According to the grid map [153] and grid data [154]
as of 2015, the number of high-voltage (equal to or over 400 kV) substations is twelve
or more. Because some power stations include step-down transformers, around half
of the high-voltage substations were compromised in 2015. Table 4.15 reveals that no
difference of blackout rates shows if the compromised substation rate is below 50%.
This means that the sequential coordinated attack does not proactively need to be
considered unless extremely severe and wide substation outages are examined.
4.8 Simulation Results for R-k Contingency
Assumptions applied to this study are shown below:
• manufacturers with the cybersecurity level are the same for protection type, such
as the line protection and bus protection.
• up to three protections type per substation is considered.





4.8.1 Dynamic Simulation Based Blckout Rate
4.8.1.1 IEEE 14-bus system
The blackout rate slowly increases as k of R-k increases in the IEEE 14-bus system
(Table 4.16). The increasing speed gradually decreases as k of R-k increases. k of
over 7 of R-k is not calculated due to enormously heavy computation.
Table 4.16
Dynamic simulation-based brownout and blackout cases of R-k contingency






R-1 23 7 0.233
R-2 258 177 0.407
R-3 1,835 2,225 0.548
R-4 9,233 18,172 0.663
R-5 35,082 107,424 0.754
R-6 104,763 489,012 0.824
R-7 249,111 1,786,689 0.878
4.8.1.2 IEEE 30-bus system
The blackout rate slowly increases as k of R-k increases in the IEEE 30-bus system
(Table 4.16). Unlike the IEEE 14-bus system, the increasing speed increases as k




Dynamic simulation-based brownout and blackout cases of R-k contingency






R-1 63 7 0.100
R-2 2,041 374 0.155
R-3 41,139 13,601 0.248
R-4 602,249 314,646 0.343
4.8.2 Comparison of Blackout Rate with and without Special
Protection Scheme (SPS) in IEEE 14-Bus System
As mentioned earlier in Clause 4.1.4, the underfrequency load shedding is a represen-
tative behavior-driven SPS. Besides, loads own the load self-disconnection property.
Both characteristics relates to the load adjustability that reduces the risk of black-
outs along with cascaded events. As such, blackout rates of R-k contingencies are
compared with and without the SPS in the IEEE 14-bus system (Table 4.18).
Table 4.18
Dynamic simulation-based brownout and blackout cases of R-k contingency
analysis with and without SPS using IEEE 14-bus system
Brownout (stable) Blackout (unstable) Blackout rate
with SPS w/o SPS with SPS w/o SPS with SPS w/o SPS
R-1 23 22 7 8 0.233 0.267
R-2 258 241 177 194 0.407 0.446
R-3 1,835 1,732 2,225 2,328 0.548 0.573
R-4 9,233 8,830 18,172 18,575 0.663 0.678
R-5 35,082 32,579 107,424 109,927 0.754 0.771
R-6 104,763 102,414 489,012 491,361 0.824 0.828
R-7 249,111 245,830 1,786,689 1,789,970 0.878 0.879
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Blackout rates with the SPS are smaller than the rates without the SPS regardless of
k of R-k. However, the discrepancy of the two blackout rates is larger when k of R-k
is small. This tendency is sound because the underfrequency load shedding amount
has its upper limit of 25% with relative to the total load. As k of R-k increases, the
active power imbalance becomes significant and it is likely to fall short of the volume
of the load tripping, especially in the small grid. It can be anticipated that the SPS
can be more effective for the larger grid because the required load shedding amount
is highly likely to remain within the tolerance (i.e., no larger than 25%).
4.9 Worst Case Scenarios and Security Protection
As shown in [17], cyberattack detection algorithms against substations have been pro-
posed, and it is expected that the leverage of the advanced cybersecurity technologies
can prevent coordinated cyberattacks against the disconnection of power equipment
in substations. This technology is applied to the IED or the SCADA. As discussed
earlier, the honeynet is one of the advanced and promising technologies to prevent
hackers from intruding control systems or protections. On the other hand, this type
of technology works after hackers successfully compromise them. Therefore, the hon-
eynet is a cybersecurity technology for the cyber system, while the aforementioned
inventing technologies are the technology for the physical system. How much these
cybersecurity technologies for the physical system can reduce the blackout-scale from
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a broad perspective is analyzed in this section using the IEEE 14-bus system.
4.9.1 Accounting for Deployed Security Technologies in Sub-
stations
New cybersecurity technologies in the cyber system can be deployed more widely,
while such technologies in the physical system cannot be developed at one time due to
the higher hardware dependency. Such a new cybersecurity technologies for physical
systems (hereafter, new security technologies for physical systems) need to be applied
from one substation to another. In the case study, one substation is assumed to
employ the new security technologies for physical systems. If this technology can be
considered to prevent hackers from switching actions in the specific substation, that
substation is out of the list of the contingency analysis. Thus, the loss of electricity
(LOE) is likely to decrease when one substation is removed from the contingency
list. For example, if the advanced technology is only available for substation 3, a
S-k contingency that contains substation 3 in the combination changes to a S-k-1
contingency that excludes substation 3 in the combination. The example change is
shown below:
Example of S-2: From “SS03-SS10” to “SS10”
Example of S-3: From “SS03-SS04-SS05” to “SS04-SS05”
Example of S-5: From “SS02-SS03-SS12-SS13-SS14” to “SS02-SS12-SS13-SS14”
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4.9.2 Case Study in IEEE 14-Bus System
The loss of electricity in the IEEE 14-bus system discussed in this case study is
calculated as the mean value of the LOE for 1022 cases (i.e., S-1, S-2, ... S-9 contin-
gencies), 94.4%. In the case of employing the new security technologies for physical
systems at one substation, the LOE decreases by 0.1-21%, depending on the substa-
tion (Fig. 4.19). Fig. 4.19 reveals that substation 4 is the most effective substation
to introduce new security technologies for physical systems. The three substations
that can obtain a higher effect of introducing the technology have a synchronous con-
denser. On the other hand, substations that can create less effect of introducing the
technology have loads only. Because only substations 1 and 2 have a synchronous
generator, it is observed that the IEEE 14-bus system is more vulnerable to the loss
of synchronous condensers compared to the loss of synchronous generators.
Although all contingencies should be considered to estimate the averaged LOE, k f
S-k can be capped at a value that is less than ten. In this case, the LOE per se can
change depending on the cap of k. Therefore, the reduction rate with relative to the
LOE that corresponds the cap of k is more comprehensive indicator. When the cap











































Figure 4.19: Loss of electricity with and without new cybersecurity tech-







































































Figure 4.20: Loss of electricity reduction rate with new cybersecurity tech-
nology for physical systems
190
Compared to the honeynet’s improvement in cybersecurity in Fig. 3.2, the improve-
ment in cybersecurity using the new cybersecurity technology for physical systems
looks overall smaller. It is noted that the honeynet is assumed to employ the pre-
vention function, and the improvement property of honeynet with the prevention
function largely depends on the used parameters in the cyber-net model. Because
some substations exponentially increase the LOE reduction rate for the cap of k,
rigorous cost-effective analysis is also required when selecting the new cybersecurity
technology.
4.10 Summing Up for the Systemic Risks
4.10.1 IEEE 14-bus system
Once the steady-state probability of cyberattacks against a designated substation
and the loss of electricity for the same substation outage, the economical impact in
the steady-state probability manner may be derived multiplying both values Table
4.19). Although the absolute value does not have a specific meaning, the critical level
of substations from insurance perspectives may be ranked using those values. The
result shows that substations 3 and 5 are the critical substations (Fig. 4.21).
It can be realized that substations 10, 11, 12 and 14 are easy to be compromised
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Table 4.19











SS01 1.59E-07 100 1.59E-05
SS02 1.20E-07 100 1.20E-05
SS03 1.90E-07 100 1.90E-05
SS04 1.75E-07 100 1.75E-05
SS05 1.97E-07 9.68 1.91E-06
SS10 2.35E-07 3.01 7.07E-07
SS11 2.35E-07 1.29 3.03E-07
SS12 2.35E-07 2.15 5.05E-07
SS13 1.90E-07 4.88 9.27E-07
SS14 2.35E-07 5.09 1.20E-06
Figure 4.21: Steady-state probability of loss of electricity for single sub-
station attack in IEEE 14-bus system
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compared to the rest substations. However, the impact of those substation attacks
is much smaller than that of substations 1, 2, 3, and 4. Therefore, the final econom-
ical loss needs to be derived from the cyber risk probability and the impact of the
cyberattack in a holistic manner.
4.10.2 IEEE 30-bus system
In the same manner, the steady-state probability manner may be derived (Table 4.20).
The result shows that substations 4 and 1 are critical (Fig. 4.22).
Figure 4.22: Steady-state probability of loss of electricity for single sub-
station attack in IEEE 30-bus system
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It can be realized that substations 3, 7, 20, and 23 are easy to compromise than the
rest substations. However, those substation attacks’ impact is much smaller than
that of substations 1, 2, 4, and 5. After the final economic loss is derived from the
cyber risk probability and the impact of the cyberattack in a holistic manner, it may
be concluded that substations 4 is the most critical substation.
Table 4.20











SS01 1.60E-07 100. 1.60E-05
SS02 1.21E-07 100. 1.21E-05
SS03 1.87E-06 1.01 1.89E-06
SS04 1.93E-07 100. 1.93E-05
SS05 1.38E-07 100. 1.38E-05
SS06 1.38E-07 23.54 3.25E-06
SS07 1.87E-06 7.50 1.40E-05
SS08 2.38E-07 9.89 2.35E-06
SS14 2.38E-07 2.04 4.86E-07
SS15 1.60E-07 2.70 4.32E-07
SS16 2.38E-07 1.15 2.74E-07
SS17 2.38E-07 2.95 7.02E-07
SS18 2.38E-07 1.05 2.50E-07
SS19 2.38E-07 3.11 7.40E-07
SS20 1.87E-06 0.73 1.37E-06
SS21 1.91E-07 5.75 1.10E-06
SS22 1.41E-06 0.00 0.00E+00
SS23 1.87E-06 1.05 1.96E-06
SS24 1.91E-07 2.85 5.44E-07
SS25 1.41E-06 1.15 1.62E-06
SS26 3.14E-07 1.15 3.61E-07
SS27 2.14E-07 4.26 9.12E-07
SS29 3.14E-07 0.79 2.48E-07
SS30 3.14E-07 3.47 1.09E-06
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
The compilation and analysis of anomaly data statistics extracted from the cyber
system in IP-based substations are critical to the understanding of security health
within the private network. Establishing steady-state probabilities based on the net-
work architecture, security technologies, as well as characterizing intrusion behaviors,
are the essential subjects to estimate security risks. This dissertation advances the
procedure to reflect on the steady-state probabilities of switching substation attacks
within the existing implementation of security protection, using Petri net models.
This also provides a guideline on the estimation of model parameters in the specific
substation topology and protective IEDs.
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5.1 Contribution of Cyber-Net Model
The first work enables us to clarify the probability of cyberattacks against SCADA
systems and IEDs from steady-state probability perspectives. The major contribu-
tions of the Petri net model are:
• The proposed Petri net model can contrast the switching attack probabilities with
and without advanced cybersecurity technologies such as the honeynet.
• The created Petri net model is further expanded to derive the probability of IED
attacks.
• The developed Petri net model can derive the different probability of substation
attacks depending on protection type, relay type, and number of relay settings.
Specifically, the Petri net model can specify the substation that power engineers
should pay attention from cybersecurity point of view.
However, the developed model has a limitation. It is noted that the proposed Petri net
model is based on the Markov property for state transitions. The GSPN is applicable
only when the holding time, such as the sojourn time, in each state, is assumed to be
either zero or exponentially distributed. Future research includes establishing other
statistical distributions. In addition, enhancing the modeling complexity in terms of
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the size of the specific modeling can increase computational time.
5.2 Contribution of Dynamic Simulation Model
The dynamic behavior caused by the switching cyberattack against substations is
different from the behavior caused by the general system fault (short circuit fault).
As the time-domain simulation is more time-consuming than the power flow analysis,
minimizing the leveraged control models and protection models that can adequately
represent the cascaded behavior in the grid is vital to ensure the balance between the
accuracy and the efficiency of this work.
The control and protection models that play an essential role in representing cascaded
events are carefully distilled (Tabs. 5.1 and 5.2). Not only the local protections but
also wide-area protections, i.e., the SPS is verified. The substation attack does not
accompany system faults. Therefore, the necessary control and protection models
have not yet been studied and clarified exhaustively. Representative stability, such
as transient stability, voltage stability, and frequency stability, are reviewed.
The various sensitivity studies for S-k and R-k contingency analyses using the prop-




Necessary protective relay for substation attack study













Network (Line) Out-of-step relay
*: Self-disconnection characteristics may be applied instead of undervoltage relay.
Table 5.2









Network (Line) FACTS (if any)
• Power flow analysis tends to bring pessimistic results (i.e., more unstable), espe-
cially when the number of substation/relay outage is small.
• Simultaneous substation/relay outage is prone to present optimistic results (i.e.,
more stable), only when the number of substation/relay outage becomes large.
• SPS (underfrequency relay) plays the important role to prevent grid stability from
deteriorating, especially when the number of substation/relay outage is small.
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Although there are available sources to obtain the IEEE standard models’ input data,
simulation data were set at different platforms/tools, and the derived power flow
solution (especially voltage angles) is not always the same. Besides, quite limited
data are provided for the dynamic simulation. If at all, no rationale of the provided
parameters is clarified. This dissertation uses a commercially available, proven time-
domain simulation tool that has been used by commercial power companies in Japan.
Then, the exact condition and parameters are rigorously illustrated in Appendix B.
5.3 Combinatorial Efficiency
Although this dissertation provides the imperative control and protection models
that are culled from the available numerical models, further efforts to lessen the
computation burden are required, especially for larger power grids. There are some
approaches to cope with this technical challenge.
• Reduce the number of contingency cases,
• Predict the loss of electricity for the larger k of S - k based on the loss of electricity
for the smaller k of S - k.
The effective leverage of the power flow analysis results can be a promising candidate
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to resolve the first problem. On the other hand, the use of the state-of-the-art tech-
niques, such as the machine-learning algorithm can be a promising candidate to tackle
the second problem. Establishing a reliable approach to skip non-critical substation
is also one of the crucial steps to decrease the calculation cost. To achieve this, the
following research studies on identifying critical substations with their ranking must
become pivotal.
5.4 Actuarial Framework Implementation
Capturing the risks of switching attack can be further extended for estimating cyber
insurance premiums because such a risk is generally derived from the steady-state
probability of anomalies and the impact of the switching attack. Other combinations,
such as one or more outages of interconnected substations due to false data injection
attacks, should be considered in the proposed risk-based framework. Asset owners
can also consider implementing their in-house cyber analytics to understand and
implement security policies more effectively.
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Power Flow Solution and Initial
Condition of Dynamic Simulation
in IEEE standard models
B.1 IEEE 14-bus System
The system diagram is shown in Fig. B.1. Power flow solutions are summarized in
Tables B.1 and B.2. The system MVA is 100 MVA. The power flow setting data
are also provided in Tables B.3 and B.4. It is noted that circuit breakers with no
impedance are inserted between the main grid and individual power equipment.
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Initial conditions of the dynamic simulation with generator constants are sorted out
in Tables B.5, B.6 and B.7. It is noted that the inertia constant of synchronous
condensers is set at 25% of synchronous generators, assuming that the generator per
se shares 25% of the whole unit that comprises turbines and generators.
Figure B.1: IEEE 14-bus system diagram
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Table B.1



















1 1.0600 0.00 0.7736 -0.0500 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 SWING
2 1.0450 -4.98 0.4000 0.4355 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 G02
3 1.0100 -12.71 0.0000 0.0000 0.9420 0.1900 0.0000 L03
4 1.0177 -10.30 0.0000 0.0000 0.4780 -0.0390 0.0000 L04
5 1.0196 -8.76 0.0000 0.0000 0.0760 0.0160 0.0000 L05
6 1.0700 -14.21 0.0000 0.0000 0.1120 0.0750 0.0000 L06
7 1.0615 -13.35 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
8 1.0900 -13.35 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
9 1.0560 -14.93 0.0000 0.0000 0.2950 0.1660 0.2119 L09
10 1.0510 -15.08 0.0000 0.0000 0.0900 0.0580 0.0000 L10
11 1.0569 -14.78 0.0000 0.0000 0.0350 0.0180 0.0000 L11
12 1.0552 -15.06 0.0000 0.0000 0.0610 0.0160 0.0000 L12
13 1.0504 -15.14 0.0000 0.0000 0.1350 0.0580 0.0000 L13
14 1.0355 -16.02 0.0000 0.0000 0.1490 0.0500 0.0000 L14
15 1.0600 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
16 1.0450 -4.98 0.0000 0.0000 0.2170 0.1270 0.0000 G02
21 1.0600 0.00 0.7750 -0.0575 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 SWING B
23 1.0100 -12.71 0.0000 0.2499 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 C02
26 1.0700 -14.21 0.0000 0.1269 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 C06
28 1.0900 -13.35 0.0000 0.1761 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 C08
31 1.0600 0.00 0.7750 -0.0572 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 SWING C
44 1.0177 -10.30 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
45 1.0196 -8.76 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
46 1.0700 -14.21 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
49 1.0560 -14.93 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
51 1.0600 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
61 1.0600 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
71 1.0600 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
80 1.0450 -4.98 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
93 1.0100 -12.71 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
96 1.0700 -14.21 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
98 1.0900 -13.35 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Total 2.7237 0.8236 2.5900 0.7350 0.2119
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Table B.2














15 16 1.5682 -0.2035 1.5253 -0.2761 0.0429 0.0725
15 5 0.7554 0.0388 0.7279 -0.0219 0.0276 0.0607
16 3 0.7324 0.0360 0.7093 -0.0155 0.0232 0.0515
16 4 0.5611 -0.0154 0.5444 -0.0300 0.0167 0.0146
16 5 0.4148 0.0118 0.4058 0.0212 0.0090 -0.0094
3 4 0.2327 0.0444 -0.2365 0.0480 0.0037 -0.0036
4 5 0.6116 0.1580 -0.6168 0.1418 0.0051 0.0162
6 11 0.0735 0.0356 0.0730 0.0344 0.0006 0.0012
6 12 0.0779 0.0250 0.0771 0.0235 0.0007 0.0015
6 13 0.1775 0.0721 0.1754 0.0680 0.0021 0.0042
7 8 0.0000 -0.1715 0.0000 -0.1761 0.0000 0.0046
7 9 0.2807 0.0578 0.2807 0.0498 0.0000 0.0080
9 10 0.0523 0.0422 0.0522 0.0419 0.0001 0.0003
9 14 0.0943 0.0361 0.0931 0.0337 0.0012 0.0025
10 11 0.0378 -0.0161 -0.0380 -0.0164 0.0001 0.0003
12 13 0.0161 0.0075 0.0161 0.0075 0.0001 0.0001
13 14 0.0564 0.0174 0.0559 0.0163 0.0005 0.0011
4 7 0.2807 -0.0967 0.2807 -0.1137 0.0000 0.0170
44 49 0.1608 -0.0042 0.1608 -0.0173 0.0000 0.0130
45 46 0.4409 0.1251 0.4409 0.0809 0.0000 0.0442
The total P loss and Q loss are 0.1337 (p.u.) and 0.3005 (p.u.), individually.
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Table B.3
System (branch) setting data
From To Resistance Reactance Capacitance (Y/2) Tap Remark
15 16 0.01938 0.05917 0.02640 0.00000
15 5 0.05403 0.22304 0.02460 0.00000
16 3 0.04699 0.19797 0.02190 0.00000
16 4 0.05811 0.17632 0.01700 0.00000
16 5 0.05695 0.17388 0.01730 0.00000
3 4 0.06701 0.17103 0.00640 0.00000
4 5 0.01335 0.04211 0.00000 0.00000
6 11 0.09498 0.19890 0.00000 0.00000
6 12 0.12291 0.25581 0.00000 0.00000
6 13 0.06615 0.13027 0.00000 0.00000
7 8 0.00000 0.17615 0.00000 0.00000
7 9 0.00000 0.11001 0.00000 0.00000
9 10 0.03181 0.08450 0.00000 0.00000
9 14 0.12711 0.27038 0.00000 0.00000
10 11 0.08205 0.19207 0.00000 0.00000
12 13 0.22092 0.19988 0.00000 0.00000
13 14 0.17093 0.34802 0.00000 0.00000
4 7 0.00000 0.20912 0.00000 1.02250
44 49 0.00000 0.55618 0.00000 1.03200
45 46 0.00000 0.25202 0.00000 1.07300
4 44 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 Circuit Breaker
9 49 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 Circuit Breaker
5 45 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 Circuit Breaker
6 46 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 Circuit Breaker
1 51 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 Circuit Breaker
51 15 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 Circuit Breaker
21 61 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 Circuit Breaker
61 15 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 Circuit Breaker
31 71 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 Circuit Breaker
71 15 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 Circuit Breaker
2 80 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 Circuit Breaker
80 16 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 Circuit Breaker
23 93 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 Circuit Breaker
93 3 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 Circuit Breaker
26 96 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 Circuit Breaker
96 6 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 Circuit Breaker
28 98 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 Circuit Breaker
98 8 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 Circuit Breaker
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Table B.4




PG QG PL QL YC Name
1 1.0600 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 SWING-A
2 1.0450 0.4000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 G02
3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9420 0.1900 0.0000 L03
4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4780 -0.0390 0.0000 L04
5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0760 0.0160 0.0000 L05
6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1120 0.0750 0.0000 L06
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
9 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2950 0.1660 0.1900 L09
10 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0900 0.0580 0.0000 L10
11 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0350 0.0180 0.0000 L11
12 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0610 0.0160 0.0000 L12
13 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1350 0.0580 0.0000 L13
14 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1490 0.0500 0.0000 L14
15 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
16 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2170 0.1270 0.0000 G02
21 1.0600 0.7750 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 SWING-B
23 1.0100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 C02
26 1.0700 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 C06
28 1.0900 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 C08
31 1.0600 0.7750 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 SWING-C
44 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
45 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
46 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
49 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
51 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
61 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
71 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
80 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
93 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
96 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































RA: Armature resistance (p.u.)
XL: Leakage reactance (p.u.)
XD: D-axis reactance (p.u.)
XDD: D-axis transient reactance (p.u.)
XDDD: D-axis sub-transient reactance (p.u.)
XFLD: D-axis field circuit reactance (p.u.)
XKLD: D-axis damper circuit reactance (p.u.)
XQ: Q-axis reactance (p.u.)
XQD: Q-axis transient reactance (p.u.)
XQDD: Q-axis sub-transient reactance (p.u.)
XFLQ: Q-axis field circuit reactance (p.u.)
XKLQ: Q-axis damper circuit reactance (p.u.)
TDD: D-axis transient time constant [s]
TDDD: D-axis sub-transient time constant [s]
RFD: D-axis field circuit resistance (p.u.)
RKD: D-axis damper circuit resistance (p.u.)
TDDD: Q-axis sub-transient time constant [s]







































































































































































































































































































































BUS: Node number which the designated generator is connected
AGG: Rotor angle of generator with relative to the center of angle (deg)
VT: Terminal voltage (p.u.)
PG: Active power output (Machine base p.u.)
QG: Reactive power output (Machine base p.u.)
TQG: Turbine output (Machine base p.u.)
EF: Field voltage (p.u.)
CF: Field current (p.u.)
CDD: D-axis armature current (p.u.)
CQQ: Q-axis armature current (p.u.)
FGD: D-axis interlinkage magnetic flux (p.u.)
FGQ: Q-axis interlinkage magnetic flux (p.u.)
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B.2 IEEE 30-bus System
The system diagram is shown in Fig. B.2. Power flow solutions are summarized in
Tables B.8, B.9, B.10, B.11, and B.12. The system MVA is 100 MVA. The power
flow setting data are also provided in Tables B.13, B.14, B.15, B.16 and B.17. It is
noted that circuit breakers with no impedance are inserted between the main grid
and individual power equipment.
Initial conditions of the dynamic simulation with generator constants are sorted out
in Tables B.18, B.19 and B.20.
It is noted that the generator’s saturation characteristics is used for the IEEE 30-bus
systems (Fig. B.3). We may use this characteristic for the IEEE 14-bus system,
although it is skipped for the IEEE 14-bus system.
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Figure B.2: IEEE 30-bus system diagram
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Table B.8

















1 1.0600 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Glen LynA1
2 1.0430 -5.35 0.0000 0.0000 0.2170 0.1270 0.0000 Claytor1
3 1.0206 -7.52 0.0000 0.0000 0.0240 0.0120 0.0000 Kumis
4 1.0116 -9.27 0.0000 0.0000 0.0760 0.0160 0.0000 Hancock
5 1.0100 -14.15 0.0000 0.0000 0.9420 0.1900 0.0000 Fieldale1
6 1.0100 -11.05 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Roanoke
7 1.0022 -12.85 0.0000 0.0000 0.2280 0.1090 0.0000 Blaine
8 1.0100 -11.80 0.0000 0.0000 0.3000 0.3000 0.0000 Reusens1
9 1.0499 -14.09 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1kVRoanoke
10 1.0431 -15.68 0.0000 0.0000 0.0580 0.0200 0.1893 33kVRoanoke
11 1.0820 -14.09 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 11kVRoanoke1
12 1.0565 -14.95 0.0000 0.0000 0.1120 0.0750 0.0000 33kVHancock
13 1.0710 -14.95 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 11kVHancock1
14 1.0415 -15.84 0.0000 0.0000 0.0620 0.0160 0.0000 33kVBus 14
15 1.0367 -15.93 0.0000 0.0000 0.0820 0.0250 0.0000 33kVBus 15
16 1.0432 -15.52 0.0000 0.0000 0.0350 0.0180 0.0000 33kVBus 16
17 1.0381 -15.85 0.0000 0.0000 0.0900 0.0580 0.0000 33kVBus 17
18 1.0268 -16.54 0.0000 0.0000 0.0320 0.0090 0.0000 33kVBus 18
19 1.0241 -16.71 0.0000 0.0000 0.0950 0.0340 0.0000 33kVBus 19
20 1.0280 -16.51 0.0000 0.0000 0.0220 0.0070 0.0000 33kVBus 20
21 1.0307 -16.13 0.0000 0.0000 0.1750 0.1120 0.0000 33kVBus 21
22 1.0313 -16.11 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 33kVBus 22
23 1.0259 -16.31 0.0000 0.0000 0.0320 0.0160 0.0000 33kVBus 23
24 1.0198 -16.48 0.0000 0.0000 0.0870 0.0670 0.0429 33kVBus 24
25 1.0161 -16.06 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 33kVBus 25
26 0.9984 -16.48 0.0000 0.0000 0.0350 0.0230 0.0000 33kVBus 26
27 1.0224 -15.54 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 33kCloverdle
28 1.0066 -11.68 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Cloverdle
29 1.0025 -16.77 0.0000 0.0000 0.0240 0.0090 0.0000 33kVBus 29
30 0.9910 -17.66 0.0000 0.0000 0.1060 0.0190 0.0000 33kVBus 30
36 1.0100 -11.05 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
39 1.0499 -14.09 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
40 1.0431 -15.68 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
44 1.0116 -9.27 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
47 1.0224 -15.54 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table B.9

















48 1.0066 -11.68 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
52 1.0565 -14.95 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
56 1.0100 -11.05 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
201 1.0600 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
202 1.0430 -5.35 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
205 1.0100 -14.15 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
208 1.0100 -11.80 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
211 1.0820 -14.09 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
213 1.0710 -14.95 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
271 1.0600 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
281 1.0600 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
301 1.0600 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
302 1.0430 -5.35 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
305 1.0100 -14.15 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
308 1.0100 -11.80 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
311 1.0820 -14.09 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
313 1.0710 -14.95 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
371 1.0600 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
381 1.0600 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
401 1.0600 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
402 1.0430 -5.35 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
405 1.0100 -14.15 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
408 1.0100 -11.80 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
411 1.0820 -14.09 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
413 1.0710 -14.95 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
471 1.0600 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
481 1.0600 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
501 1.0600 0.00 0.8699 -0.0546 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Glen LynA2
502 1.0430 -5.35 0.4000 0.4984 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Claytor2
505 1.0100 -14.15 0.0000 0.3697 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Fieldale2
508 1.0100 -11.80 0.0000 0.3780 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Reusens2
511 1.0820 -14.09 0.0000 0.1671 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 11kVRoanoke2
513 1.0710 -14.95 0.0000 0.1109 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 11kVHancock2
571 1.0600 0.00 0.8698 -0.0545 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Glen LynB2
581 1.0600 0.00 0.8698 -0.0545 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Glen LynC2
Total 3.0094 1.3605 2.8340 1.2620 0.2322
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1 2 1.7322 -0.2105 1.6804 -0.3073 0.0518 0.0968
1 3 0.8772 0.0469 0.8461 -0.0226 0.0311 0.0695
2 4 0.4361 0.0403 0.4259 0.0483 0.0101 -0.0079
3 4 0.8221 -0.0346 0.8135 -0.0506 0.0086 0.0160
2 5 0.8241 0.0179 0.7946 -0.0619 0.0295 0.0798
2 6 0.6032 0.0059 0.5838 -0.0137 0.0194 0.0196
4 6 0.7206 -0.1628 0.7142 -0.1756 0.0063 0.0128
5 7 -0.1474 0.1178 -0.1491 0.1341 0.0017 -0.0163
6 7 0.3809 -0.0306 0.3771 -0.0251 0.0038 -0.0055
6 8 0.2958 -0.0861 0.2947 -0.0808 0.0011 -0.0053
9 11 0.0000 -0.1621 0.0000 -0.1671 0.0000 0.0050
9 10 0.2765 0.0684 0.2765 0.0603 0.0000 0.0081
12 13 0.0000 -0.1094 0.0000 -0.1109 0.0000 0.0015
12 14 0.0788 0.0247 0.0781 0.0231 0.0008 0.0016
12 15 0.1794 0.0705 0.1772 0.0662 0.0022 0.0043
12 16 0.0727 0.0365 0.0722 0.0354 0.0006 0.0012
14 15 0.0161 0.0071 0.0160 0.0070 0.0001 0.0001
16 17 0.0372 0.0174 0.0371 0.0171 0.0001 0.0003
15 18 0.0605 0.0176 0.0601 0.0168 0.0004 0.0008
18 19 0.0281 0.0078 0.0281 0.0077 0.0001 0.0001
19 20 -0.0669 -0.0263 -0.0671 -0.0267 0.0002 0.0003
10 20 0.0899 0.0355 0.0891 0.0337 0.0008 0.0018
10 17 0.0530 0.0413 0.0529 0.0409 0.0001 0.0004
10 21 0.1575 0.0995 0.1564 0.0971 0.0011 0.0024
10 22 0.0760 0.0456 0.0754 0.0445 0.0005 0.0011
21 22 -0.0186 -0.0149 -0.0186 -0.0149 0.0000 0.0000
15 23 0.0506 0.0307 0.0503 0.0300 0.0003 0.0007
22 24 0.0568 0.0296 0.0564 0.0289 0.0004 0.0007
23 24 0.0183 0.0140 0.0182 0.0139 0.0001 0.0001
24 25 -0.0124 0.0187 -0.0125 0.0185 0.0001 0.0002
25 26 0.0354 0.0237 0.0350 0.0230 0.0004 0.0007
25 27 -0.0479 -0.0052 -0.0482 -0.0056 0.0002 0.0005
27 29 0.0619 0.0167 0.0610 0.0151 0.0009 0.0016
27 30 0.0709 0.0166 0.0693 0.0136 0.0016 0.0031
29 30 0.0370 0.0061 0.0367 0.0054 0.0003 0.0006
8 28 -0.0053 -0.0028 -0.0054 0.0407 0.0000 -0.0435
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6 28 0.1869 0.0001 0.1863 0.0113 0.0006 -0.0112
36 39 0.2765 -0.0776 0.2765 -0.0937 0.0000 0.0161
56 40 0.1579 0.0050 0.1579 -0.0078 0.0000 0.0128
44 52 0.4429 0.1445 0.4429 0.0973 0.0000 0.0472
48 47 0.1810 0.0519 0.1810 0.0390 0.0000 0.0130
6 36 0.2765 -0.0776 0.2765 -0.0776 0.0000 0.0000
39 9 0.2765 -0.0937 0.2765 -0.0937 0.0000 0.0000
6 56 0.1579 0.0050 0.1579 0.0050 0.0000 0.0000
40 10 0.1579 -0.0078 0.1579 -0.0078 0.0000 0.0000
4 44 0.4429 0.1445 0.4429 0.1445 0.0000 0.0000
52 12 0.4429 0.0973 0.4429 0.0973 0.0000 0.0000
28 48 0.1810 0.0519 0.1810 0.0519 0.0000 0.0000
47 27 0.1810 0.0390 0.1810 0.0390 0.0000 0.0000
1 201 -0.8699 0.0546 -0.8699 0.0546 0.0000 0.0000
201 301 -0.8699 0.0546 -0.8699 0.0546 0.0000 0.0000
301 401 -0.8699 0.0546 -0.8699 0.0546 0.0000 0.0000
401 501 -0.8699 0.0546 -0.8699 0.0546 0.0000 0.0000
1 271 -0.8698 0.0545 -0.8698 0.0545 0.0000 0.0000
271 371 -0.8698 0.0545 -0.8698 0.0545 0.0000 0.0000
371 471 -0.8698 0.0545 -0.8698 0.0545 0.0000 0.0000
471 571 -0.8698 0.0545 -0.8698 0.0545 0.0000 0.0000
1 281 -0.8698 0.0545 -0.8698 0.0545 0.0000 0.0000
281 381 -0.8698 0.0545 -0.8698 0.0545 0.0000 0.0000
381 481 -0.8698 0.0545 -0.8698 0.0545 0.0000 0.0000
481 581 -0.8698 0.0545 -0.8698 0.0545 0.0000 0.0000
2 202 -0.4000 -0.4984 -0.4000 -0.4984 0.0000 0.0000
202 302 -0.4000 -0.4984 -0.4000 -0.4984 0.0000 0.0000
302 402 -0.4000 -0.4984 -0.4000 -0.4984 0.0000 0.0000
402 502 -0.4000 -0.4984 -0.4000 -0.4984 0.0000 0.0000
5 205 0.0000 -0.3697 0.0000 -0.3697 0.0000 0.0000
205 305 0.0000 -0.3697 0.0000 -0.3697 0.0000 0.0000
305 405 0.0000 -0.3697 0.0000 -0.3697 0.0000 0.0000
405 505 0.0000 -0.3697 0.0000 -0.3697 0.0000 0.0000
8 208 0.0000 -0.3780 0.0000 -0.3780 0.0000 0.0000
208 308 0.0000 -0.3780 0.0000 -0.3780 0.0000 0.0000
308 408 0.0000 -0.3780 0.0000 -0.3780 0.0000 0.0000
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408 508 0.0000 -0.3780 0.0000 -0.3780 0.0000 0.0000
11 211 0.0000 -0.1671 0.0000 -0.1671 0.0000 0.0000
211 311 0.0000 -0.1671 0.0000 -0.1671 0.0000 0.0000
311 411 0.0000 -0.1671 0.0000 -0.1671 0.0000 0.0000
411 511 0.0000 -0.1671 0.0000 -0.1671 0.0000 0.0000
13 213 0.0000 -0.1109 0.0000 -0.1109 0.0000 0.0000
213 313 0.0000 -0.1109 0.0000 -0.1109 0.0000 0.0000
313 413 0.0000 -0.1109 0.0000 -0.1109 0.0000 0.0000
413 513 0.0000 -0.1109 0.0000 -0.1109 0.0000 0.0000
The total P loss and Q loss are 0.1754 (p.u.) and 0.3308 (p.u.), individually.
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Table B.13
System (branch) setting data (Part 1)
From To Resistance Reactance Capacitance (Y/2) Tap Remark
1 2 0.01920 0.05750 0.02640 0.00000
1 3 0.04520 0.16520 0.02040 0.00000
2 4 0.05700 0.17370 0.01840 0.00000
3 4 0.01320 0.03790 0.00420 0.00000
2 5 0.04720 0.19830 0.02090 0.00000
2 6 0.05810 0.17630 0.01870 0.00000
4 6 0.01190 0.04140 0.00450 0.00000
5 7 0.04600 0.11600 0.01020 0.00000
6 7 0.02670 0.08200 0.00850 0.00000
6 8 0.01200 0.04200 0.00450 0.00000
9 11 0.00000 0.20800 0.00000 0.00000
9 10 0.00000 0.11000 0.00000 0.00000
12 13 0.00000 0.14000 0.00000 0.00000
12 14 0.12310 0.25590 0.00000 0.00000
12 15 0.06620 0.13040 0.00000 0.00000
12 16 0.09450 0.19870 0.00000 0.00000
14 15 0.22100 0.19970 0.00000 0.00000
16 17 0.05240 0.19230 0.00000 0.00000
15 18 0.10730 0.21850 0.00000 0.00000
18 19 0.06390 0.12920 0.00000 0.00000
19 20 0.03400 0.06800 0.00000 0.00000
10 20 0.09360 0.20900 0.00000 0.00000
10 17 0.03240 0.08450 0.00000 0.00000
10 21 0.03480 0.07490 0.00000 0.00000
10 22 0.07270 0.14990 0.00000 0.00000
21 22 0.01160 0.02360 0.00000 0.00000
15 23 0.10000 0.20200 0.00000 0.00000
22 24 0.11500 0.17900 0.00000 0.00000
23 24 0.13200 0.27000 0.00000 0.00000
24 25 0.18850 0.32920 0.00000 0.00000
25 26 0.25440 0.38000 0.00000 0.00000
25 27 0.10930 0.20870 0.00000 0.00000
27 29 0.21980 0.41530 0.00000 0.00000
27 30 0.32020 0.60270 0.00000 0.00000
29 30 0.23990 0.45330 0.00000 0.00000
8 28 0.06360 0.20000 0.02140 0.00000
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Table B.14
System (branch) setting data (Part 2)
From To Resistance Reactance Capacitance (Y/2) Tap Remark
6 28 0.01690 0.05990 0.00650 0.00000
36 39 0.00000 0.20800 0.00000 1.02250
56 40 0.00000 0.55600 0.00000 1.03200
44 52 0.00000 0.25600 0.00000 1.07300
48 47 0.00000 0.39600 0.00000 1.03306
6 36 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
39 9 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
6 56 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
40 10 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
4 44 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
52 12 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
28 48 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
47 27 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
1 201 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
201 301 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
301 401 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
401 501 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
1 271 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
271 371 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
371 471 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
471 571 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
1 281 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
281 381 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
381 481 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
481 581 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
2 202 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
202 302 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
302 402 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
402 502 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
5 205 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
205 305 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
305 405 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
405 505 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
8 208 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
208 308 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
308 408 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
408 508 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
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Table B.15
System (branch) setting data (Part 3)
From To Resistance Reactance Capacitance (Y/2) Tap Remark
11 211 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
211 311 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
311 411 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
411 511 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
13 213 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
213 313 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
313 413 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
413 513 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
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Table B.16
Power flow condition setting data (Part 1)
Node To PG QG PL QL QC Name
1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Glen LynA1
2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2170 0.1270 0.0000 Claytor1
3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0240 0.0120 0.0000 Kumis
4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0760 0.0160 0.0000 Hancock
5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9420 0.1900 0.0000 Fieldale1
6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Roanoke
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2280 0.1090 0.0000 Blaine
8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3000 0.3000 0.0000 Reusens1
9 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1kVRoanoke
10 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0580 0.0200 0.1740 33kVRoanoke
11 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 11kVRoanoke1
12 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1120 0.0750 0.0000 33kVHancock
13 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 11kVHancock1
14 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0620 0.0160 0.0000 33kVBus 14
15 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0820 0.0250 0.0000 33kVBus 15
16 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0350 0.0180 0.0000 33kVBus 16
17 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0900 0.0580 0.0000 33kVBus 17
18 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0320 0.0090 0.0000 33kVBus 18
19 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0950 0.0340 0.0000 33kVBus 19
20 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0220 0.0070 0.0000 33kVBus 20
21 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1750 0.1120 0.0000 33kVBus 21
22 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 33kVBus 22
23 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0320 0.0160 0.0000 33kVBus 23
24 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0870 0.0670 0.0413 33kVBus 24
25 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 33kVBus 25
26 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0350 0.0230 0.0000 33kVBus 26
27 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 33kCloverdle
28 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Cloverdle
29 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0240 0.0090 0.0000 33kVBus 29
30 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1060 0.0190 0.0000 33kVBus 30
36 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Glen LynA2
39 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Claytor2
40 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Fieldale2
44 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Reusens2
47 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 11kVRoanoke2
48 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 11kVHancock2
52 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Glen LynB2
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Table B.17
Power flow condition setting data (Part 2)
Node To PG QG PL QL QC Name
56 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Glen LynC2
201 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
202 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
205 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
208 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
211 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
213 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
271 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
281 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
301 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
302 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
305 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
308 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
311 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
313 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
371 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
381 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
401 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
402 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
405 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
408 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
411 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
413 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
471 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
481 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
501 1.0600 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
502 1.0430 0.4000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
505 1.0100 0.0000 0.3700 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
508 1.0100 0.0000 0.3730 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
511 1.0820 0.0000 0.1620 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
513 1.0710 0.0000 0.1060 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
571 1.0600 0.8698 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
581 1.0600 0.8698 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table B.18
Generator constants with implemented generator controller
Node AVR OEL PSS GOV GMVA GMW GPF MG DG PLM Name
501 X X X 100.0 87.5 0.875 6.0 0.0 5.0 G1A
571 X X X 100.0 87.5 0.875 6.0 0.0 5.0 G1B
581 X X X 100.0 87.5 0.875 6.0 0.0 5.0 G1C
502 X X X 70.0 61.3 0.875 6.0 0.0 5.0 G2
505 X 50.0 0.0 0.000 1.5 0.0 0.0 C05
508 X 50.0 0.0 0.000 1.5 0.0 0.0 C08
511 X 25.0 0.0 0.000 1.5 0.0 0.0 C11











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure B.3: Generator’s saturation characteristics
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B.3 IEEE 57-bus System
The system diagram is shown in Fig. B.4. Power flow solutions are summarized in
Tables B.21, B.22, B.22, B.24, B.25, B.26, B.27, B.28, and B.29. The system MVA is
100 MVA. The power flow setting data are also provided in Tables B.30, B.31, B.32,
B.33, B.34, B.35, B.36 and B.37. It is noted that circuit breakers with no impedance
are inserted between the main grid and individual power equipment.
Initial conditions of the dynamic simulation with generator constants are sorted out
in Tables B.39, B.40 and B.41.
It is noted that the generator’s saturation characteristics is used for the IEEE 57-bus
systems (Fig. B.3).
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Figure B.4: Diagram of IEEE 57-bus system
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Table B.21
Power flow node solution in IEEE 57-bus system (part 1)
Node |V | ∠ V PG QG PL QL QC Name
1 1.0400 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.5500 0.1700 0.0000 Kanawha1
2 1.0100 -1.19 0.0000 0.0000 0.0300 0.8800 0.0000 Turner1
3 0.9850 -5.98 0.0000 0.0000 0.4100 0.2100 0.0000 Logan1
4 0.9808 -7.33 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Sprigg
5 0.9765 -8.53 0.0000 0.0000 0.1300 0.0400 0.0000 Bus5
6 0.9800 -8.66 0.0000 0.0000 0.7500 0.0200 0.0000 BeaverCk1
7 0.9843 -7.59 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bus7
8 1.0050 -4.47 0.0000 0.0000 1.5000 0.2200 0.0000 ClinchRv1
9 0.9800 -9.57 0.0000 0.0000 1.2100 0.2600 0.0000 Saltville1
10 0.9863 -11.44 0.0000 0.0000 0.0500 0.0200 0.0000 Bus10
11 0.9740 -10.18 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Tazewell
12 1.0150 -10.46 0.0000 0.0000 3.7700 0.2400 0.0000 Glen Lyn1
13 0.9789 -9.79 0.0000 0.0000 0.1800 0.0230 0.0000 Bus13
14 0.9703 -9.34 0.0000 0.0000 0.1050 0.0530 0.0000 Bus14
15 0.9881 -7.18 0.0000 0.0000 0.2200 0.0500 0.0000 Bus15
16 1.0134 -8.84 0.0000 0.0000 0.4300 0.0300 0.0000 Bus16
17 1.0175 -5.39 0.0000 0.0000 0.4200 0.0800 0.0000 Bus17
18 1.0006 -11.72 0.0000 0.0000 0.2720 0.0980 0.0999 Sprigg
19 0.9702 -13.22 0.0000 0.0000 0.0330 0.0060 0.0000 Bus19
20 0.9639 -13.44 0.0000 0.0000 0.0230 0.0100 0.0000 Bus20
21 1.0087 -12.92 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bus21
22 1.0100 -12.86 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bus22
23 1.0086 -12.93 0.0000 0.0000 0.0630 0.0210 0.0000 Bus23
24 0.9998 -13.29 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bus24
25 0.9843 -18.17 0.0000 0.0000 0.0630 0.0320 0.0593 Bus25
26 0.9594 -12.98 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bus26
27 0.9819 -11.51 0.0000 0.0000 0.0930 0.0050 0.0000 Bus27
28 0.9970 -10.47 0.0000 0.0000 0.0460 0.0230 0.0000 Bus28
29 1.0105 -9.76 0.0000 0.0000 0.1700 0.0260 0.0000 Bus29
30 0.9643 -18.71 0.0000 0.0000 0.0360 0.0180 0.0000 Bus30
31 0.9373 -19.37 0.0000 0.0000 0.0580 0.0290 0.0000 Bus31
32 0.9508 -18.49 0.0000 0.0000 0.0160 0.0080 0.0000 Bus32
33 0.9485 -18.53 0.0000 0.0000 0.0380 0.0190 0.0000 Bus33
34 0.9596 -14.14 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bus34
35 0.9665 -13.90 0.0000 0.0000 0.0600 0.0300 0.0000 Bus35
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Table B.22
Power flow node solution in IEEE 57-bus system (part 2)
Node |V | ∠ V PG QG PL QL QC Name
36 0.9761 -13.62 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bus36
37 0.9852 -13.44 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bus37
38 1.0130 -12.72 0.0000 0.0000 0.1400 0.0700 0.0000 Bus38
39 0.9831 -13.48 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bus39
40 0.9731 -13.65 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bus40
41 0.9963 -14.06 0.0000 0.0000 0.0630 0.0300 0.0000 Tazewell
42 0.9667 -15.52 0.0000 0.0000 0.0710 0.0440 0.0000 Bus42
43 1.0096 -11.34 0.0000 0.0000 0.0200 0.0100 0.0000 Tazewell
44 1.0170 -11.85 0.0000 0.0000 0.1200 0.0180 0.0000 Bus44
45 1.0361 -9.26 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bus45
46 1.0599 -11.10 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bus46
47 1.0334 -12.50 0.0000 0.0000 0.2970 0.1160 0.0000 Bus47
48 1.0275 -12.60 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bus48
49 1.0364 -12.92 0.0000 0.0000 0.1800 0.0850 0.0000 Bus49
50 1.0234 -13.40 0.0000 0.0000 0.2100 0.1050 0.0000 Bus50
51 1.0523 -12.52 0.0000 0.0000 0.1800 0.0530 0.0000 Bus51
52 0.9811 -11.51 0.0000 0.0000 0.0490 0.0220 0.0000 Bus52
53 0.9719 -12.27 0.0000 0.0000 0.2000 0.1000 0.0631 Bus53
54 0.9969 -11.71 0.0000 0.0000 0.0410 0.0140 0.0000 Bus54
55 1.0310 -10.79 0.0000 0.0000 0.0680 0.0340 0.0000 Saltville
56 0.9685 -16.05 0.0000 0.0000 0.0760 0.0220 0.0000 Bus56
57 0.9650 -16.57 0.0000 0.0000 0.0670 0.0200 0.0000 Bus57
201 1.0400 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Kanawha2A
202 1.0100 -1.19 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Turner2
203 0.9850 -5.98 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Logan2
206 0.9800 -8.66 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 BeaverCk2
208 1.0050 -4.47 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ClinchRv2A
209 0.9800 -9.57 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Saltville2
212 1.0150 -10.46 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Glen Lyn2A
271 1.0400 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Kanawha2B
272 1.0150 -10.46 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Glen Lyn2B
278 1.0050 -4.47 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ClinchRv2B
281 1.0400 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Kanawha2C
288 1.0050 -4.47 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ClinchRv2C
301 1.0400 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table B.23
Power flow node solution in IEEE 57-bus system (part 3)
Node |V | ∠ V PG QG PL QL QC Name
302 1.0100 -1.19 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
303 0.9850 -5.98 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
306 0.9800 -8.66 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
308 1.0050 -4.47 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
309 0.9800 -9.57 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
312 1.0150 -10.46 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
371 1.0400 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
372 1.0150 -10.46 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
378 1.0050 -4.47 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
381 1.0400 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
388 1.0050 -4.47 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
401 1.0400 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
402 1.0100 -1.19 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
403 0.9850 -5.98 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
406 0.9800 -8.66 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
408 1.0050 -4.47 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
409 0.9800 -9.57 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
412 1.0150 -10.46 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
471 1.0400 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
472 1.0150 -10.46 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
478 1.0050 -4.47 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
481 1.0400 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
488 1.0050 -4.47 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
501 1.0400 0.00 1.5954 0.4300 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
502 1.0100 -1.19 0.0000 -0.0077 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
503 0.9850 -5.98 0.4000 -0.0110 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
506 0.9800 -8.66 0.0000 0.0071 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
508 1.0050 -4.47 1.5000 0.2066 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
509 0.9800 -9.57 0.0000 0.0193 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
512 1.0150 -10.46 1.5500 0.6425 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
571 1.0400 0.00 1.5954 0.4301 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
572 1.0150 -10.46 1.5500 0.6425 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
578 1.0050 -4.47 1.5000 0.2066 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
581 1.0400 0.00 1.5954 0.4300 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
588 1.0050 -4.47 1.5000 0.2067 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table B.24
Power flow node solution in IEEE 57-bus system (part 4)
Node |V | ∠ V PG QG PL QL QC Name
604 0.9808 -7.33 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
607 0.9843 -7.59 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
609 0.9800 -9.57 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
610 0.9863 -11.44 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
611 0.9740 -10.18 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
613 0.9789 -9.79 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
614 0.9703 -9.34 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
615 0.9881 -7.18 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
618 1.0006 -11.72 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
620 0.9639 -13.44 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
621 1.0087 -12.92 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
624 0.9998 -13.29 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
625 0.9843 -18.17 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
626 0.9594 -12.98 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
629 1.0105 -9.76 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
632 0.9508 -18.49 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
634 0.9596 -14.14 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
639 0.9831 -13.48 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
640 0.9731 -13.65 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
641 0.9963 -14.06 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
643 1.0096 -11.34 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
645 1.0361 -9.26 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
646 1.0599 -11.10 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
649 1.0364 -12.92 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
651 1.0523 -12.52 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
655 1.0310 -10.79 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
656 0.9685 -16.05 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
657 0.9650 -16.57 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
704 0.9808 -7.33 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
711 0.9740 -10.18 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
718 1.0006 -11.72 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
724 0.9998 -13.29 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
725 0.9843 -18.17 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
824 0.9998 -13.29 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Total 12.7861 3.2027 12.5080 3.3640 0.2223
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Table B.25
Power flow branch solution in IEEE 57-bus system (Part 1)
From To Psend Qsend Prec Qrec Ploss Qloss
1 2 1.0204 0.7509 1.0073 0.8421 0.0132 -0.0912
2 3 0.9773 -0.0456 0.9494 -0.0437 0.0279 -0.0020
3 4 0.6020 -0.0816 0.5978 -0.0588 0.0042 -0.0229
4 5 0.1379 -0.0443 0.1366 -0.0223 0.0013 -0.0220
4 6 0.1415 -0.0509 0.1406 -0.0207 0.0010 -0.0302
6 7 -0.1776 -0.0184 -0.1782 0.0049 0.0007 -0.0233
6 8 -0.4253 -0.0659 -0.4317 -0.0525 0.0064 -0.0135
8 9 1.7801 0.1986 1.7485 0.0917 0.0315 0.1069
9 10 0.1717 -0.0925 0.1703 -0.0559 0.0013 -0.0365
9 11 0.1289 0.0203 0.1285 0.0395 0.0005 -0.0193
9 12 0.0256 -0.1590 0.0245 -0.0868 0.0011 -0.0722
9 13 0.0231 -0.0199 0.0231 0.0190 0.0000 -0.0389
13 14 -0.1035 0.2229 -0.1044 0.2305 0.0009 -0.0076
13 15 -0.4889 0.0487 -0.4957 0.0489 0.0068 -0.0003
1 15 1.4899 0.3382 1.4509 0.2406 0.0390 0.0976
1 16 0.7927 -0.0085 0.7664 -0.0704 0.0263 0.0619
1 17 0.9332 0.0395 0.9140 -0.0175 0.0192 0.0569
3 15 0.3374 -0.1830 0.3351 -0.1376 0.0023 -0.0454
5 6 0.0066 -0.0623 0.0065 -0.0507 0.0001 -0.0117
7 8 -0.7793 -0.1225 -0.7882 -0.1489 0.0089 0.0264
10 12 -0.1760 -0.2008 -0.1779 -0.1764 0.0019 -0.0244
11 13 -0.0993 -0.0441 -0.0996 -0.0270 0.0003 -0.0171
12 13 -0.0047 0.6028 -0.0116 0.6403 0.0069 -0.0375
12 16 -0.3343 0.0878 -0.3364 0.1004 0.0021 -0.0126
12 17 -0.4844 0.0913 -0.4940 0.0975 0.0095 -0.0061
14 15 -0.6882 -0.0959 -0.6970 -0.1097 0.0087 0.0138
18 19 0.0463 0.0137 0.0452 0.0121 0.0011 0.0016
19 20 0.0122 0.0061 0.0122 0.0061 0.0001 0.0001
21 22 -0.0108 -0.0041 -0.0108 -0.0041 0.0000 0.0000
22 23 0.0965 0.0298 0.0964 0.0297 0.0001 0.0002
23 24 0.0334 0.0087 0.0332 0.0168 0.0002 -0.0081
26 27 -0.1055 -0.0155 -0.1076 -0.0186 0.0020 0.0031
27 28 -0.2006 -0.0236 -0.2032 -0.0277 0.0026 0.0040
28 29 -0.2492 -0.0507 -0.2519 -0.0545 0.0027 0.0038
25 30 0.0757 0.0468 0.0746 0.0451 0.0011 0.0017
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Table B.26
Power flow branch solution in IEEE 57-bus system (Part 2)
From To Psend Qsend Prec Qrec Ploss Qloss
30 31 0.0386 0.0271 0.0379 0.0259 0.0008 0.0012
31 32 -0.0201 -0.0031 -0.0204 -0.0034 0.0002 0.0004
32 33 0.0381 0.0191 0.0380 0.0190 0.0001 0.0001
34 35 -0.0745 -0.0373 -0.0748 -0.0349 0.0004 -0.0024
35 36 -0.1348 -0.0649 -0.1359 -0.0647 0.0010 -0.0002
36 37 -0.1705 -0.1057 -0.1718 -0.1072 0.0012 0.0015
37 38 -0.2103 -0.1366 -0.2146 -0.1411 0.0042 0.0045
37 39 0.0386 0.0294 0.0385 0.0293 0.0001 0.0001
36 40 0.0347 0.0410 0.0346 0.0409 0.0001 0.0001
22 38 -0.1073 -0.0339 -0.1076 -0.0343 0.0002 0.0004
41 42 0.0888 0.0326 0.0869 0.0295 0.0019 0.0032
41 43 -0.1159 -0.0294 -0.1159 -0.0354 0.0000 0.0059
38 44 -0.2434 0.0528 -0.2452 0.0513 0.0017 0.0015
46 47 0.4789 0.2542 0.4728 0.2398 0.0060 0.0143
47 48 0.1758 0.1238 0.1751 0.1228 0.0008 0.0010
48 49 0.0008 -0.0735 0.0004 -0.0690 0.0004 -0.0045
49 50 0.0967 0.0446 0.0958 0.0432 0.0008 0.0014
50 51 -0.1142 -0.0618 -0.1164 -0.0653 0.0022 0.0035
29 52 0.1792 0.0233 0.1746 0.0173 0.0046 0.0060
52 53 0.1256 -0.0047 0.1243 -0.0063 0.0012 0.0016
53 54 -0.0757 -0.0432 -0.0772 -0.0450 0.0015 0.0019
54 55 -0.1182 -0.0590 -0.1212 -0.0630 0.0030 0.0040
44 45 -0.3652 0.0333 -0.3733 0.0214 0.0081 0.0119
56 41 -0.0543 0.0067 -0.0560 0.0050 0.0018 0.0018
56 42 -0.0158 0.0147 -0.0159 0.0145 0.0001 0.0002
57 56 -0.0285 0.0061 -0.0286 0.0059 0.0002 0.0002
38 49 -0.0466 -0.1050 -0.0480 -0.1040 0.0014 -0.0009
38 48 -0.1722 -0.1932 -0.1742 -0.1964 0.0020 0.0031
604 618 0.1396 0.0244 0.1396 0.0135 0.0000 0.0109
704 718 0.1787 0.0120 0.1787 -0.0017 0.0000 0.0137
621 620 0.0108 0.0041 0.0108 0.0039 0.0000 0.0001
624 625 0.0708 0.0162 0.0708 0.0100 0.0000 0.0062
724 725 0.0680 0.0155 0.0680 0.0096 0.0000 0.0060
824 626 -0.1055 -0.0149 -0.1055 -0.0155 0.0000 0.0006
607 629 0.6011 0.1274 0.6011 0.1038 0.0000 0.0236
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Table B.27
Power flow branch solution in IEEE 57-bus system (Part 3)
From To Psend Qsend Prec Qrec Ploss Qloss
634 632 0.0745 0.0373 0.0745 0.0305 0.0000 0.0068
611 641 0.0919 0.0352 0.0919 0.0282 0.0000 0.0070
615 645 0.3733 -0.0078 0.3733 -0.0214 0.0000 0.0136
614 646 0.4789 0.2734 0.4789 0.2542 0.0000 0.0192
610 651 0.2964 0.1249 0.2964 0.1183 0.0000 0.0065
613 649 0.3242 0.3376 0.3242 0.3026 0.0000 0.0350
711 643 0.1359 0.0484 0.1359 0.0454 0.0000 0.0031
640 656 0.0346 0.0409 0.0346 0.0375 0.0000 0.0033
639 657 0.0385 0.0293 0.0385 0.0261 0.0000 0.0032
609 655 0.1892 0.1022 0.1892 0.0970 0.0000 0.0051
4 604 0.1396 0.0244 0.1396 0.0244 0.0000 0.0000
618 18 0.1396 0.0135 0.1396 0.0135 0.0000 0.0000
4 704 0.1787 0.0120 0.1787 0.0120 0.0000 0.0000
718 18 0.1787 -0.0017 0.1787 -0.0017 0.0000 0.0000
21 621 0.0108 0.0041 0.0108 0.0041 0.0000 0.0000
620 20 0.0108 0.0040 0.0108 0.0040 0.0000 0.0000
24 624 0.0708 0.0162 0.0708 0.0162 0.0000 0.0000
625 25 0.0708 0.0100 0.0708 0.0100 0.0000 0.0000
24 724 0.0680 0.0155 0.0680 0.0155 0.0000 0.0000
725 25 0.0680 0.0096 0.0680 0.0096 0.0000 0.0000
24 824 -0.1055 -0.0149 -0.1055 -0.0149 0.0000 0.0000
626 26 -0.1055 -0.0155 -0.1055 -0.0155 0.0000 0.0000
7 607 0.6011 0.1274 0.6011 0.1274 0.0000 0.0000
629 29 0.6011 0.1038 0.6011 0.1038 0.0000 0.0000
34 634 0.0745 0.0373 0.0745 0.0373 0.0000 0.0000
632 32 0.0745 0.0305 0.0745 0.0305 0.0000 0.0000
11 611 0.0919 0.0352 0.0919 0.0352 0.0000 0.0000
641 41 0.0919 0.0282 0.0919 0.0282 0.0000 0.0000
15 615 0.3733 -0.0078 0.3733 -0.0078 0.0000 0.0000
645 45 0.3733 -0.0214 0.3733 -0.0214 0.0000 0.0000
14 614 0.4789 0.2734 0.4789 0.2734 0.0000 0.0000
646 46 0.4789 0.2542 0.4789 0.2542 0.0000 0.0000
10 610 0.2964 0.1249 0.2964 0.1249 0.0000 0.0000
651 51 0.2964 0.1183 0.2964 0.1183 0.0000 0.0000
13 613 0.3242 0.3376 0.3242 0.3376 0.0000 0.0000
649 49 0.3242 0.3026 0.3242 0.3026 0.0000 0.0000
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Table B.28
Power flow branch solution in IEEE 57-bus system (Part 4)
From To Psend Qsend Prec Qrec Ploss Qloss
11 711 0.1359 0.0484 0.1359 0.0484 0.0000 0.0000
643 43 0.1359 0.0453 0.1359 0.0453 0.0000 0.0000
40 640 0.0346 0.0409 0.0346 0.0409 0.0000 0.0000
656 56 0.0346 0.0376 0.0346 0.0376 0.0000 0.0000
39 639 0.0385 0.0293 0.0385 0.0293 0.0000 0.0000
657 57 0.0385 0.0261 0.0385 0.0261 0.0000 0.0000
9 609 0.1892 0.1022 0.1892 0.1022 0.0000 0.0000
655 55 0.1892 0.0970 0.1892 0.0970 0.0000 0.0000
1 201 -1.5954 -0.4300 -1.5954 -0.4300 0.0000 0.0000
201 301 -1.5954 -0.4300 -1.5954 -0.4300 0.0000 0.0000
301 401 -1.5954 -0.4300 -1.5954 -0.4300 0.0000 0.0000
401 501 -1.5954 -0.4300 -1.5954 -0.4300 0.0000 0.0000
1 271 -1.5954 -0.4301 -1.5954 -0.4301 0.0000 0.0000
271 371 -1.5954 -0.4301 -1.5954 -0.4301 0.0000 0.0000
371 471 -1.5954 -0.4301 -1.5954 -0.4301 0.0000 0.0000
471 571 -1.5954 -0.4301 -1.5954 -0.4301 0.0000 0.0000
1 281 -1.5954 -0.4300 -1.5954 -0.4300 0.0000 0.0000
281 381 -1.5954 -0.4300 -1.5954 -0.4300 0.0000 0.0000
381 481 -1.5954 -0.4300 -1.5954 -0.4300 0.0000 0.0000
481 581 -1.5954 -0.4300 -1.5954 -0.4300 0.0000 0.0000
3 203 -0.4000 0.0110 -0.4000 0.0110 0.0000 0.0000
203 303 -0.4000 0.0110 -0.4000 0.0110 0.0000 0.0000
303 403 -0.4000 0.0110 -0.4000 0.0110 0.0000 0.0000
403 503 -0.4000 0.0110 -0.4000 0.0110 0.0000 0.0000
8 208 -1.5000 -0.2066 -1.5000 -0.2066 0.0000 0.0000
208 308 -1.5000 -0.2066 -1.5000 -0.2066 0.0000 0.0000
308 408 -1.5000 -0.2066 -1.5000 -0.2066 0.0000 0.0000
408 508 -1.5000 -0.2066 -1.5000 -0.2066 0.0000 0.0000
8 278 -1.5000 -0.2066 -1.5000 -0.2066 0.0000 0.0000
278 378 -1.5000 -0.2066 -1.5000 -0.2066 0.0000 0.0000
378 478 -1.5000 -0.2066 -1.5000 -0.2066 0.0000 0.0000
478 578 -1.5000 -0.2066 -1.5000 -0.2066 0.0000 0.0000
8 288 -1.5000 -0.2067 -1.5000 -0.2067 0.0000 0.0000
288 388 -1.5000 -0.2067 -1.5000 -0.2067 0.0000 0.0000
388 488 -1.5000 -0.2067 -1.5000 -0.2067 0.0000 0.0000
488 588 -1.5000 -0.2067 -1.5000 -0.2067 0.0000 0.0000
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Table B.29
Power flow branch solution in IEEE 57-bus system (Part 5)
From To Psend Qsend Prec Qrec Ploss Qloss
12 212 -1.5500 -0.6425 -1.5500 -0.6425 0.0000 0.0000
212 312 -1.5500 -0.6425 -1.5500 -0.6425 0.0000 0.0000
312 412 -1.5500 -0.6425 -1.5500 -0.6425 0.0000 0.0000
412 512 -1.5500 -0.6425 -1.5500 -0.6425 0.0000 0.0000
12 272 -1.5500 -0.6425 -1.5500 -0.6425 0.0000 0.0000
272 372 -1.5500 -0.6425 -1.5500 -0.6425 0.0000 0.0000
372 472 -1.5500 -0.6425 -1.5500 -0.6425 0.0000 0.0000
472 572 -1.5500 -0.6425 -1.5500 -0.6425 0.0000 0.0000
2 202 0.0000 0.0077 0.0000 0.0077 0.0000 0.0000
202 302 0.0000 0.0077 0.0000 0.0077 0.0000 0.0000
302 402 0.0000 0.0077 0.0000 0.0077 0.0000 0.0000
402 502 0.0000 0.0077 0.0000 0.0077 0.0000 0.0000
6 206 0.0000 -0.0071 0.0000 -0.0071 0.0000 0.0000
206 306 0.0000 -0.0071 0.0000 -0.0071 0.0000 0.0000
306 406 0.0000 -0.0071 0.0000 -0.0071 0.0000 0.0000
406 506 0.0000 -0.0071 0.0000 -0.0071 0.0000 0.0000
9 209 0.0000 -0.0193 0.0000 -0.0193 0.0000 0.0000
209 309 0.0000 -0.0193 0.0000 -0.0193 0.0000 0.0000
309 409 0.0000 -0.0193 0.0000 -0.0193 0.0000 0.0000
409 509 0.0000 -0.0193 0.0000 -0.0193 0.0000 0.0000
The total P loss and Q loss are 0.2781 (p.u.) and 0.0611 (p.u.), individually.
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Table B.30
System (branch) setting data (Part 1)
From To R X Y/2 Tap Remark
1 2 0.00830 0.02800 0.06450 0.00000
2 3 0.02980 0.08500 0.04090 0.00000
3 4 0.01120 0.03660 0.01900 0.00000
4 5 0.06250 0.13200 0.01290 0.00000
4 6 0.04300 0.14800 0.01740 0.00000
6 7 0.02000 0.10200 0.01380 0.00000
6 8 0.03390 0.17300 0.02350 0.00000
8 9 0.00990 0.05050 0.02740 0.00000
9 10 0.03690 0.16790 0.02200 0.00000
9 11 0.02580 0.08480 0.01090 0.00000
9 12 0.06480 0.29500 0.03860 0.00000
9 13 0.04810 0.15800 0.02030 0.00000
13 14 0.01320 0.04340 0.00550 0.00000
13 15 0.02690 0.08690 0.01150 0.00000
1 15 0.01780 0.09100 0.04940 0.00000
1 16 0.04540 0.20600 0.02730 0.00000
1 17 0.02380 0.10800 0.01430 0.00000
3 15 0.01620 0.05300 0.02720 0.00000
5 6 0.03020 0.06410 0.00620 0.00000
7 8 0.01390 0.07120 0.00970 0.00000
10 12 0.02770 0.12620 0.01640 0.00000
11 13 0.02230 0.07320 0.00940 0.00000
12 13 0.01780 0.05800 0.03020 0.00000
12 16 0.01800 0.08130 0.01080 0.00000
12 17 0.03970 0.17900 0.02380 0.00000
14 15 0.01710 0.05470 0.00740 0.00000
18 19 0.46100 0.68500 0.00000 0.00000
19 20 0.28300 0.43400 0.00000 0.00000
21 22 0.07360 0.11700 0.00000 0.00000
22 23 0.00990 0.01520 0.00000 0.00000
23 24 0.16600 0.25600 0.00420 0.00000
26 27 0.16500 0.25400 0.00000 0.00000
27 28 0.06180 0.09540 0.00000 0.00000
28 29 0.04180 0.05870 0.00000 0.00000
25 30 0.13500 0.20200 0.00000 0.00000
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Table B.31
System (branch) setting data (Part 2)
From To R X Y/2 Tap Remark
30 31 0.32600 0.49700 0.00000 0.00000
31 32 0.50700 0.75500 0.00000 0.00000
32 33 0.03920 0.03600 0.00000 0.00000
34 35 0.05200 0.07800 0.00160 0.00000
35 36 0.04300 0.05370 0.00080 0.00000
36 37 0.02900 0.03660 0.00000 0.00000
37 38 0.06510 0.10090 0.00100 0.00000
37 39 0.02390 0.03790 0.00000 0.00000
36 40 0.03000 0.04660 0.00000 0.00000
22 38 0.01920 0.02950 0.00000 0.00000
41 42 0.20700 0.35200 0.00000 0.00000
41 43 0.00000 0.41200 0.00000 0.00000
38 44 0.02890 0.05850 0.00100 0.00000
46 47 0.02300 0.06800 0.00160 0.00000
47 48 0.01820 0.02330 0.00000 0.00000
48 49 0.08340 0.12900 0.00240 0.00000
49 50 0.08010 0.12800 0.00000 0.00000
50 51 0.13860 0.22000 0.00000 0.00000
29 52 0.14420 0.18700 0.00000 0.00000
52 53 0.07620 0.09840 0.00000 0.00000
53 54 0.18780 0.23200 0.00000 0.00000
54 55 0.17320 0.22650 0.00000 0.00000
44 45 0.06240 0.12420 0.00200 0.00000
56 41 0.55300 0.54900 0.00000 0.00000
56 42 0.21250 0.35400 0.00000 0.00000
57 56 0.17400 0.26000 0.00000 0.00000
38 49 0.11500 0.17700 0.00150 0.00000
38 48 0.03120 0.04820 0.00000 0.00000
604 618 0.00000 0.55500 0.00000 1.03093
704 718 0.00000 0.43000 0.00000 1.02250
621 620 0.00000 0.77670 0.00000 0.95877
624 625 0.00000 1.18200 0.00000 1.00000
724 725 0.00000 1.23000 0.00000 1.00000
824 626 0.00000 0.04730 0.00000 0.95877
607 629 0.00000 0.06480 0.00000 1.03413
274
Table B.32
System (branch) setting data (Part 3)
From To R X Y/2 Tap Remark
634 632 0.00000 0.95300 0.00000 1.02564
611 641 0.00000 0.74900 0.00000 1.04712
615 645 0.00000 0.10420 0.00000 1.04712
614 646 0.00000 0.07350 0.00000 1.11111
610 651 0.00000 0.07120 0.00000 1.07527
613 649 0.00000 0.19100 0.00000 1.11732
711 643 0.00000 0.15300 0.00000 1.04384
640 656 0.00000 1.19500 0.00000 1.04384
639 657 0.00000 1.35500 0.00000 1.02041
609 655 0.00000 0.12050 0.00000 1.06383
4 604 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
618 18 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
4 704 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
718 18 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
21 621 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
620 20 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
24 624 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
625 25 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
24 724 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
725 25 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
24 824 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
626 26 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
7 607 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
629 29 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
34 634 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
632 32 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
11 611 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
641 41 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
15 615 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
645 45 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
14 614 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
646 46 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
10 610 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
651 51 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
13 613 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
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Table B.33
System (branch) setting data (Part 4)
From To R X Y/2 Tap Remark
649 49 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
11 711 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
643 43 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
40 640 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
656 56 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
39 639 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
657 57 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
9 609 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
655 55 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
1 201 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
201 301 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
301 401 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
401 501 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
1 271 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
271 371 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
371 471 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
471 571 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
1 281 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
281 381 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
381 481 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
481 581 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
3 203 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
203 303 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
303 403 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
403 503 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
8 208 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
208 308 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
308 408 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
408 508 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
8 278 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
278 378 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
378 478 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
478 578 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
8 288 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
288 388 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
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Table B.34
System (branch) setting data (Part 5)
From To R X Y/2 Tap Remark
388 488 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
488 588 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
12 212 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
212 312 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
312 412 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
412 512 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
12 272 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
272 372 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
372 472 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
472 572 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
2 202 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
202 302 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
302 402 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
402 502 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
6 206 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
206 306 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
306 406 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
406 506 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
9 209 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
209 309 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
309 409 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
409 509 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB1
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Table B.35
Power flow condition setting data (Part 1)
Node V magnitude PG QG PL QL QC Name
1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5500 0.1700 0.0000 Kanawha1
2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0300 0.8800 0.0000 Turner1
3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4100 0.2100 0.0000 Logan1
4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Sprigg
5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1300 0.0400 0.0000 Bus5
6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7500 0.0200 0.0000 BeaverCk1
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bus7
8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.5000 0.2200 0.0000 ClinchRv1
9 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.2100 0.2600 0.0000 Saltville1
10 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0500 0.0200 0.0000 Bus10
11 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Tazewell
12 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 3.7700 0.2400 0.0000 Glen Lyn1
13 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1800 0.0230 0.0000 Bus13
14 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1050 0.0530 0.0000 Bus14
15 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2200 0.0500 0.0000 Bus15
16 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4300 0.0300 0.0000 Bus16
17 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4200 0.0800 0.0000 Bus17
18 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2720 0.0980 0.0998 Sprigg
19 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0330 0.0060 0.0000 Bus19
20 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0230 0.0100 0.0000 Bus20
21 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bus21
22 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bus22
23 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0630 0.0210 0.0000 Bus23
24 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bus24
25 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0630 0.0320 0.0612 Bus25
26 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bus26
27 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0930 0.0050 0.0000 Bus27
28 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0460 0.0230 0.0000 Bus28
29 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1700 0.0260 0.0000 Bus29
30 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0360 0.0180 0.0000 Bus30
31 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0580 0.0290 0.0000 Bus31
32 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0160 0.0080 0.0000 Bus32
33 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0380 0.0190 0.0000 Bus33
34 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bus34
35 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0600 0.0300 0.0000 Bus35
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Table B.36
Power flow condition setting data (Part 2)
Node V magnitude PG QG PL QL QC Name
36 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bus36
37 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bus37
38 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1400 0.0700 0.0000 Bus38
39 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bus39
40 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bus40
41 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0630 0.0300 0.0000 Tazewell
42 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0710 0.0440 0.0000 Bus42
43 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0200 0.0100 0.0000 Tazewell
44 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1200 0.0180 0.0000 Bus44
45 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bus45
46 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bus46
47 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2970 0.1160 0.0000 Bus47
48 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bus48
49 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1800 0.0850 0.0000 Bus49
50 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2100 0.1050 0.0000 Bus50
51 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1800 0.0530 0.0000 Bus51
52 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0490 0.0220 0.0000 Bus52
53 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2000 0.1000 0.0668 Bus53
54 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0410 0.0140 0.0000 Bus54
55 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0680 0.0340 0.0000 Saltville
56 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0760 0.0220 0.0000 Bus56
57 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0670 0.0200 0.0000 Bus57
58 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Kanawha2A
59 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Turner2
60 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Logan2
61 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 BeaverCk2
62 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ClinchRv2A
63 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Saltville2
64 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Glen Lyn2A
65 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Kanawha2B
66 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Glen Lyn2B
67 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ClinchRv2B
68 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Kanawha2C
69 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ClinchRv2C
70 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table B.37
Power flow condition setting data (Part 3)
Node V magnitude PG QG PL QL QC Name
71 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
72 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
73 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
74 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
75 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
76 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
77 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
78 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
79 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
80 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
81 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
82 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
83 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
84 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
85 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
86 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
87 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
88 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
89 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
90 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
91 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
92 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
93 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
94 1.0400 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
95 1.0100 0.0000 -0.0080 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
96 0.9850 0.4000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
97 0.9800 0.0000 0.0080 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
98 1.0050 1.5000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
99 0.9800 0.0000 0.0220 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
100 1.0150 1.5500 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
101 1.0400 1.5954 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
102 1.0150 1.5500 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
103 1.0050 1.5000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
104 1.0400 1.5954 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
105 1.0050 1.5000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table B.38
Power flow condition setting data (Part 4)
Node V magnitude PG QG PL QL QC Name
106 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
107 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
108 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
109 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
110 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
111 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
112 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
113 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
114 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
115 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
116 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
117 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
118 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
119 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
120 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
121 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
122 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
123 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
124 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
125 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
126 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
127 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
128 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
129 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
130 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
131 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
132 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
133 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
134 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
135 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
136 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
137 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
138 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
139 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table B.39
Generator constants with implemented generator controller
Node AVR OEL PSS GOV GVA GMW GPF MG DG PLM Name
501 X X X 182 170 0.934 6.0 0.0 5.0 G1A
571 X X X 182 170 0.934 6.0 0.0 5.0 G1B
581 X X X 182 170 0.934 6.0 0.0 5.0 G1C
503 X X X 100 80 0.800 6.0 0.0 5.0 G3
508 X X X 182 170 0.934 6.0 0.0 5.0 G8A
578 X X X 182 170 0.934 6.0 0.0 5.0 G8B
588 X X X 182 170 0.934 6.0 0.0 5.0 G8C
512 X X X 178 160 0.899 6.0 0.0 5.0 G12A
572 X X X 178 160 0.899 6.0 0.0 5.0 G12B
502 X 50 0 0.000 1.5 0.0 0.0 C2
506 X 25 0 0.000 1.5 0.0 0.0 C6





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B.4 IEEE 118-bus System
The system diagram is shown in Fig. B.5. Power flow solutions are summarized in
Tables B.42, B.43, B.43, and B.45. The system MVA is 100 MVA. The power flow
setting data are also provided in Tables B.64, B.65, B.66, B.67, B.68, B.76, B.77 and
B.78. It is noted that circuit breakers with no impedance are inserted between the
main grid and individual power equipment.
Initial conditions of the dynamic simulation with generator constants are sorted out
in Tables B.86, B.87, B.88, B.89, B.90 and B.91.
It is noted that the generator’s saturation characteristics is used for the IEEE 118-bus
systems (Fig. B.3).
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Figure B.5: Diagram of IEEE 118-bus system
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Table B.42
Power flow node solution in IEEE 118-bus system (part 1)
Node |V | ∠ V PG QG PL QL QC Name
1 0.9550 -19.16 0.0000 0.0000 0.5100 0.2700 0.0000 Riverside1
2 0.9714 -18.63 0.0000 0.0000 0.2000 0.0900 0.0000 Pokagon
3 0.9677 -18.27 0.0000 0.0000 0.3900 0.1000 0.0000 HickoryCk
4 0.9980 -14.54 0.0000 0.0000 0.3900 0.1200 0.0000 NCarlisle1
5 1.0018 -14.09 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.4015 Olive
6 0.9900 -16.84 0.0000 0.0000 0.5200 0.2200 0.0000 Kankakee1
7 0.9893 -17.29 0.0000 0.0000 0.1900 0.0200 0.0000 JacksonRd
8 1.0150 -8.88 0.0000 0.0000 0.2800 0.0000 0.0000 Olive1
9 1.0430 -1.67 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Beguine
10 1.0500 5.86 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Breed1
11 0.9850 -17.13 0.0000 0.0000 0.7000 0.2300 0.0000 SouthBend
12 0.9900 -17.66 0.0000 0.0000 0.4700 0.1000 0.0000 TwnBranch1
13 0.9683 -18.54 0.0000 0.0000 0.3400 0.1600 0.0000 Concord
14 0.9836 -18.41 0.0000 0.0000 0.1400 0.0100 0.0000 GoshenJct
15 0.9700 -18.79 0.0000 0.0000 0.9000 0.3000 0.0000 FortWayne1
16 0.9838 -17.99 0.0000 0.0000 0.2500 0.1000 0.0000 N. E.
17 0.9948 -16.26 0.0000 0.0000 0.1100 0.0300 0.0000 Sorenson
18 0.9730 -18.49 0.0000 0.0000 0.6000 0.3400 0.0000 McKinley1
19 0.9620 -18.96 0.0000 0.0000 0.4500 0.2500 0.0000 Lincoln1
20 0.9569 -18.06 0.0000 0.0000 0.1800 0.0300 0.0000 Adams
21 0.9577 -16.45 0.0000 0.0000 0.1400 0.0800 0.0000 Jay
22 0.9690 -13.88 0.0000 0.0000 0.1000 0.0500 0.0000 Randolph
23 0.9994 -8.93 0.0000 0.0000 0.0700 0.0300 0.0000 CollgeCnr
24 0.9920 -9.03 0.0000 0.0000 0.1300 0.0000 0.0000 Trenton1
25 1.0500 -2.01 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 TannersCk1
26 1.0150 -0.07 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 TannersCk3
27 0.9680 -14.58 0.0000 0.0000 0.7100 0.1300 0.0000 Madison1
28 0.9616 -16.32 0.0000 0.0000 0.1700 0.0700 0.0000 Mullin
29 0.9632 -17.32 0.0000 0.0000 0.2400 0.0400 0.0000 Grant
30 0.9871 -10.83 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Sorenson
31 0.9670 -17.21 0.0000 0.0000 0.4300 0.2700 0.0000 DeerCreek1
32 0.9630 -15.13 0.0000 0.0000 0.5900 0.2300 0.0000 Delaware1
33 0.9707 -19.50 0.0000 0.0000 0.2300 0.0900 0.0000 Haviland
34 0.9840 -18.93 0.0000 0.0000 0.5900 0.2600 0.1356 Rockhill1
35 0.9804 -19.39 0.0000 0.0000 0.3300 0.0900 0.0000 West Lima
36 0.9800 -19.39 0.0000 0.0000 0.3100 0.1700 0.0000 Sterling1
37 0.9902 -18.48 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.2451 East Lima
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Table B.43
Power flow node solution in IEEE 118-bus system (part 2)
Node |V | ∠ V PG QG PL QL QC Name
38 0.9645 -12.71 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 East Lima
39 0.9698 -21.83 0.0000 0.0000 0.2700 0.1100 0.0000 NwLiberty
40 0.9700 -22.88 0.0000 0.0000 0.6600 0.2300 0.0000 West End1
41 0.9668 -23.31 0.0000 0.0000 0.3700 0.1000 0.0000 S. Tiffin
42 0.9850 -21.65 0.0000 0.0000 0.9600 0.2300 0.0000 Howard1
43 0.9771 -18.92 0.0000 0.0000 0.1800 0.0700 0.0000 S. Kenton
44 0.9843 -16.35 0.0000 0.0000 0.1600 0.0800 0.0969 WMtVernon
45 0.9863 -14.49 0.0000 0.0000 0.5300 0.2200 0.0973 N. Newark
46 1.0050 -11.65 0.0000 0.0000 0.2800 0.1000 0.1010 W.Lancstr1
47 1.0170 -9.40 0.0000 0.0000 0.3400 0.0000 0.0000 Crooksvil
48 1.0206 -10.22 0.0000 0.0000 0.2000 0.1100 0.1563 Zanesvile
49 1.0250 -9.21 0.0000 0.0000 0.8700 0.3000 0.0000 Philo1
50 1.0011 -11.26 0.0000 0.0000 0.1700 0.0400 0.0000 W.Cambrdg
51 0.9669 -13.89 0.0000 0.0000 0.1700 0.0800 0.0000 Newcmrstn
52 0.9568 -14.85 0.0000 0.0000 0.1800 0.0500 0.0000 SCoshoctn
53 0.9460 -15.83 0.0000 0.0000 0.2300 0.1100 0.0000 Wooster
54 0.9550 -14.93 0.0000 0.0000 1.1300 0.3200 0.0000 Torrey1
55 0.9520 -15.22 0.0000 0.0000 0.6300 0.2200 0.0000 Wagenhals1
56 0.9540 -15.03 0.0000 0.0000 0.8400 0.1800 0.0000 Sunnyside1
57 0.9706 -13.81 0.0000 0.0000 0.1200 0.0300 0.0000 WNwPhila1
58 0.9590 -14.67 0.0000 0.0000 0.1200 0.0300 0.0000 WNwPhila2
59 0.9850 -10.88 0.0000 0.0000 2.7700 1.1300 0.0000 Tidd1
60 0.9931 -7.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.7800 0.0300 0.0000 SW Kammer
61 0.9950 -6.10 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 W. Kammer1
62 0.9980 -6.72 0.0000 0.0000 0.7700 0.1400 0.0000 Natrium1
63 0.9698 -7.30 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Tidd
64 0.9842 -5.58 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Kammer
65 1.0050 -2.48 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Muskingum1
66 1.0500 -2.67 0.0000 0.0000 0.3900 0.1800 0.0000 Muskingum1
67 1.0197 -5.31 0.0000 0.0000 0.2800 0.0700 0.0000 Summerfld
68 1.0038 -2.63 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Sporn
69 1.0350 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Sporn1
70 0.9840 -7.42 0.0000 0.0000 0.6600 0.2000 0.0000 Portsmoth1
71 0.9868 -7.84 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 NPortsmth
72 0.9800 -8.99 0.0000 0.0000 0.1200 0.0000 0.0000 Hillsboro1
73 0.9910 -8.05 0.0000 0.0000 0.0600 0.0000 0.0000 Sargents1
74 0.9580 -8.36 0.0000 0.0000 0.6800 0.2700 0.1101 Bellefont1
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Table B.44
Power flow node solution in IEEE 118-bus system (part 3)
Node |V | ∠ V PG QG PL QL QC Name
75 0.9674 -7.09 0.0000 0.0000 0.4700 0.1100 0.0000 Sth Point
76 0.9430 -8.24 0.0000 0.0000 0.6800 0.3600 0.0000 Darrah1
77 1.0060 -3.30 0.0000 0.0000 0.6100 0.2800 0.0000 Turner1
78 1.0034 -3.61 0.0000 0.0000 0.7100 0.2600 0.0000 Chemical
79 1.0092 -3.32 0.0000 0.0000 0.3900 0.3200 0.2037 CapitolHl
80 1.0400 -1.08 0.0000 0.0000 1.3000 0.2600 0.0000 Cabin Crk1
81 0.9984 -2.08 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Kanawha
82 0.9886 -2.79 0.0000 0.0000 0.5400 0.2700 0.1955 Logan
83 0.9844 -1.60 0.0000 0.0000 0.2000 0.1000 0.0969 Sprigg
84 0.9797 0.93 0.0000 0.0000 0.1100 0.0700 0.0000 BetsyLayn
85 0.9850 2.49 0.0000 0.0000 0.2400 0.1500 0.0000 BeaverCrk1
86 0.9867 1.12 0.0000 0.0000 0.2100 0.1000 0.0000 Hazard
87 1.0150 1.38 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Pineville1
88 0.9875 5.62 0.0000 0.0000 0.4800 0.1000 0.0000 Fremont
89 1.0050 9.67 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ClinchRvr1
90 0.9850 3.27 0.0000 0.0000 1.6300 0.4200 0.0000 Holston1
91 0.9800 3.28 0.0000 0.0000 0.1000 0.0000 0.0000 HolstonTP1
92 0.9900 3.81 0.0000 0.0000 0.6500 0.1000 0.0000 Saltville1
93 0.9854 0.78 0.0000 0.0000 0.1200 0.0700 0.0000 Tazewell
94 0.9899 -1.38 0.0000 0.0000 0.3000 0.1600 0.0000 Switchbak
95 0.9804 -2.36 0.0000 0.0000 0.4200 0.3100 0.0000 Caldwell
96 0.9923 -2.52 0.0000 0.0000 0.3800 0.1500 0.0000 Baileysvl
97 1.0112 -2.15 0.0000 0.0000 0.1500 0.0900 0.0000 Sundial
98 1.0235 -2.64 0.0000 0.0000 0.3400 0.0800 0.0000 Bradley
99 1.0100 -3.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.4200 0.0000 0.0000 Hinton1
100 1.0170 -2.01 0.0000 0.0000 0.3700 0.1800 0.0000 Glen Lyn1
101 0.9914 -0.42 0.0000 0.0000 0.2200 0.1500 0.0000 Wythe
102 0.9891 2.29 0.0000 0.0000 0.0500 0.0300 0.0000 Smyth
103 1.0100 -5.74 0.0000 0.0000 0.2300 0.1600 0.0000 Claytor1
104 0.9710 -8.31 0.0000 0.0000 0.3800 0.2500 0.0000 Hancock1
105 0.9650 -9.41 0.0000 0.0000 0.3100 0.2600 0.1862 Roanoke1
106 0.9612 -9.67 0.0000 0.0000 0.4300 0.1600 0.0000 Cloverdle
107 0.9520 -12.47 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000 0.1200 0.0544 Reusens1
108 0.9662 -10.61 0.0000 0.0000 0.0200 0.0100 0.0000 Blaine
109 0.9670 -11.06 0.0000 0.0000 0.0800 0.0300 0.0000 Franklin
110 0.9730 -11.91 0.0000 0.0000 0.3900 0.3000 0.0568 Fieldale1
111 0.9800 -10.26 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Dan River1
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Table B.45
Power flow node solution in IEEE 118-bus system (part 4)
Node |V | ∠ V PG QG PL QL QC Name
112 0.9750 -15.01 0.0000 0.0000 0.6800 0.1300 0.0000 Danville1
113 0.9930 -16.26 0.0000 0.0000 0.0600 0.0000 0.0000 DeerCk TP1
114 0.9601 -15.46 0.0000 0.0000 0.0800 0.0300 0.0000 W Medford
115 0.9600 -15.47 0.0000 0.0000 0.2200 0.0700 0.0000 Medford
116 1.0050 -3.07 0.0000 0.0000 1.8400 0.0000 0.0000 Kyger Crk1
117 0.9738 -19.20 0.0000 0.0000 0.2000 0.0800 0.0000 Corey
118 0.9495 -8.09 0.0000 0.0000 0.3300 0.1500 0.0000 WHuntngdn
120 1.0018 -14.09 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
123 1.0150 -8.88 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
132 0.9948 -16.26 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
140 1.0500 -2.01 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
141 1.0150 -0.07 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
145 0.9871 -10.83 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
152 0.9902 -18.48 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
153 0.9645 -12.71 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
174 0.9850 -10.88 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
176 0.9950 -6.10 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
178 0.9698 -7.30 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
179 0.9842 -5.58 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
180 1.0050 -2.48 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
181 1.0500 -2.67 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
183 1.0038 -2.63 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
184 1.0350 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
195 1.0400 -1.08 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
196 0.9984 -2.08 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
201 0.9550 -19.16 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
204 0.9980 -14.54 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
206 0.9900 -16.84 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
208 1.0150 -8.88 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
210 1.0500 5.86 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
212 0.9900 -17.66 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
215 0.9700 -18.79 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
218 0.9730 -18.49 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
219 0.9620 -18.96 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
224 0.9920 -9.03 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
225 1.0500 -2.01 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
226 1.0150 -0.07 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table B.46
Power flow node solution in IEEE 118-bus system (part 5)
Node |V | ∠ V PG QG PL QL QC Name
227 0.9680 -14.58 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
231 0.9670 -17.21 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
232 0.9630 -15.13 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
234 0.9840 -18.93 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
236 0.9800 -19.39 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
240 0.9700 -22.88 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
242 0.9850 -21.65 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
246 1.0050 -11.65 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
249 1.0250 -9.21 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
254 0.9550 -14.93 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
255 0.9520 -15.22 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
256 0.9540 -15.03 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
259 0.9850 -10.88 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
261 0.9950 -6.10 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
262 0.9980 -6.72 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
265 1.0050 -2.48 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
266 1.0500 -2.67 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
269 1.0350 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
270 0.9840 -7.42 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
272 0.9800 -8.99 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
273 0.9910 -8.05 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
274 0.9580 -8.36 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
276 0.9430 -8.24 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
277 1.0060 -3.30 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
280 1.0400 -1.08 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
285 0.9850 2.49 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
287 1.0150 1.38 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
289 1.0050 9.67 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
290 0.9850 3.27 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
291 0.9800 3.28 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
292 0.9900 3.81 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
299 1.0100 -3.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
301 0.9550 -19.16 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
304 0.9980 -14.54 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table B.47
Power flow node solution in IEEE 118-bus system (part 6)
Node |V | ∠ V PG QG PL QL QC Name
306 0.9900 -16.84 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
308 1.0150 -8.88 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
310 1.0500 5.86 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
312 0.9900 -17.66 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
315 0.9700 -18.79 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
318 0.9730 -18.49 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
319 0.9620 -18.96 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
324 0.9920 -9.03 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
325 1.0500 -2.01 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
326 1.0150 -0.07 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
327 0.9680 -14.58 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
331 0.9670 -17.21 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
332 0.9630 -15.13 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
334 0.9840 -18.93 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
336 0.9800 -19.39 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
340 0.9700 -22.88 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
342 0.9850 -21.65 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
346 1.0050 -11.65 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
349 1.0250 -9.21 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
354 0.9550 -14.93 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
355 0.9520 -15.22 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
356 0.9540 -15.03 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
359 0.9850 -10.88 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
361 0.9950 -6.10 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
362 0.9980 -6.72 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
365 1.0050 -2.48 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
366 1.0500 -2.67 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
369 1.0350 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
370 0.9840 -7.42 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
372 0.9800 -8.99 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
373 0.9910 -8.05 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
374 0.9580 -8.36 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
376 0.9430 -8.24 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
377 1.0060 -3.30 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table B.48
Power flow node solution in IEEE 118-bus system (part 8)
Node |V | ∠ V PG QG PL QL QC Name
380 1.0400 -1.08 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
385 0.9850 2.49 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
387 1.0150 1.38 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
389 1.0050 9.67 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
390 0.9850 3.27 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
391 0.9800 3.28 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
392 0.9900 3.81 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
399 1.0100 -3.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
401 0.9550 -19.16 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
404 0.9980 -14.54 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
406 0.9900 -16.84 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
408 1.0150 -8.88 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
410 1.0500 5.86 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
412 0.9900 -17.66 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
415 0.9700 -18.79 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
418 0.9730 -18.49 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
419 0.9620 -18.96 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
424 0.9920 -9.03 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
425 1.0500 -2.01 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
426 1.0150 -0.07 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
427 0.9680 -14.58 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
431 0.9670 -17.21 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
432 0.9630 -15.13 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
434 0.9840 -18.93 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
436 0.9800 -19.39 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
440 0.9700 -22.88 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
442 0.9850 -21.65 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
446 1.0050 -11.65 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
449 1.0250 -9.21 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
454 0.9550 -14.93 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
455 0.9520 -15.22 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
456 0.9540 -15.03 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
459 0.9850 -10.88 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
461 0.9950 -6.10 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table B.49
Power flow node solution in IEEE 118-bus system (part 9)
Node |V | ∠ V PG QG PL QL QC Name
462 0.9980 -6.72 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
465 1.0050 -2.48 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
466 1.0500 -2.67 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
469 1.0350 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
470 0.9840 -7.42 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
472 0.9800 -8.99 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
473 0.9910 -8.05 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
474 0.9580 -8.36 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
476 0.9430 -8.24 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
477 1.0060 -3.30 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
480 1.0400 -1.08 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
485 0.9850 2.49 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
487 1.0150 1.38 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
489 1.0050 9.67 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
490 0.9850 3.27 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
491 0.9800 3.28 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
492 0.9900 3.81 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
499 1.0100 -3.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
501 0.9550 -19.16 0.0000 -0.0304 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Riverside2
504 0.9980 -14.54 0.0000 -0.1279 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 NCarlisle2
506 0.9900 -16.84 0.0000 0.1627 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Kankakee2
508 1.0150 -8.88 0.0000 0.5671 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Olive2
510 1.0500 5.86 4.5000 -0.5127 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Breed2
512 0.9900 -17.66 0.8500 0.9166 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 TwnBranch2
515 0.9700 -18.79 0.0000 0.0797 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 FortWayne2
518 0.9730 -18.49 0.0000 0.2901 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 McKinley2
519 0.9620 -18.96 0.0000 -0.1431 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Lincoln2
524 0.9920 -9.03 0.0000 -0.1498 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Trenton2
525 1.0500 -2.01 2.2000 0.5220 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 TannersCk2
526 1.0150 -0.07 3.1400 0.0672 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 TannersCk4
527 0.9680 -14.58 0.0000 0.0363 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Madison2
531 0.9670 -17.21 0.0700 0.3274 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 DeerCreek2
532 0.9630 -15.13 0.0000 -0.1637 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Delaware2
534 0.9840 -18.93 0.0000 -0.1639 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Rockhill2
536 0.9800 -19.39 0.0000 0.0842 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Sterling2
540 0.9700 -22.88 0.0000 0.2876 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 West End2
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Table B.50
Power flow node solution in IEEE 118-bus system (part 10)
Node |V | ∠ V PG QG PL QL QC Name
542 0.9850 -21.65 0.0000 0.4094 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Howard2
546 1.0050 -11.65 0.1900 -0.0491 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 W.Lancstr2
549 1.0250 -9.21 2.0400 1.1711 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Philo2
554 0.9550 -14.93 0.4800 0.0365 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Torrey2
555 0.9520 -15.22 0.0000 0.0461 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Wagenhals2
556 0.9540 -15.03 0.0000 -0.0244 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Sunnyside2
559 0.9850 -10.88 1.5500 0.8034 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Tidd2
561 0.9950 -6.10 1.6000 -0.4196 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 W. Kammer2
562 0.9980 -6.72 0.0000 0.0119 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Natrium2
565 1.0050 -2.48 3.9100 0.6395 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Muskingum2
566 1.0500 -2.67 3.9200 0.0700 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Muskingum2
569 1.0350 0.00 5.1408 -0.7068 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Sporn2
570 0.9840 -7.42 0.0000 0.0970 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Portsmoth2
572 0.9800 -8.99 0.0000 -0.1114 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Hillsboro2
573 0.9910 -8.05 0.0000 0.0966 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Sargents2
574 0.9580 -8.36 0.0000 -0.0574 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bellefont2
576 0.9430 -8.24 0.0000 0.0516 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Darrah2
577 1.0060 -3.30 0.0000 0.1206 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Turner2
580 1.0400 -1.08 4.7700 1.1096 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Cabin Crk2
585 0.9850 2.49 0.0000 -0.0568 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 BeaverCrk2
587 1.0150 1.38 0.0400 0.1103 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Pineville2
589 1.0050 9.67 6.0700 -0.0573 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ClinchRvr2
590 0.9850 3.27 0.0000 0.5916 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Holston2
591 0.9800 3.28 0.0000 -0.1310 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 HolstonTP2
592 0.9900 3.81 0.0000 -0.1403 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Saltville2
599 1.0100 -3.00 0.0000 -0.1758 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Hinton2
600 1.0170 -2.01 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
603 1.0100 -5.74 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
604 0.9710 -8.31 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
605 0.9650 -9.41 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
607 0.9520 -12.47 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
610 0.9730 -11.91 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
611 0.9800 -10.26 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
612 0.9750 -15.01 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
613 0.9930 -16.26 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
616 1.0050 -3.07 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table B.51
Power flow node solution in IEEE 118-bus system (part 11)
Node |V | ∠ V PG QG PL QL QC Name
700 1.0170 -2.01 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
703 1.0100 -5.74 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
704 0.9710 -8.31 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
705 0.9650 -9.41 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
707 0.9520 -12.47 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
710 0.9730 -11.91 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
711 0.9800 -10.26 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
712 0.9750 -15.01 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
713 0.9930 -16.26 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
716 1.0050 -3.07 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
800 1.0170 -2.01 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
803 1.0100 -5.74 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
804 0.9710 -8.31 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
805 0.9650 -9.41 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
807 0.9520 -12.47 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
810 0.9730 -11.91 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
811 0.9800 -10.26 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
812 0.9750 -15.01 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
813 0.9930 -16.26 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
816 1.0050 -3.07 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
900 1.0170 -2.01 2.5200 0.9569 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Glen Lyn2
903 1.0100 -5.74 0.4000 0.7550 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Claytor2
904 0.9710 -8.31 0.0000 0.0228 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Hancock2
905 0.9650 -9.41 0.0000 -0.1842 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Roanoke2
907 0.9520 -12.47 0.0000 0.0650 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Reusens2
910 0.9730 -11.91 0.0000 0.0024 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Fieldale2
911 0.9800 -10.26 0.3600 -0.0184 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Dan River2
912 0.9750 -15.01 0.0000 0.4149 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Danville2
913 0.9930 -16.26 0.0000 0.0774 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 DeerCk TP2
916 1.0050 -3.07 0.0000 0.3758 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Kyger Crk2
Total 43.7508 7.9523 42.4200 14.3800 0.8440
296
Table B.52
Power flow branch solution in IEEE 118-bus system (Part 1)
From To Psend Qsend Prec Qrec Ploss Qloss
1 2 -0.1223 -0.1309 -0.1233 -0.1105 0.0010 -0.0204
1 3 -0.3877 -0.1696 -0.3902 -0.1678 0.0025 -0.0018
4 5 -1.0382 -0.2449 -1.0402 -0.2519 0.0020 0.0070
3 5 -0.6839 -0.1430 -0.6964 -0.1713 0.0125 0.0283
5 6 0.8900 0.0370 0.8806 0.0084 0.0094 0.0286
6 7 0.3606 -0.0489 0.3600 -0.0463 0.0006 -0.0026
8 9 -4.4068 -0.9103 -4.4528 -0.2505 0.0460 -0.6598
9 10 -4.4528 -0.2505 -4.5000 0.5127 0.0472 -0.7632
4 11 0.6482 -0.0030 0.6394 -0.0148 0.0088 0.0118
5 11 0.7786 0.0263 0.7663 0.0022 0.0123 0.0241
11 12 0.3487 -0.3551 0.3472 -0.3552 0.0015 0.0001
2 12 -0.3233 -0.2005 -0.3261 -0.1946 0.0028 -0.0059
3 12 -0.0963 -0.1248 -0.0974 -0.0894 0.0011 -0.0354
7 12 0.1700 -0.0663 0.1697 -0.0589 0.0003 -0.0074
11 13 0.3570 0.1124 0.3537 0.1196 0.0033 -0.0072
12 14 0.1901 0.0244 0.1893 0.0394 0.0008 -0.0150
13 15 0.0137 -0.0404 0.0137 0.0184 0.0000 -0.0589
14 15 0.0493 0.0294 0.0490 0.0763 0.0003 -0.0469
12 16 0.0818 0.0422 0.0816 0.0623 0.0002 -0.0200
15 17 -1.0404 -0.2358 -1.0562 -0.2453 0.0158 0.0095
16 17 -0.1684 -0.0377 -0.1697 0.0026 0.0013 -0.0403
17 18 0.8053 0.2414 0.7965 0.2177 0.0088 0.0237
18 19 0.1965 0.1678 0.1957 0.1749 0.0008 -0.0071
19 20 -0.1097 0.0529 -0.1102 0.0782 0.0005 -0.0254
15 19 0.1193 0.1560 0.1188 0.1637 0.0005 -0.0077
20 21 -0.2902 0.0482 -0.2919 0.0599 0.0018 -0.0117
21 22 -0.4319 -0.0201 -0.4362 -0.0170 0.0043 -0.0031
22 23 -0.5362 -0.0670 -0.5467 -0.0769 0.0105 0.0099
23 24 0.0733 0.1062 0.0730 0.1544 0.0003 -0.0483
23 25 -1.6241 -0.2637 -1.6660 -0.3878 0.0419 0.1241
25 27 1.4407 0.3036 1.3767 0.1548 0.0640 0.1488
27 28 0.3309 -0.0063 0.3286 0.0038 0.0022 -0.0101
28 29 0.1586 -0.0662 0.1579 -0.0470 0.0007 -0.0192
8 30 0.7217 0.2499 0.7183 0.7279 0.0034 -0.4780
26 30 2.2333 -0.1341 2.1942 0.3616 0.0391 -0.4958
17 31 0.1428 0.1149 0.1409 0.1473 0.0018 -0.0323
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Table B.53
Power flow branch solution in IEEE 118-bus system (Part 2)
From To Psend Qsend Prec Qrec Ploss Qloss
29 31 -0.0821 -0.0870 -0.0822 -0.0798 0.0002 -0.0072
23 32 0.9340 0.0507 0.9061 0.0619 0.0280 -0.0112
31 32 -0.3013 0.1249 -0.3048 0.1367 0.0035 -0.0119
27 32 0.1275 0.0170 0.1270 0.0336 0.0004 -0.0166
15 33 0.0837 -0.0458 0.0834 -0.0168 0.0003 -0.0290
19 34 -0.0258 -0.1073 -0.0264 -0.0492 0.0006 -0.0581
35 36 0.0070 0.0338 0.0070 0.0364 0.0000 -0.0026
35 37 -0.3370 -0.1238 -0.3385 -0.1176 0.0015 -0.0062
33 37 -0.1466 -0.1068 -0.1479 -0.0760 0.0013 -0.0308
34 36 0.3039 0.0465 0.3030 0.0494 0.0009 -0.0029
34 37 -0.9285 -0.4022 -0.9312 -0.4025 0.0027 0.0003
37 39 0.5422 0.0289 0.5326 0.0228 0.0097 0.0060
37 40 0.4338 -0.0372 0.4224 -0.0291 0.0114 -0.0081
30 38 0.6125 0.1650 0.6100 0.5394 0.0025 -0.3743
39 40 0.2626 -0.0872 0.2611 -0.0774 0.0015 -0.0098
40 41 0.1482 0.0138 0.1479 0.0241 0.0003 -0.0103
40 42 -0.1247 -0.0626 -0.1257 -0.0214 0.0010 -0.0412
41 42 -0.2221 -0.0759 -0.2244 -0.0508 0.0023 -0.0251
43 44 -0.1718 -0.0116 -0.1737 0.0392 0.0019 -0.0508
34 43 0.0082 0.0181 0.0082 0.0584 0.0001 -0.0404
44 45 -0.3337 0.0561 -0.3364 0.0671 0.0027 -0.0110
45 46 -0.3669 -0.0351 -0.3724 -0.0209 0.0055 -0.0141
46 47 -0.3150 -0.0105 -0.3188 0.0093 0.0037 -0.0198
46 48 -0.1474 -0.0586 -0.1487 -0.0144 0.0014 -0.0442
47 49 -0.0860 -0.1123 -0.0863 -0.0966 0.0003 -0.0156
42 49 -0.6551 0.0536 -0.6871 -0.0045 0.0320 0.0582
42 49 -0.6551 0.0536 -0.6871 -0.0045 0.0320 0.0582
45 49 -0.4995 -0.0205 -0.5170 -0.0233 0.0175 0.0027
48 49 -0.3487 0.0319 -0.3509 0.0390 0.0021 -0.0072
49 50 0.5388 0.1339 0.5309 0.1309 0.0079 0.0030
49 51 0.6690 0.2042 0.6460 0.1734 0.0230 0.0308
51 52 0.2864 0.0623 0.2845 0.0698 0.0019 -0.0075
52 53 0.1045 0.0198 0.1040 0.0543 0.0006 -0.0345
53 54 -0.1260 -0.0557 -0.1265 -0.0301 0.0005 -0.0256
49 54 0.3810 0.1313 0.3690 0.1561 0.0120 -0.0248
49 54 0.3807 0.1124 0.3669 0.1379 0.0138 -0.0255
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Table B.54
Power flow branch solution in IEEE 118-bus system (Part 3)
From To Psend Qsend Prec Qrec Ploss Qloss
54 55 0.0716 0.0144 0.0715 0.0323 0.0001 -0.0179
54 56 0.1885 0.0425 0.1884 0.0488 0.0001 -0.0063
55 56 -0.2162 -0.0576 -0.2165 -0.0550 0.0003 -0.0026
56 57 -0.2319 -0.0903 -0.2342 -0.0743 0.0023 -0.0160
50 57 0.3609 0.0909 0.3542 0.1043 0.0067 -0.0133
56 58 -0.0684 -0.0363 -0.0686 -0.0148 0.0002 -0.0216
51 58 0.1896 0.0311 0.1886 0.0448 0.0010 -0.0137
54 59 -0.3008 -0.0764 -0.3059 -0.0434 0.0051 -0.0330
56 59 -0.2772 -0.0433 -0.2842 -0.0109 0.0070 -0.0323
56 59 -0.2906 -0.0407 -0.2980 -0.0124 0.0075 -0.0282
55 59 -0.3422 -0.0840 -0.3485 -0.0596 0.0063 -0.0244
59 60 -0.4444 0.0389 -0.4510 0.0457 0.0066 -0.0068
59 61 -0.5290 0.0537 -0.5386 0.0477 0.0096 0.0060
60 61 -1.1306 0.0867 -1.1341 0.0834 0.0034 0.0032
60 62 -0.1003 -0.0710 -0.1005 -0.0572 0.0002 -0.0137
61 62 0.2562 -0.1388 0.2555 -0.1323 0.0007 -0.0066
63 64 -1.4833 -0.6534 -1.4879 -0.5004 0.0046 -0.1530
38 65 -1.7836 -0.5746 -1.8142 0.1167 0.0307 -0.6912
64 65 -1.8168 -0.6536 -1.8266 -0.3869 0.0098 -0.2667
49 66 -1.3243 0.0437 -1.3544 -0.0833 0.0301 0.1269
49 66 -1.3243 0.0437 -1.3544 -0.0833 0.0301 0.1269
62 66 -0.3721 -0.1732 -0.3798 -0.1473 0.0077 -0.0259
62 67 -0.2429 -0.1443 -0.2449 -0.1217 0.0020 -0.0227
66 67 0.5315 0.1929 0.5249 0.1917 0.0066 0.0012
65 68 0.1792 -0.2623 0.1791 0.3813 0.0001 -0.6436
47 69 -0.5728 0.1216 -0.6015 0.1018 0.0287 0.0198
49 69 -0.4793 0.1121 -0.5030 0.1221 0.0237 -0.0100
69 70 1.0914 0.1614 1.0567 0.1390 0.0347 0.0224
24 70 -0.0673 -0.0296 -0.0673 0.0682 0.0000 -0.0978
70 71 0.1710 -0.1247 0.1706 -0.1178 0.0004 -0.0069
24 72 0.0103 0.0342 0.0101 0.0810 0.0002 -0.0468
71 72 0.1105 -0.0104 0.1099 0.0304 0.0006 -0.0407
71 73 0.0601 -0.1075 0.0600 -0.0966 0.0001 -0.0109
70 74 0.1611 0.1294 0.1591 0.1547 0.0020 -0.0253
70 75 -0.0027 0.0996 -0.0033 0.1319 0.0006 -0.0323
69 75 1.1060 0.2054 1.0571 0.1826 0.0488 0.0228
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Table B.55
Power flow branch solution in IEEE 118-bus system (Part 4)
From To Psend Qsend Prec Qrec Ploss Qloss
74 75 -0.5209 -0.0626 -0.5245 -0.0651 0.0037 0.0026
76 77 -0.6100 -0.2115 -0.6305 -0.2448 0.0205 0.0332
69 77 0.6322 0.0661 0.6203 0.1353 0.0119 -0.0692
75 77 -0.3443 -0.0965 -0.3523 -0.0744 0.0079 -0.0221
77 78 0.4569 0.0653 0.4561 0.0754 0.0008 -0.0101
78 79 -0.2539 -0.1846 -0.2544 -0.1804 0.0005 -0.0042
77 80 -0.9597 -0.3769 -0.9772 -0.3776 0.0176 0.0007
77 80 -0.4408 -0.2066 -0.4475 -0.2068 0.0067 0.0002
79 80 -0.6444 -0.2967 -0.6520 -0.3114 0.0076 0.0148
68 81 -0.4554 -0.0984 -0.4560 0.7065 0.0006 -0.8049
77 82 -0.0290 0.1750 -0.0304 0.2523 0.0014 -0.0773
82 83 -0.4721 0.2439 -0.4754 0.2699 0.0033 -0.0260
83 84 -0.2477 0.1468 -0.2533 0.1599 0.0056 -0.0131
83 85 -0.4277 0.1200 -0.4366 0.1230 0.0089 -0.0030
84 85 -0.3633 0.0899 -0.3677 0.0924 0.0044 -0.0025
85 86 0.1717 -0.0737 0.1705 -0.0510 0.0012 -0.0226
86 87 -0.0395 -0.1510 -0.0400 -0.1103 0.0005 -0.0407
85 88 -0.5035 0.0758 -0.5089 0.0751 0.0054 0.0006
85 89 -0.7126 0.0065 -0.7251 -0.0375 0.0125 0.0440
88 89 -0.9889 -0.0249 -1.0028 -0.0771 0.0139 0.0522
89 90 0.5823 -0.0469 0.5649 -0.0577 0.0174 0.0108
89 90 1.1085 -0.0538 1.0797 -0.0698 0.0289 0.0161
90 91 0.0146 0.0441 0.0145 0.0645 0.0001 -0.0204
89 92 2.0150 -0.0207 1.9753 -0.1691 0.0398 0.1484
89 92 0.6362 -0.0505 0.6205 -0.0727 0.0158 0.0222
91 92 -0.0855 -0.0665 -0.0859 -0.0361 0.0004 -0.0304
92 93 0.5760 -0.1166 0.5670 -0.1250 0.0090 0.0084
92 94 0.5219 -0.1522 0.5077 -0.1591 0.0142 0.0069
93 94 0.4470 -0.1950 0.4416 -0.1944 0.0054 -0.0006
94 95 0.4086 0.0901 0.4062 0.0931 0.0024 -0.0030
80 96 0.1892 0.2110 0.1862 0.2466 0.0030 -0.0356
82 96 -0.0983 -0.0661 -0.0985 -0.0134 0.0002 -0.0528
94 96 0.1979 -0.0983 0.1966 -0.0798 0.0013 -0.0185
80 97 0.2636 0.2576 0.2612 0.2720 0.0024 -0.0144
80 98 0.2890 0.0833 0.2870 0.1045 0.0021 -0.0211
80 99 0.1954 0.0820 0.1933 0.1299 0.0021 -0.0478
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Table B.56
Power flow branch solution in IEEE 118-bus system (Part 5)
From To Psend Qsend Prec Qrec Ploss Qloss
92 100 0.3155 -0.1655 0.3076 -0.1539 0.0079 -0.0116
94 100 0.0428 -0.5053 0.0387 -0.4579 0.0041 -0.0473
95 96 -0.0138 -0.2169 -0.0146 -0.2051 0.0008 -0.0118
96 97 -0.1103 -0.2017 -0.1112 -0.1820 0.0008 -0.0198
98 100 -0.0530 0.0244 -0.0532 0.0731 0.0002 -0.0487
99 100 -0.2267 -0.0459 -0.2276 -0.0279 0.0009 -0.0180
100 101 -0.1673 0.2290 -0.1697 0.2513 0.0024 -0.0223
92 102 0.4464 -0.0839 0.4438 -0.0813 0.0026 -0.0026
101 102 -0.3897 0.1013 -0.3938 0.1113 0.0041 -0.0100
100 103 1.2168 -0.2211 1.1933 -0.2430 0.0235 0.0220
100 104 0.5619 0.1070 0.5474 0.0948 0.0145 0.0122
103 104 0.3241 0.1391 0.3182 0.1588 0.0060 -0.0197
103 105 0.4332 0.1290 0.4222 0.1354 0.0110 -0.0064
100 106 0.6040 0.0954 0.5818 0.0720 0.0222 0.0234
104 105 0.4856 0.0264 0.4831 0.0262 0.0025 0.0003
105 106 0.0882 0.0384 0.0881 0.0511 0.0001 -0.0127
105 107 0.2675 -0.0236 0.2634 0.0058 0.0041 -0.0294
105 108 0.2396 -0.1113 0.2377 -0.0992 0.0019 -0.0121
106 107 0.2399 -0.0370 0.2366 -0.0052 0.0033 -0.0318
108 109 0.2177 -0.1092 0.2170 -0.1039 0.0007 -0.0053
103 110 0.6060 0.0839 0.5915 0.0620 0.0145 0.0219
109 110 0.1370 -0.1339 0.1360 -0.1177 0.0010 -0.0162
110 111 -0.3570 0.0095 -0.3600 0.0184 0.0030 -0.0089
110 112 0.6946 -0.3060 0.6800 -0.2849 0.0146 -0.0211
17 113 0.0160 0.0508 0.0160 0.0582 0.0000 -0.0075
32 113 0.0458 -0.1795 0.0440 -0.1356 0.0017 -0.0439
32 114 0.0925 0.0180 0.0924 0.0325 0.0001 -0.0144
27 115 0.2084 0.0504 0.2076 0.0650 0.0008 -0.0146
114 115 0.0124 0.0025 0.0124 0.0050 0.0000 -0.0025
68 116 1.8412 -0.5269 1.8400 -0.3758 0.0012 -0.1510
12 117 0.2015 0.0520 0.2000 0.0800 0.0015 -0.0280
75 118 0.4036 0.2359 0.4002 0.2355 0.0034 0.0004
76 118 -0.0700 -0.0969 -0.0702 -0.0855 0.0002 -0.0113
120 123 -3.4052 -0.8879 -3.4052 -1.2275 0.0000 0.3396
140 141 -0.9067 -0.1694 -0.9067 -0.2013 0.0000 0.0320
132 145 -2.3001 -0.6798 -2.3001 -0.9245 0.0000 0.2447
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Table B.57
Power flow branch solution in IEEE 118-bus system (Part 6)
From To Psend Qsend Prec Qrec Ploss Qloss
152 153 -2.3936 -0.8329 -2.3936 -1.1139 0.0000 0.2810
174 178 -1.4833 -0.5456 -1.4833 -0.6534 0.0000 0.1078
176 179 -0.3289 -0.1496 -0.3289 -0.1532 0.0000 0.0036
181 180 -0.0900 -0.6168 -0.0900 -0.6317 0.0000 0.0149
184 183 1.2067 -0.9159 1.2067 -1.0065 0.0000 0.0907
195 196 0.4560 -0.6802 0.4560 -0.7065 0.0000 0.0262
5 120 -3.4052 -0.8879 -3.4052 -0.8879 0.0000 0.0000
25 140 -0.9067 -0.1694 -0.9067 -0.1694 0.0000 0.0000
17 132 -2.3001 -0.6798 -2.3001 -0.6798 0.0000 0.0000
37 152 -2.3936 -0.8329 -2.3936 -0.8329 0.0000 0.0000
59 174 -1.4833 -0.5456 -1.4833 -0.5456 0.0000 0.0000
61 176 -0.3289 -0.1496 -0.3289 -0.1496 0.0000 0.0000
66 181 -0.0900 -0.6168 -0.0900 -0.6168 0.0000 0.0000
69 184 1.2067 -0.9159 1.2067 -0.9159 0.0000 0.0000
80 195 0.4560 -0.6802 0.4560 -0.6802 0.0000 0.0000
123 8 -3.4052 -1.2275 -3.4052 -1.2275 0.0000 0.0000
141 26 -0.9067 -0.2013 -0.9067 -0.2013 0.0000 0.0000
145 30 -2.3001 -0.9245 -2.3001 -0.9245 0.0000 0.0000
153 38 -2.3936 -1.1139 -2.3936 -1.1139 0.0000 0.0000
178 63 -1.4833 -0.6534 -1.4833 -0.6534 0.0000 0.0000
179 64 -0.3289 -0.1532 -0.3289 -0.1532 0.0000 0.0000
180 65 -0.0900 -0.6317 -0.0900 -0.6317 0.0000 0.0000
183 68 1.2067 -1.0065 1.2067 -1.0065 0.0000 0.0000
196 81 0.4560 -0.7065 0.4560 -0.7065 0.0000 0.0000
1 201 0.0000 0.0304 0.0000 0.0304 0.0000 0.0000
201 301 0.0000 0.0304 0.0000 0.0304 0.0000 0.0000
301 401 0.0000 0.0304 0.0000 0.0304 0.0000 0.0000
401 501 0.0000 0.0304 0.0000 0.0304 0.0000 0.0000
4 204 0.0000 0.1279 0.0000 0.1279 0.0000 0.0000
204 304 0.0000 0.1279 0.0000 0.1279 0.0000 0.0000
304 404 0.0000 0.1279 0.0000 0.1279 0.0000 0.0000
404 504 0.0000 0.1279 0.0000 0.1279 0.0000 0.0000
6 206 0.0000 -0.1627 0.0000 -0.1627 0.0000 0.0000
206 306 0.0000 -0.1627 0.0000 -0.1627 0.0000 0.0000
306 406 0.0000 -0.1627 0.0000 -0.1627 0.0000 0.0000
406 506 0.0000 -0.1627 0.0000 -0.1627 0.0000 0.0000
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Table B.58
Power flow branch solution in IEEE 118-bus system (Part 7)
From To Psend Qsend Prec Qrec Ploss Qloss
8 208 0.0000 -0.5671 0.0000 -0.5671 0.0000 0.0000
208 308 0.0000 -0.5671 0.0000 -0.5671 0.0000 0.0000
308 408 0.0000 -0.5671 0.0000 -0.5671 0.0000 0.0000
408 508 0.0000 -0.5671 0.0000 -0.5671 0.0000 0.0000
10 210 -4.5000 0.5127 -4.5000 0.5127 0.0000 0.0000
210 310 -4.5000 0.5127 -4.5000 0.5127 0.0000 0.0000
310 410 -4.5000 0.5127 -4.5000 0.5127 0.0000 0.0000
410 510 -4.5000 0.5127 -4.5000 0.5127 0.0000 0.0000
12 212 -0.8500 -0.9166 -0.8500 -0.9166 0.0000 0.0000
212 312 -0.8500 -0.9166 -0.8500 -0.9166 0.0000 0.0000
312 412 -0.8500 -0.9166 -0.8500 -0.9166 0.0000 0.0000
412 512 -0.8500 -0.9166 -0.8500 -0.9166 0.0000 0.0000
15 215 0.0000 -0.0797 0.0000 -0.0797 0.0000 0.0000
215 315 0.0000 -0.0797 0.0000 -0.0797 0.0000 0.0000
315 415 0.0000 -0.0797 0.0000 -0.0797 0.0000 0.0000
415 515 0.0000 -0.0797 0.0000 -0.0797 0.0000 0.0000
18 218 0.0000 -0.2901 0.0000 -0.2901 0.0000 0.0000
218 318 0.0000 -0.2901 0.0000 -0.2901 0.0000 0.0000
318 418 0.0000 -0.2901 0.0000 -0.2901 0.0000 0.0000
418 518 0.0000 -0.2901 0.0000 -0.2901 0.0000 0.0000
19 219 0.0000 0.1431 0.0000 0.1431 0.0000 0.0000
219 319 0.0000 0.1431 0.0000 0.1431 0.0000 0.0000
319 419 0.0000 0.1431 0.0000 0.1431 0.0000 0.0000
419 519 0.0000 0.1431 0.0000 0.1431 0.0000 0.0000
24 224 0.0000 0.1498 0.0000 0.1498 0.0000 0.0000
224 324 0.0000 0.1498 0.0000 0.1498 0.0000 0.0000
324 424 0.0000 0.1498 0.0000 0.1498 0.0000 0.0000
424 524 0.0000 0.1498 0.0000 0.1498 0.0000 0.0000
25 225 -2.2000 -0.5220 -2.2000 -0.5220 0.0000 0.0000
225 325 -2.2000 -0.5220 -2.2000 -0.5220 0.0000 0.0000
325 425 -2.2000 -0.5220 -2.2000 -0.5220 0.0000 0.0000
425 525 -2.2000 -0.5220 -2.2000 -0.5220 0.0000 0.0000
26 226 -3.1400 -0.0672 -3.1400 -0.0672 0.0000 0.0000
226 326 -3.1400 -0.0672 -3.1400 -0.0672 0.0000 0.0000
326 426 -3.1400 -0.0672 -3.1400 -0.0672 0.0000 0.0000
426 526 -3.1400 -0.0672 -3.1400 -0.0672 0.0000 0.0000
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Table B.59
Power flow branch solution in IEEE 118-bus system (Part 8)
From To Psend Qsend Prec Qrec Ploss Qloss
27 227 0.0000 -0.0363 0.0000 -0.0363 0.0000 0.0000
227 327 0.0000 -0.0363 0.0000 -0.0363 0.0000 0.0000
327 427 0.0000 -0.0363 0.0000 -0.0363 0.0000 0.0000
427 527 0.0000 -0.0363 0.0000 -0.0363 0.0000 0.0000
31 231 -0.0700 -0.3274 -0.0700 -0.3274 0.0000 0.0000
231 331 -0.0700 -0.3274 -0.0700 -0.3274 0.0000 0.0000
331 431 -0.0700 -0.3274 -0.0700 -0.3274 0.0000 0.0000
431 531 -0.0700 -0.3274 -0.0700 -0.3274 0.0000 0.0000
32 232 0.0000 0.1637 0.0000 0.1637 0.0000 0.0000
232 332 0.0000 0.1637 0.0000 0.1637 0.0000 0.0000
332 432 0.0000 0.1637 0.0000 0.1637 0.0000 0.0000
432 532 0.0000 0.1637 0.0000 0.1637 0.0000 0.0000
34 234 0.0000 0.1639 0.0000 0.1639 0.0000 0.0000
234 334 0.0000 0.1639 0.0000 0.1639 0.0000 0.0000
334 434 0.0000 0.1639 0.0000 0.1639 0.0000 0.0000
434 534 0.0000 0.1639 0.0000 0.1639 0.0000 0.0000
36 236 0.0000 -0.0842 0.0000 -0.0842 0.0000 0.0000
236 336 0.0000 -0.0842 0.0000 -0.0842 0.0000 0.0000
336 436 0.0000 -0.0842 0.0000 -0.0842 0.0000 0.0000
436 536 0.0000 -0.0842 0.0000 -0.0842 0.0000 0.0000
40 240 0.0000 -0.2876 0.0000 -0.2876 0.0000 0.0000
240 340 0.0000 -0.2876 0.0000 -0.2876 0.0000 0.0000
340 440 0.0000 -0.2876 0.0000 -0.2876 0.0000 0.0000
440 540 0.0000 -0.2876 0.0000 -0.2876 0.0000 0.0000
42 242 0.0000 -0.4094 0.0000 -0.4094 0.0000 0.0000
242 342 0.0000 -0.4094 0.0000 -0.4094 0.0000 0.0000
342 442 0.0000 -0.4094 0.0000 -0.4094 0.0000 0.0000
442 542 0.0000 -0.4094 0.0000 -0.4094 0.0000 0.0000
46 246 -0.1900 0.0491 -0.1900 0.0491 0.0000 0.0000
246 346 -0.1900 0.0491 -0.1900 0.0491 0.0000 0.0000
346 446 -0.1900 0.0491 -0.1900 0.0491 0.0000 0.0000
446 546 -0.1900 0.0491 -0.1900 0.0491 0.0000 0.0000
49 249 -2.0400 -1.1711 -2.0400 -1.1711 0.0000 0.0000
249 349 -2.0400 -1.1711 -2.0400 -1.1711 0.0000 0.0000
349 449 -2.0400 -1.1711 -2.0400 -1.1711 0.0000 0.0000
449 549 -2.0400 -1.1711 -2.0400 -1.1711 0.0000 0.0000
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Table B.60
Power flow branch solution in IEEE 118-bus system (Part 9)
From To Psend Qsend Prec Qrec Ploss Qloss
54 254 -0.4800 -0.0365 -0.4800 -0.0365 0.0000 0.0000
254 354 -0.4800 -0.0365 -0.4800 -0.0365 0.0000 0.0000
354 454 -0.4800 -0.0365 -0.4800 -0.0365 0.0000 0.0000
454 554 -0.4800 -0.0365 -0.4800 -0.0365 0.0000 0.0000
55 255 0.0000 -0.0461 0.0000 -0.0461 0.0000 0.0000
255 355 0.0000 -0.0461 0.0000 -0.0461 0.0000 0.0000
355 455 0.0000 -0.0461 0.0000 -0.0461 0.0000 0.0000
455 555 0.0000 -0.0461 0.0000 -0.0461 0.0000 0.0000
56 256 0.0000 0.0244 0.0000 0.0244 0.0000 0.0000
256 356 0.0000 0.0244 0.0000 0.0244 0.0000 0.0000
356 456 0.0000 0.0244 0.0000 0.0244 0.0000 0.0000
456 556 0.0000 0.0244 0.0000 0.0244 0.0000 0.0000
59 259 -1.5500 -0.8034 -1.5500 -0.8034 0.0000 0.0000
259 359 -1.5500 -0.8034 -1.5500 -0.8034 0.0000 0.0000
359 459 -1.5500 -0.8034 -1.5500 -0.8034 0.0000 0.0000
459 559 -1.5500 -0.8034 -1.5500 -0.8034 0.0000 0.0000
61 261 -1.6000 0.4196 -1.6000 0.4196 0.0000 0.0000
261 361 -1.6000 0.4196 -1.6000 0.4196 0.0000 0.0000
361 461 -1.6000 0.4196 -1.6000 0.4196 0.0000 0.0000
461 561 -1.6000 0.4196 -1.6000 0.4196 0.0000 0.0000
62 262 0.0000 -0.0119 0.0000 -0.0119 0.0000 0.0000
262 362 0.0000 -0.0119 0.0000 -0.0119 0.0000 0.0000
362 462 0.0000 -0.0119 0.0000 -0.0119 0.0000 0.0000
462 562 0.0000 -0.0119 0.0000 -0.0119 0.0000 0.0000
65 265 -3.9100 -0.6395 -3.9100 -0.6395 0.0000 0.0000
265 365 -3.9100 -0.6395 -3.9100 -0.6395 0.0000 0.0000
365 465 -3.9100 -0.6395 -3.9100 -0.6395 0.0000 0.0000
465 565 -3.9100 -0.6395 -3.9100 -0.6395 0.0000 0.0000
66 266 -3.9200 -0.0700 -3.9200 -0.0700 0.0000 0.0000
266 366 -3.9200 -0.0700 -3.9200 -0.0700 0.0000 0.0000
366 466 -3.9200 -0.0700 -3.9200 -0.0700 0.0000 0.0000
466 566 -3.9200 -0.0700 -3.9200 -0.0700 0.0000 0.0000
69 269 -5.1408 0.7068 -5.1408 0.7068 0.0000 0.0000
269 369 -5.1408 0.7068 -5.1408 0.7068 0.0000 0.0000
369 469 -5.1408 0.7068 -5.1408 0.7068 0.0000 0.0000
469 569 -5.1408 0.7068 -5.1408 0.7068 0.0000 0.0000
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Table B.61
Power flow branch solution in IEEE 118-bus system (Part 10)
From To Psend Qsend Prec Qrec Ploss Qloss
70 270 0.0000 -0.0970 0.0000 -0.0970 0.0000 0.0000
270 370 0.0000 -0.0970 0.0000 -0.0970 0.0000 0.0000
370 470 0.0000 -0.0970 0.0000 -0.0970 0.0000 0.0000
470 570 0.0000 -0.0970 0.0000 -0.0970 0.0000 0.0000
72 272 0.0000 0.1114 0.0000 0.1114 0.0000 0.0000
272 372 0.0000 0.1114 0.0000 0.1114 0.0000 0.0000
372 472 0.0000 0.1114 0.0000 0.1114 0.0000 0.0000
472 572 0.0000 0.1114 0.0000 0.1114 0.0000 0.0000
73 273 0.0000 -0.0966 0.0000 -0.0966 0.0000 0.0000
273 373 0.0000 -0.0966 0.0000 -0.0966 0.0000 0.0000
373 473 0.0000 -0.0966 0.0000 -0.0966 0.0000 0.0000
473 573 0.0000 -0.0966 0.0000 -0.0966 0.0000 0.0000
74 274 0.0000 0.0574 0.0000 0.0574 0.0000 0.0000
274 374 0.0000 0.0574 0.0000 0.0574 0.0000 0.0000
374 474 0.0000 0.0574 0.0000 0.0574 0.0000 0.0000
474 574 0.0000 0.0574 0.0000 0.0574 0.0000 0.0000
76 276 0.0000 -0.0516 0.0000 -0.0516 0.0000 0.0000
276 376 0.0000 -0.0516 0.0000 -0.0516 0.0000 0.0000
376 476 0.0000 -0.0516 0.0000 -0.0516 0.0000 0.0000
476 576 0.0000 -0.0516 0.0000 -0.0516 0.0000 0.0000
77 277 0.0000 -0.1206 0.0000 -0.1206 0.0000 0.0000
277 377 0.0000 -0.1206 0.0000 -0.1206 0.0000 0.0000
377 477 0.0000 -0.1206 0.0000 -0.1206 0.0000 0.0000
477 577 0.0000 -0.1206 0.0000 -0.1206 0.0000 0.0000
80 280 -4.7700 -1.1096 -4.7700 -1.1096 0.0000 0.0000
280 380 -4.7700 -1.1096 -4.7700 -1.1096 0.0000 0.0000
380 480 -4.7700 -1.1096 -4.7700 -1.1096 0.0000 0.0000
480 580 -4.7700 -1.1096 -4.7700 -1.1096 0.0000 0.0000
85 285 0.0000 0.0568 0.0000 0.0568 0.0000 0.0000
285 385 0.0000 0.0568 0.0000 0.0568 0.0000 0.0000
385 485 0.0000 0.0568 0.0000 0.0568 0.0000 0.0000
485 585 0.0000 0.0568 0.0000 0.0568 0.0000 0.0000
87 287 -0.0400 -0.1103 -0.0400 -0.1103 0.0000 0.0000
287 387 -0.0400 -0.1103 -0.0400 -0.1103 0.0000 0.0000
387 487 -0.0400 -0.1103 -0.0400 -0.1103 0.0000 0.0000
487 587 -0.0400 -0.1103 -0.0400 -0.1103 0.0000 0.0000
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Table B.62
Power flow branch solution in IEEE 118-bus system (Part 11)
From To Psend Qsend Prec Qrec Ploss Qloss
89 289 -6.0700 0.0573 -6.0700 0.0573 0.0000 0.0000
289 389 -6.0700 0.0573 -6.0700 0.0573 0.0000 0.0000
389 489 -6.0700 0.0573 -6.0700 0.0573 0.0000 0.0000
489 589 -6.0700 0.0573 -6.0700 0.0573 0.0000 0.0000
90 290 0.0000 -0.5916 0.0000 -0.5916 0.0000 0.0000
290 390 0.0000 -0.5916 0.0000 -0.5916 0.0000 0.0000
390 490 0.0000 -0.5916 0.0000 -0.5916 0.0000 0.0000
490 590 0.0000 -0.5916 0.0000 -0.5916 0.0000 0.0000
91 291 0.0000 0.1310 0.0000 0.1310 0.0000 0.0000
291 391 0.0000 0.1310 0.0000 0.1310 0.0000 0.0000
391 491 0.0000 0.1310 0.0000 0.1310 0.0000 0.0000
491 591 0.0000 0.1310 0.0000 0.1310 0.0000 0.0000
92 292 0.0000 0.1403 0.0000 0.1403 0.0000 0.0000
292 392 0.0000 0.1403 0.0000 0.1403 0.0000 0.0000
392 492 0.0000 0.1403 0.0000 0.1403 0.0000 0.0000
492 592 0.0000 0.1403 0.0000 0.1403 0.0000 0.0000
99 299 0.0000 0.1758 0.0000 0.1758 0.0000 0.0000
299 399 0.0000 0.1758 0.0000 0.1758 0.0000 0.0000
399 499 0.0000 0.1758 0.0000 0.1758 0.0000 0.0000
499 599 0.0000 0.1758 0.0000 0.1758 0.0000 0.0000
100 600 -2.5200 -0.9569 -2.5200 -0.9569 0.0000 0.0000
600 700 -2.5200 -0.9569 -2.5200 -0.9569 0.0000 0.0000
700 800 -2.5200 -0.9569 -2.5200 -0.9569 0.0000 0.0000
800 900 -2.5200 -0.9569 -2.5200 -0.9569 0.0000 0.0000
103 603 -0.4000 -0.7550 -0.4000 -0.7550 0.0000 0.0000
603 703 -0.4000 -0.7550 -0.4000 -0.7550 0.0000 0.0000
703 803 -0.4000 -0.7550 -0.4000 -0.7550 0.0000 0.0000
803 903 -0.4000 -0.7550 -0.4000 -0.7550 0.0000 0.0000
104 604 0.0000 -0.0228 0.0000 -0.0228 0.0000 0.0000
604 704 0.0000 -0.0228 0.0000 -0.0228 0.0000 0.0000
704 804 0.0000 -0.0228 0.0000 -0.0228 0.0000 0.0000
804 904 0.0000 -0.0228 0.0000 -0.0228 0.0000 0.0000
105 605 0.0000 0.1842 0.0000 0.1842 0.0000 0.0000
605 705 0.0000 0.1842 0.0000 0.1842 0.0000 0.0000
705 805 0.0000 0.1842 0.0000 0.1842 0.0000 0.0000
805 905 0.0000 0.1842 0.0000 0.1842 0.0000 0.0000
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Table B.63
Power flow branch solution in IEEE 118-bus system (Part 12)
From To Psend Qsend Prec Qrec Ploss Qloss
107 607 0.0000 -0.0650 0.0000 -0.0650 0.0000 0.0000
607 707 0.0000 -0.0650 0.0000 -0.0650 0.0000 0.0000
707 807 0.0000 -0.0650 0.0000 -0.0650 0.0000 0.0000
807 907 0.0000 -0.0650 0.0000 -0.0650 0.0000 0.0000
110 610 0.0000 -0.0024 0.0000 -0.0024 0.0000 0.0000
610 710 0.0000 -0.0024 0.0000 -0.0024 0.0000 0.0000
710 810 0.0000 -0.0024 0.0000 -0.0024 0.0000 0.0000
810 910 0.0000 -0.0024 0.0000 -0.0024 0.0000 0.0000
111 611 -0.3600 0.0184 -0.3600 0.0184 0.0000 0.0000
611 711 -0.3600 0.0184 -0.3600 0.0184 0.0000 0.0000
711 811 -0.3600 0.0184 -0.3600 0.0184 0.0000 0.0000
811 911 -0.3600 0.0184 -0.3600 0.0184 0.0000 0.0000
112 612 0.0000 -0.4149 0.0000 -0.4149 0.0000 0.0000
612 712 0.0000 -0.4149 0.0000 -0.4149 0.0000 0.0000
712 812 0.0000 -0.4149 0.0000 -0.4149 0.0000 0.0000
812 912 0.0000 -0.4149 0.0000 -0.4149 0.0000 0.0000
113 613 0.0000 -0.0774 0.0000 -0.0774 0.0000 0.0000
613 713 0.0000 -0.0774 0.0000 -0.0774 0.0000 0.0000
713 813 0.0000 -0.0774 0.0000 -0.0774 0.0000 0.0000
813 913 0.0000 -0.0774 0.0000 -0.0774 0.0000 0.0000
116 616 0.0000 -0.3758 0.0000 -0.3758 0.0000 0.0000
616 716 0.0000 -0.3758 0.0000 -0.3758 0.0000 0.0000
716 816 0.0000 -0.3758 0.0000 -0.3758 0.0000 0.0000
816 916 0.0000 -0.3758 0.0000 -0.3758 0.0000 0.0000
The total P loss and Q loss are 1.3308 (p.u.) and -5.5837 (p.u.), individually.
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Table B.64
System (branch) setting data (Part 1)
From To R X Y/2 Tap Remark
1 2 0.03030 0.09990 0.01270 0.00000
1 3 0.01290 0.04240 0.00541 0.00000
4 5 0.00176 0.00798 0.00105 0.00000
3 5 0.02410 0.10800 0.01420 0.00000
5 6 0.01190 0.05400 0.00713 0.00000
6 7 0.00459 0.02080 0.00275 0.00000
8 9 0.00244 0.03050 0.58100 0.00000
9 10 0.00258 0.03220 0.61500 0.00000
4 11 0.02090 0.06880 0.00874 0.00000
5 11 0.02030 0.06820 0.00869 0.00000
11 12 0.00595 0.01960 0.00251 0.00000
2 12 0.01870 0.06160 0.00786 0.00000
3 12 0.04840 0.16000 0.02030 0.00000
7 12 0.00862 0.03400 0.00437 0.00000
11 13 0.02225 0.07310 0.00938 0.00000
12 14 0.02150 0.07070 0.00908 0.00000
13 15 0.07440 0.24440 0.03134 0.00000
14 15 0.05950 0.19500 0.02510 0.00000
12 16 0.02120 0.08340 0.01070 0.00000
15 17 0.01320 0.04370 0.02220 0.00000
16 17 0.04540 0.18010 0.02330 0.00000
17 18 0.01230 0.05050 0.00649 0.00000
18 19 0.01119 0.04930 0.00571 0.00000
19 20 0.02520 0.11700 0.01490 0.00000
15 19 0.01200 0.03940 0.00505 0.00000
20 21 0.01830 0.08490 0.01080 0.00000
21 22 0.02090 0.09700 0.01230 0.00000
22 23 0.03420 0.15900 0.02020 0.00000
23 24 0.01350 0.04920 0.02490 0.00000
23 25 0.01560 0.08000 0.04320 0.00000
25 27 0.03180 0.16300 0.08820 0.00000
27 28 0.01913 0.08550 0.01080 0.00000
28 29 0.02370 0.09430 0.01190 0.00000
8 30 0.00431 0.05040 0.25700 0.00000
26 30 0.00799 0.08600 0.45400 0.00000
17 31 0.04740 0.15630 0.01995 0.00000
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Table B.65
System (branch) setting data (Part 2)
From To R X Y/2 Tap Remark
29 31 0.01080 0.03310 0.00415 0.00000
23 32 0.03170 0.11530 0.05865 0.00000
31 32 0.02980 0.09850 0.01255 0.00000
27 32 0.02290 0.07550 0.00963 0.00000
15 33 0.03800 0.12440 0.01597 0.00000
19 34 0.07520 0.24700 0.03160 0.00000
35 36 0.00224 0.01020 0.00134 0.00000
35 37 0.01100 0.04970 0.00659 0.00000
33 37 0.04150 0.14200 0.01830 0.00000
34 36 0.00871 0.02680 0.00284 0.00000
34 37 0.00256 0.00940 0.00492 0.00000
37 39 0.03210 0.10600 0.01350 0.00000
37 40 0.05930 0.16800 0.02100 0.00000
30 38 0.00464 0.05400 0.21100 0.00000
39 40 0.01840 0.06050 0.00776 0.00000
40 41 0.01450 0.04870 0.00611 0.00000
40 42 0.05550 0.18300 0.02330 0.00000
41 42 0.04100 0.13500 0.01720 0.00000
43 44 0.06080 0.24540 0.03034 0.00000
34 43 0.04130 0.16810 0.02113 0.00000
44 45 0.02240 0.09010 0.01120 0.00000
45 46 0.04000 0.13560 0.01660 0.00000
46 47 0.03800 0.12700 0.01580 0.00000
46 48 0.06010 0.18900 0.02360 0.00000
47 49 0.01910 0.06250 0.00802 0.00000
42 49 0.07150 0.32300 0.04300 0.00000
42 49 0.07150 0.32300 0.04300 0.00000
45 49 0.06840 0.18600 0.02220 0.00000
48 49 0.01790 0.05050 0.00629 0.00000
49 50 0.02670 0.07520 0.00937 0.00000
49 51 0.04860 0.13700 0.01710 0.00000
51 52 0.02030 0.05880 0.00698 0.00000
52 53 0.04050 0.16350 0.02029 0.00000
53 54 0.02630 0.12200 0.01550 0.00000
49 54 0.07300 0.28900 0.03690 0.00000
49 54 0.08690 0.29100 0.03650 0.00000
310
Table B.66
System (branch) setting data (Part 3)
From To R X Y/2 Tap Remark
54 55 0.01690 0.07070 0.01010 0.00000
54 56 0.00275 0.00955 0.00366 0.00000
55 56 0.00488 0.01510 0.00187 0.00000
56 57 0.03430 0.09660 0.01210 0.00000
50 57 0.04740 0.13400 0.01660 0.00000
56 58 0.03430 0.09660 0.01210 0.00000
51 58 0.02550 0.07190 0.00894 0.00000
54 59 0.05030 0.22930 0.02990 0.00000
56 59 0.08250 0.25100 0.02845 0.00000
56 59 0.08030 0.23900 0.02680 0.00000
55 59 0.04739 0.21580 0.02823 0.00000
59 60 0.03170 0.14500 0.01880 0.00000
59 61 0.03280 0.15000 0.01940 0.00000
60 61 0.00264 0.01350 0.00728 0.00000
60 62 0.01230 0.05610 0.00734 0.00000
61 62 0.00824 0.03760 0.00490 0.00000
63 64 0.00172 0.02000 0.10800 0.00000
38 65 0.00901 0.09860 0.52300 0.00000
64 65 0.00269 0.03020 0.19000 0.00000
49 66 0.01800 0.09190 0.01240 0.00000
49 66 0.01800 0.09190 0.01240 0.00000
62 66 0.04820 0.21800 0.02890 0.00000
62 67 0.02580 0.11700 0.01550 0.00000
66 67 0.02240 0.10150 0.01341 0.00000
65 68 0.00138 0.01600 0.31900 0.00000
47 69 0.08440 0.27780 0.03546 0.00000
49 69 0.09850 0.32400 0.04140 0.00000
69 70 0.03000 0.12700 0.06100 0.00000
24 70 0.00221 0.41150 0.05099 0.00000
70 71 0.00882 0.03550 0.00439 0.00000
24 72 0.04880 0.19600 0.02440 0.00000
71 72 0.04460 0.18000 0.02222 0.00000
71 73 0.00866 0.04540 0.00589 0.00000
70 74 0.04010 0.13230 0.01684 0.00000
70 75 0.04280 0.14100 0.01800 0.00000
69 75 0.04050 0.12200 0.06200 0.00000
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Table B.67
System (branch) setting data (Part 4)
From To R X Y/2 Tap Remark
74 75 0.01230 0.04060 0.00517 0.00000
76 77 0.04440 0.14800 0.01840 0.00000
69 77 0.03090 0.10100 0.05190 0.00000
75 77 0.06010 0.19990 0.02489 0.00000
77 78 0.00376 0.01240 0.00632 0.00000
78 79 0.00546 0.02440 0.00324 0.00000
77 80 0.01700 0.04850 0.02360 0.00000
77 80 0.02940 0.10500 0.01140 0.00000
79 80 0.01560 0.07040 0.00935 0.00000
68 81 0.00175 0.02020 0.40400 0.00000
77 82 0.02980 0.08530 0.04087 0.00000
82 83 0.01120 0.03665 0.01898 0.00000
83 84 0.06250 0.13200 0.01290 0.00000
83 85 0.04300 0.14800 0.01740 0.00000
84 85 0.03020 0.06410 0.00617 0.00000
85 86 0.03500 0.12300 0.01380 0.00000
86 87 0.02828 0.20740 0.02225 0.00000
85 88 0.02000 0.10200 0.01380 0.00000
85 89 0.02390 0.17300 0.02350 0.00000
88 89 0.01390 0.07120 0.00967 0.00000
89 90 0.05180 0.18800 0.02640 0.00000
89 90 0.02380 0.09970 0.05300 0.00000
90 91 0.02540 0.08360 0.01070 0.00000
89 92 0.00990 0.05050 0.02740 0.00000
89 92 0.03930 0.15810 0.02070 0.00000
91 92 0.03870 0.12720 0.01634 0.00000
92 93 0.02580 0.08480 0.01090 0.00000
92 94 0.04810 0.15800 0.02030 0.00000
93 94 0.02230 0.07320 0.00938 0.00000
94 95 0.01320 0.04340 0.00555 0.00000
80 96 0.03560 0.18200 0.02470 0.00000
82 96 0.01620 0.05300 0.02720 0.00000
94 96 0.02690 0.08690 0.01150 0.00000
80 97 0.01830 0.09340 0.01270 0.00000
80 98 0.02380 0.10800 0.01430 0.00000
80 99 0.04540 0.20600 0.02730 0.00000
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Table B.68
System (branch) setting data (Part 5)
From To R X Y/2 Tap Remark
92 100 0.06480 0.29500 0.02360 0.00000
94 100 0.01780 0.05800 0.03020 0.00000
95 96 0.01710 0.05470 0.00737 0.00000
96 97 0.01730 0.08850 0.01200 0.00000
98 100 0.03970 0.17900 0.02380 0.00000
99 100 0.01800 0.08130 0.01080 0.00000
100 101 0.02770 0.12620 0.01640 0.00000
92 102 0.01230 0.05590 0.00732 0.00000
101 102 0.02460 0.11200 0.01470 0.00000
100 103 0.01600 0.05250 0.02680 0.00000
100 104 0.04510 0.20400 0.02705 0.00000
103 104 0.04660 0.15840 0.02035 0.00000
103 105 0.05350 0.16250 0.02040 0.00000
100 106 0.06050 0.22900 0.03100 0.00000
104 105 0.00994 0.03780 0.00493 0.00000
105 106 0.01400 0.05470 0.00717 0.00000
105 107 0.05300 0.18300 0.02360 0.00000
105 108 0.02610 0.07030 0.00922 0.00000
106 107 0.05300 0.18300 0.02360 0.00000
108 109 0.01050 0.02880 0.00380 0.00000
103 110 0.03906 0.18130 0.02305 0.00000
109 110 0.02780 0.07620 0.01010 0.00000
110 111 0.02200 0.07550 0.01000 0.00000
110 112 0.02470 0.06400 0.03100 0.00000
17 113 0.00913 0.03010 0.00384 0.00000
32 113 0.06150 0.20300 0.02590 0.00000
32 114 0.01350 0.06120 0.00814 0.00000
27 115 0.01640 0.07410 0.00986 0.00000
114 115 0.00230 0.01040 0.00138 0.00000
68 116 0.00034 0.00405 0.08200 0.00000
12 117 0.03290 0.14000 0.01790 0.00000
75 118 0.01450 0.04810 0.00599 0.00000
76 118 0.01640 0.05440 0.00678 0.00000
120 123 0.00000 0.02670 0.00000 0.98500
140 141 0.00000 0.03820 0.00000 0.96000
132 145 0.00000 0.03880 0.00000 0.96000
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Table B.69
System (branch) setting data (Part 6)
From To R X Y/2 Tap Remark
152 153 0.00000 0.03750 0.00000 0.93500
174 178 0.00000 0.03860 0.00000 0.96000
176 179 0.00000 0.02680 0.00000 0.98500
181 180 0.00000 0.03700 0.00000 0.93500
184 183 0.00000 0.03700 0.00000 0.93500
195 196 0.00000 0.03700 0.00000 0.93500
5 120 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
25 140 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
17 132 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
37 152 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
59 174 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
61 176 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
66 181 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
69 184 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
80 195 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
123 8 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
141 26 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
145 30 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
153 38 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
178 63 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
179 64 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
180 65 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
183 68 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
196 81 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
1 201 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
201 301 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
301 401 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
401 501 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
4 204 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
204 304 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
304 404 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
404 504 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
6 206 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
206 306 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
306 406 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
406 506 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
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Table B.70
System (branch) setting data (Part 7)
From To R X Y/2 Tap Remark
8 208 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
208 308 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
308 408 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
408 508 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
10 210 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
210 310 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
310 410 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
410 510 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
12 212 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
212 312 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
312 412 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
412 512 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
15 215 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
215 315 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
315 415 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
415 515 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
18 218 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
218 318 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
318 418 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
418 518 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
19 219 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
219 319 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
319 419 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
419 519 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
24 224 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
224 324 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
324 424 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
424 524 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
25 225 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
225 325 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
325 425 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
425 525 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
26 226 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
226 326 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
326 426 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
426 526 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
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Table B.71
System (branch) setting data (Part 8)
From To R X Y/2 Tap Remark
27 227 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
227 327 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
327 427 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
427 527 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
31 231 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
231 331 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
331 431 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
431 531 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
32 232 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
232 332 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
332 432 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
432 532 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
34 234 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
234 334 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
334 434 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
434 534 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
36 236 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
236 336 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
336 436 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
436 536 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
40 240 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
240 340 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
340 440 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
440 540 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
42 242 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
242 342 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
342 442 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
442 542 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
46 246 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
246 346 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
346 446 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
446 546 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
49 249 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
249 349 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
349 449 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
449 549 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
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Table B.72
System (branch) setting data (Part 9)
From To R X Y/2 Tap Remark
54 254 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
254 354 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
354 454 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
454 554 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
55 255 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
255 355 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
355 455 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
455 555 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
56 256 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
256 356 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
356 456 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
456 556 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
59 259 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
259 359 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
359 459 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
459 559 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
61 261 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
261 361 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
361 461 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
461 561 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
62 262 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
262 362 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
362 462 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
462 562 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
65 265 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
265 365 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
365 465 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
465 565 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
66 266 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
266 366 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
366 466 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
466 566 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
69 269 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
269 369 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
369 469 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
469 569 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
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Table B.73
System (branch) setting data (Part 10)
From To R X Y/2 Tap Remark
70 270 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
270 370 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
370 470 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
470 570 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
72 272 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
272 372 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
372 472 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
472 572 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
73 273 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
273 373 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
373 473 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
473 573 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
74 274 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
274 374 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
374 474 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
474 574 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
76 276 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
276 376 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
376 476 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
476 576 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
77 277 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
277 377 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
377 477 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
477 577 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
80 280 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
280 380 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
380 480 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
480 580 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
85 285 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
285 385 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
385 485 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
485 585 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
87 287 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
287 387 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
387 487 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
487 587 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
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Table B.74
System (branch) setting data (Part 11)
From To R X Y/2 Tap Remark
89 289 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
289 389 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
389 489 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
489 589 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
90 290 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
290 390 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
390 490 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
490 590 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
91 291 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
291 391 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
391 491 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
491 591 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
92 292 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
292 392 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
392 492 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
492 592 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
99 299 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
299 399 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
399 499 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
499 599 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
100 600 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
600 700 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
700 800 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
800 900 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
103 603 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
603 703 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
703 803 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
803 903 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
104 604 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
604 704 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
704 804 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
804 904 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
105 605 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
605 705 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
705 805 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
805 905 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
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Table B.75
System (branch) setting data (Part 12)
From To R X Y/2 Tap Remark
107 607 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
607 707 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
707 807 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
807 907 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
110 610 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
610 710 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
710 810 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
810 910 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
111 611 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
611 711 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
711 811 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
811 911 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
112 612 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
612 712 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
712 812 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
812 912 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
113 613 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
613 713 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
713 813 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
813 913 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
116 616 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 CB
616 716 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 81
716 816 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 78
816 916 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 59
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Table B.76
Power flow condition setting data (Part 1)
Node V magnitude PG QG PL QL QC Name
1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5100 0.2700 0.0000 Riverside1
2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2000 0.0900 0.0000 Pokagon
3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3900 0.1000 0.0000 HickoryCk
4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3900 0.1200 0.0000 NCarlisle1
5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.4000 Olive
6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5200 0.2200 0.0000 Kankakee1
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1900 0.0200 0.0000 JacksonRd
8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2800 0.0000 0.0000 Olive1
9 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Beguine
10 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Breed1
11 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7000 0.2300 0.0000 SouthBend
12 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4700 0.1000 0.0000 TwnBranch1
13 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3400 0.1600 0.0000 Concord
14 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1400 0.0100 0.0000 GoshenJct
15 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9000 0.3000 0.0000 FortWayne1
16 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2500 0.1000 0.0000 N. E.
17 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1100 0.0300 0.0000 Sorenson
18 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6000 0.3400 0.0000 McKinley1
19 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4500 0.2500 0.0000 Lincoln1
20 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1800 0.0300 0.0000 Adams
21 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1400 0.0800 0.0000 Jay
22 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1000 0.0500 0.0000 Randolph
23 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0700 0.0300 0.0000 CollgeCnr
24 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1300 0.0000 0.0000 Trenton1
25 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 TannersCk1
26 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 TannersCk3
27 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7100 0.1300 0.0000 Madison1
28 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1700 0.0700 0.0000 Mullin
29 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2400 0.0400 0.0000 Grant
30 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Sorenson
31 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4300 0.2700 0.0000 DeerCreek1
32 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5900 0.2300 0.0000 Delaware1
33 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2300 0.0900 0.0000 Haviland
34 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5900 0.2600 0.1400 Rockhill1
35 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3300 0.0900 0.0000 West Lima
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Table B.77
Power flow condition setting data (Part 2)
Node V magnitude PG QG PL QL QC Name
36 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3100 0.1700 0.0000 Sterling1
37 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.2500 East Lima
38 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 East Lima
39 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2700 0.1100 0.0000 NwLiberty
40 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6600 0.2300 0.0000 West End1
41 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3700 0.1000 0.0000 S. Tiffin
42 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9600 0.2300 0.0000 Howard1
43 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1800 0.0700 0.0000 S. Kenton
44 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1600 0.0800 0.1000 WMtVernon
45 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5300 0.2200 0.1000 N. Newark
46 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2800 0.1000 0.1000 W.Lancstr1
47 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3400 0.0000 0.0000 Crooksvil
48 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2000 0.1100 0.1500 Zanesvile
49 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8700 0.3000 0.0000 Philo1
50 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1700 0.0400 0.0000 W.Cambrdg
51 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1700 0.0800 0.0000 Newcmrstn
52 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1800 0.0500 0.0000 SCoshoctn
53 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2300 0.1100 0.0000 Wooster
54 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.1300 0.3200 0.0000 Torrey1
55 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6300 0.2200 0.0000 Wagenhals1
56 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8400 0.1800 0.0000 Sunnyside1
57 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1200 0.0300 0.0000 WNwPhila1
58 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1200 0.0300 0.0000 WNwPhila2
59 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 2.7700 1.1300 0.0000 Tidd1
60 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7800 0.0300 0.0000 SW Kammer
61 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 W. Kammer1
62 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7700 0.1400 0.0000 Natrium1
63 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Tidd
64 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Kammer
65 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Muskingum1
66 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3900 0.1800 0.0000 Muskingum1
67 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2800 0.0700 0.0000 Summerfld
68 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Sporn
69 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Sporn1
70 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6600 0.2000 0.0000 Portsmoth1
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Table B.78
Power flow condition setting data (Part 3)
Node V magnitude PG QG PL QL QC Name
71 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 NPortsmth
72 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1200 0.0000 0.0000 Hillsboro1
73 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0600 0.0000 0.0000 Sargents1
74 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6800 0.2700 0.1200 Bellefont1
75 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4700 0.1100 0.0000 Sth Point
76 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6800 0.3600 0.0000 Darrah1
77 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6100 0.2800 0.0000 Turner1
78 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7100 0.2600 0.0000 Chemical
79 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3900 0.3200 0.2000 CapitolHl
80 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.3000 0.2600 0.0000 Cabin Crk1
81 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Kanawha
82 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5400 0.2700 0.2000 Logan
83 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2000 0.1000 0.1000 Sprigg
84 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1100 0.0700 0.0000 BetsyLayn
85 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2400 0.1500 0.0000 BeaverCrk1
86 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2100 0.1000 0.0000 Hazard
87 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Pineville1
88 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4800 0.1000 0.0000 Fremont
89 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ClinchRvr1
90 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.6300 0.4200 0.0000 Holston1
91 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1000 0.0000 0.0000 HolstonTP1
92 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6500 0.1000 0.0000 Saltville1
93 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1200 0.0700 0.0000 Tazewell
94 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3000 0.1600 0.0000 Switchbak
95 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4200 0.3100 0.0000 Caldwell
96 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3800 0.1500 0.0000 Baileysvl
97 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1500 0.0900 0.0000 Sundial
98 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3400 0.0800 0.0000 Bradley
99 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4200 0.0000 0.0000 Hinton1
100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3700 0.1800 0.0000 Glen Lyn1
101 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2200 0.1500 0.0000 Wythe
102 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0500 0.0300 0.0000 Smyth
103 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2300 0.1600 0.0000 Claytor1
104 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3800 0.2500 0.0000 Hancock1
105 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3100 0.2600 0.2000 Roanoke1
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Table B.79
Power flow condition setting data (Part 4)
Node V magnitude PG QG PL QL QC Name
106 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4300 0.1600 0.0000 Cloverdle
107 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000 0.1200 0.0600 Reusens1
108 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0200 0.0100 0.0000 Blaine
109 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0800 0.0300 0.0000 Franklin
110 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3900 0.3000 0.0600 Fieldale1
111 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Dan River1
112 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6800 0.1300 0.0000 Danville1
113 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0600 0.0000 0.0000 DeerCk TP1
114 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0800 0.0300 0.0000 W Medford
115 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2200 0.0700 0.0000 Medford
116 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.8400 0.0000 0.0000 Kyger Crk1
117 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2000 0.0800 0.0000 Corey
118 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3300 0.1500 0.0000 WHuntngdn
120 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
123 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
132 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
140 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
141 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
145 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
152 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
153 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
174 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
176 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
178 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
179 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
180 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
181 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
183 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
184 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
195 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
196 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
201 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
204 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
206 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
208 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table B.80
Power flow condition setting data (Part 5)
Node V magnitude PG QG PL QL QC Name
210 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
212 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
215 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
218 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
219 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
224 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
225 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
226 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
227 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
231 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
232 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
234 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
236 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
240 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
242 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
246 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
249 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
254 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
255 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
256 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
259 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
261 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
262 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
265 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
266 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
269 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
270 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
272 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
273 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
274 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
276 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
277 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
280 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
285 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
287 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
325
Table B.81
Power flow condition setting data (Part 6)
Node V magnitude PG QG PL QL QC Name
289 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
290 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
291 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
292 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
299 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
301 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
304 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
306 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
308 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
310 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
312 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
315 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
318 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
319 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
324 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
325 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
326 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
327 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
331 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
332 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
334 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
336 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
340 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
342 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
346 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
349 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
354 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
355 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
356 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
359 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
361 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
362 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
365 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
366 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
369 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table B.82
Power flow condition setting data (Part 7)
Node V magnitude PG QG PL QL QC Name
370 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
372 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
373 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
374 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
376 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
377 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
380 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
385 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
387 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
389 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
390 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
391 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
392 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
399 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
401 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
404 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
406 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
408 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
410 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
412 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
415 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
418 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
419 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
424 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
425 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
426 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
427 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
431 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
432 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
434 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
436 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
440 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
442 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
446 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
449 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table B.83
Power flow condition setting data (Part 8)
Node V magnitude PG QG PL QL QC Name
454 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
455 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
456 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
459 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
461 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
462 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
465 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
466 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
469 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
470 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
472 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
473 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
474 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
476 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
477 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
480 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
485 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
487 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
489 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
490 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
491 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
492 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
499 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
501 0.9550 0.0000 -0.0310 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Riverside2
504 0.9980 0.0000 -0.1500 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 NCarlisle2
506 0.9900 0.0000 0.1593 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Kankakee2
508 1.0150 0.0000 0.6276 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Olive2
510 1.0500 4.5000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Breed2
512 0.9900 0.8500 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 TwnBranch2
515 0.9700 0.0000 0.0306 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 FortWayne2
518 0.9730 0.0000 0.2553 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 McKinley2
519 0.9620 0.0000 -0.0800 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Lincoln2
524 0.9920 0.0000 -0.1528 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Trenton2
525 1.0500 2.2000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 TannersCk2
526 1.0150 3.1400 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 TannersCk4
328
Table B.84
Power flow condition setting data (Part 9)
Node V magnitude PG QG PL QL QC Name
527 0.9680 0.0000 0.0283 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Madison2
531 0.9670 0.0700 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 DeerCreek2
532 0.9630 0.0000 -0.1400 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Delaware2
534 0.9840 0.0000 -0.0800 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Rockhill2
536 0.9800 0.0000 -0.0125 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Sterling2
540 0.9700 0.0000 0.2689 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 West End2
542 0.9850 0.0000 0.4100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Howard2
546 1.0050 0.1900 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 W.Lancstr2
549 1.0250 2.0400 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Philo2
554 0.9550 0.4800 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Torrey2
555 0.9520 0.0000 0.0466 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Wagenhals2
556 0.9540 0.0000 -0.0229 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Sunnyside2
559 0.9850 1.5500 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Tidd2
561 0.9950 1.6000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 W. Kammer2
562 0.9980 0.0000 0.0126 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Natrium2
565 1.0050 3.9100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Muskingum2
566 1.0500 3.9200 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Muskingum2
569 1.0350 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Sporn2
570 0.9840 0.0000 0.0966 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Portsmoth2
572 0.9800 0.0000 -0.1113 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Hillsboro2
573 0.9910 0.0000 0.0965 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Sargents2
574 0.9580 0.0000 -0.0563 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Bellefont2
576 0.9430 0.0000 0.0527 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Darrah2
577 1.0060 0.0000 0.1194 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Turner2
580 1.0400 4.7700 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Cabin Crk2
585 0.9850 0.0000 -0.0577 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 BeaverCrk2
587 1.0150 0.0400 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Pineville2
589 1.0050 6.0700 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ClinchRvr2
590 0.9850 0.0000 0.5930 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Holston2
591 0.9800 0.0000 -0.1485 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 HolstonTP2
592 0.9900 0.0000 -0.0300 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Saltville2
599 1.0100 0.0000 -0.1754 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Hinton2
600 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
603 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
604 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table B.85
Power flow condition setting data (Part 10)
Node V magnitude PG QG PL QL QC Name
605 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
607 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
610 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
611 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
612 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
613 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
616 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
700 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
703 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
704 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
705 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
707 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
710 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
711 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
712 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
713 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
716 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
800 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
803 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
804 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
805 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
807 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
810 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
811 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
812 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
813 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
816 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
900 1.0170 2.5200 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Glen Lyn2
903 1.0100 0.4000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Claytor2
904 0.9710 0.0000 0.0564 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Hancock2
905 0.9650 0.0000 -0.0800 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Roanoke2
907 0.9520 0.0000 0.0569 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Reusens2
910 0.9730 0.0000 0.0485 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Fieldale2
911 0.9800 0.3600 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Dan River2
912 0.9750 0.0000 0.4151 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Danville2
913 0.9930 0.0000 0.0632 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 DeerCk TP2
916 1.0050 0.0000 0.5132 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Kyger Crk2
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Table B.86
Generator constants with implemented generator controller (part 1)
Node AVR OEL PSS GOV GVA GMW GPF MG DG PLM Name
501 X 15.0 0.0 0.000 1.05 0.0 0.00
504 X 300.0 0.0 0.000 1.05 0.0 0.00
506 X 50.0 0.0 0.000 0.92 0.0 0.00
508 X 300.0 0.0 0.000 1.05 0.0 0.00
510 X X X 500.0 450.0 0.900 4.76 0.0 5.00
512 X X X 275.3 247.8 0.900 5.48 0.0 5.00
515 X 30.0 0.0 0.000 1.05 0.0 0.00
518 X 50.0 0.0 0.000 1.05 0.0 0.00
519 X 24.0 0.0 0.000 1.05 0.0 0.00
524 X 300.0 0.0 0.000 0.92 0.0 0.00
525 X X X 321.2 289.1 0.900 4.76 0.0 5.00
526 X X X 2294.2 2064.7 0.900 4.60 0.0 5.00
527 X 300.0 0.0 0.000 0.92 0.0 0.00
531 X X X 688.2 619.4 0.900 4.76 0.0 5.00
532 X 42.0 0.0 0.000 1.05 0.0 0.00
534 X 24.0 0.0 0.000 1.05 0.0 0.00
536 X 24.0 0.0 0.000 1.05 0.0 0.00
540 X 300.0 0.0 0.000 0.92 0.0 0.00
542 X 300.0 0.0 0.000 0.92 0.0 0.00
546 X X X 229.4 206.5 0.900 5.48 0.0 5.00
549 X X X 481.8 433.6 0.900 4.76 0.0 5.00
554 X X X 668.2 619.4 0.927 4.76 0.0 5.00
555 X 23.0 0.0 0.000 1.05 0.0 0.00
556 X 15.0 0.0 0.000 1.05 0.0 0.00
559 X X X 412.9 371.7 0.900 4.76 0.0 5.00
561 X X X 688.2 619.4 0.900 4.76 0.0 5.00
562 X 23.0 0.0 0.000 1.05 0.0 0.00
565 X X X 458.8 412.9 0.900 4.76 0.0 5.00
566 X X X 458.8 412.9 0.900 4.76 0.0 5.00
569 X X X 688.2 619.4 0.900 4.76 0.0 5.00 Swing
570 X 32.0 0.0 0.000 1.05 0.0 0.00
572 X 100.0 0.0 0.000 1.05 0.0 0.00
573 X 100.0 0.0 0.000 1.05 0.0 0.00
574 X 9.0 0.0 0.000 1.05 0.0 0.00
576 X 23.0 0.0 0.000 1.05 0.0 0.00
577 X 70.0 0.0 0.000 1.05 0.0 0.00
580 X X X 642.4 578.1 0.900 4.76 0.0 5.00
585 X 23.0 0.0 0.000 1.05 0.0 0.00
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Table B.87
Generator constants with implemented generator controller (part 2)
Node AVR OEL PSS GOV GVA GMW GPF MG DG PLM Name
587 X X X 2294.2 2064.7 0.900 4.60 0.0 5.00
589 X X X 688.2 619.4 0.900 4.76 0.0 5.00
590 X 300.0 0.0 0.000 0.92 0.0 0.00
591 X 100.0 0.0 0.000 1.05 0.0 0.00
592 X 15.0 0.0 0.000 1.05 0.0 0.00
599 X 100.0 0.0 0.000 1.05 0.0 0.00
900 X X X 355.6 320.0 0.900 4.76 0.0 5.00
903 X X X 91.8 82.6 0.900 5.48 0.0 5.00
904 X 23.0 0.0 0.000 1.05 0.0 0.00
905 X 23.0 0.0 0.000 1.05 0.0 0.00
907 X 200.0 0.0 0.000 1.05 0.0 0.00
910 X 23.0 0.0 0.000 1.05 0.0 0.00
911 X X X 2294.2 2064.7 0.900 4.60 0.0 5.00
912 X 1000.0 0.0 0.000 0.89 0.0 0.00
913 X 200.0 0.0 0.000 0.92 0.0 0.00










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Initial condition of synchronous generator and condenser (part 1)
Node AGG VT PG QG TQG EF CF CDD CQQ FGD FGQ
1 -19.13 0.9550 0.0000 -0.2029 0.0001 0.5938 0.5938 -0.2125 0.0001 0.9072 -0.0002
2 -14.54 0.9980 0.0000 -0.0426 0.0000 0.9254 0.9254 -0.0427 0.0000 0.9884 0.0000
3 -16.86 0.9900 0.0000 0.3254 0.0002 1.5488 1.5488 0.3287 0.0001 1.0640 -0.0002
4 -8.90 1.0150 0.0000 0.1890 0.0001 1.3316 1.3316 0.1862 0.0000 1.0569 -0.0001
5 64.58 1.0500 0.9000 -0.1025 0.9012 1.7052 1.7052 0.6818 0.5285 0.6995 -0.7796
6 1.07 0.9900 0.3088 0.3330 0.3091 1.6496 1.6496 0.4187 0.1874 1.0321 -0.2764
7 -18.81 0.9700 0.0000 0.2657 0.0001 1.4356 1.4356 0.2739 0.0001 1.0316 -0.0001
8 -18.52 0.9730 0.0000 0.5801 0.0006 1.9866 1.9866 0.5962 0.0003 1.1071 -0.0004
9 160.40 0.9620 0.0000 -0.5963 0.0006 0.0917 0.0917 0.6198 0.0069 -0.8225 -0.0102
10 -9.03 0.9920 0.0000 -0.0499 0.0000 0.9064 0.9064 -0.0503 0.0000 0.9807 0.0000
11 38.14 1.0500 0.6849 0.1625 0.6857 1.7194 1.7194 0.5389 0.3988 0.9245 -0.5882
12 12.59 1.0150 0.1369 0.0029 0.1369 1.0456 1.0456 0.0324 0.1309 0.9978 -0.1931
13 -14.58 0.9680 0.0000 0.0121 0.0000 0.9893 0.9893 0.0125 0.0000 0.9708 0.0000
14 -16.24 0.9670 0.0102 0.0476 0.0102 1.0508 1.0508 0.0494 0.0097 0.9780 -0.0143
15 -14.99 0.9630 0.0000 -0.3898 0.0003 0.2748 0.2748 -0.4048 0.0010 0.8719 -0.0015
16 160.73 0.9840 0.0000 -0.6830 0.0008 0.1960 0.1960 0.6941 0.0041 -0.8278 -0.0060
17 -19.41 0.9800 0.0000 0.3510 0.0002 1.5888 1.5888 0.3581 0.0001 1.0606 -0.0002
18 -22.89 0.9700 0.0000 0.0959 0.0000 1.1380 1.1380 0.0988 0.0000 0.9922 0.0000
19 -21.66 0.9850 0.0000 0.1365 0.0000 1.2205 1.2205 0.1386 0.0000 1.0162 0.0000
20 -3.43 1.0050 0.0828 -0.0214 0.0828 0.9790 0.9790 -0.0093 0.0846 0.9927 -0.1248
21 16.95 1.0250 0.4234 0.2431 0.4238 1.5919 1.5919 0.3950 0.2662 1.0093 -0.3927
22 -7.38 0.9550 0.0718 0.0055 0.0718 0.9733 0.9733 0.0156 0.0738 0.9503 -0.1089
23 -15.24 0.9520 0.0000 0.2006 0.0001 1.3102 1.3102 0.2107 0.0001 0.9994 -0.0001
24 -15.01 0.9540 0.0000 -0.1625 0.0000 0.6645 0.6645 -0.1703 0.0001 0.9157 -0.0001
25 15.23 0.9850 0.3754 0.1946 0.3757 1.4716 1.4716 0.3451 0.2553 0.9626 -0.3766
26 17.93 0.9950 0.2325 -0.0610 0.2326 0.9758 0.9758 0.0392 0.2384 0.9180 -0.3516
27 -6.72 0.9980 0.0000 0.0518 0.0000 1.0862 1.0862 0.0519 0.0000 1.0097 0.0000
28 46.77 1.0050 0.8522 0.1394 0.8534 1.9028 1.9028 0.7329 0.4485 0.8217 -0.6616
29 49.45 1.0500 0.8544 0.0152 0.8555 1.7525 1.7525 0.6512 0.4882 0.7920 -0.7200
30 54.74 1.0350 0.7470 -0.1027 0.7479 1.5028 1.5028 0.5320 0.4977 0.7180 -0.7340
31 -7.44 0.9840 0.0000 0.3031 0.0002 1.5076 1.5076 0.3080 0.0001 1.0533 -0.0002
32 -8.97 0.9800 0.0000 -0.1114 0.0000 0.7867 0.7867 -0.1137 0.0000 0.9544 0.0000
33 -8.06 0.9910 0.0000 0.0966 0.0000 1.1567 1.1567 0.0975 0.0000 1.0129 0.0000
34 171.28 0.9580 0.0000 -0.6378 0.0007 0.1739 0.1739 0.6658 0.0042 -0.8082 -0.0062
35 -8.25 0.9430 0.0000 0.2244 0.0001 1.3475 1.3475 0.2379 0.0001 0.9965 -0.0001
36 -3.32 1.0060 0.0000 0.1723 0.0000 1.2972 1.2972 0.1713 0.0000 1.0445 -0.0001
37 41.43 1.0400 0.7425 0.1727 0.7434 1.7956 1.7956 0.6049 0.4140 0.9034 -0.6107
38 2.53 0.9850 0.0000 -0.2469 0.0001 0.5588 0.5588 -0.2507 0.0002 0.9286 -0.0003
39 1.54 1.0150 0.0017 0.0048 0.0017 1.0231 1.0231 0.0047 0.0017 1.0161 -0.0025
40 66.04 1.0050 0.8820 -0.0083 0.8833 1.7919 1.7919 0.7262 0.4929 0.7208 -0.7271
41 3.26 0.9850 0.0000 0.1972 0.0001 1.3254 1.3254 0.2002 0.0001 1.0300 -0.0001
42 3.30 0.9800 0.0000 -0.1310 0.0000 0.7528 0.7528 -0.1336 0.0000 0.9499 -0.0001
43 -176.34 0.9900 0.0000 -0.9357 0.0015 0.6167 0.6167 0.9451 0.0024 -0.7773 -0.0035
44 -2.98 1.0100 0.0000 -0.1758 0.0001 0.7141 0.7141 -0.1740 0.0001 0.9708 -0.0001
45 36.88 1.0170 0.7087 0.2691 0.7096 1.8860 1.8860 0.6434 0.3762 0.9370 -0.5549
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Table B.91
Initial condition of synchronous generator and condenser (part 2)
Node AGG VT PG QG TQG EF CF CDD CQQ FGD FGQ
46 11.25 1.0100 0.4357 0.8225 0.4371 2.5045 2.5045 0.9049 0.1745 1.1698 -0.2575
47 -8.32 0.9710 0.0000 0.0992 0.0000 1.1446 1.1446 0.1021 0.0000 0.9940 0.0000
48 170.41 0.9650 0.0000 -0.8010 0.0011 0.4461 0.4461 0.8301 0.0026 -0.7782 -0.0038
49 -12.47 0.9520 0.0000 0.0325 0.0000 1.0100 1.0100 0.0341 0.0000 0.9597 0.0000
50 -11.91 0.9730 0.0000 0.0104 0.0000 0.9911 0.9911 0.0106 0.0000 0.9754 0.0000
51 -8.67 0.9800 0.0157 -0.0008 0.0157 0.9790 0.9790 -0.0004 0.0160 0.9796 -0.0236
52 -15.01 0.9750 0.0000 0.0415 0.0000 1.0473 1.0473 0.0426 0.0000 0.9846 0.0000
53 -16.26 0.9930 0.0000 0.0387 0.0000 1.0593 1.0593 0.0390 0.0000 1.0018 0.0000
54 -3.07 1.0050 0.0000 0.0376 0.0000 1.0686 1.0686 0.0374 0.0000 1.0134 0.0000
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